The once-core business is in a slump, and profits have turned to losses; times are tough for the internet medical aesthetics platform So Young. In recent years, So Young's declining performance is closely tied to the persistent weakness of its former core business—information and booking services. In 2024, revenue from this business plummeted by 19.3% year-over-year. By 2025, revenue from this segment had already declined year-over-year for three consecutive quarters, with Q1-Q3 drops of 34.1%, 35.6%, and 34.5%, respectively.
Plagued by growth anxiety, So Young Technology has continuously attempted to explore new businesses to stabilize growth. From medical aesthetic laser equipment to exclusive代理 agreements for hyaluronic acid products, and even opening its own medical aesthetic institutions, the company has been relentlessly extending into the mid-to-upper reaches of the industry chain, significantly increasing its asset-heavy operations. The latest financial report reveals that the expansion into beauty treatment services has brought a structural shift to So Young's performance. In the third quarter of 2025, So Young's overall revenue remained largely flat compared to the same period last year. However, revenue from its beauty treatment services (i.e., the light medical aesthetics chain business) surged by 305% year-over-year to 184 million yuan, accounting for approximately 47.5% of total revenue.
Nevertheless, the revenue growth in medical aesthetic services has largely been achieved through "price-breaking" strategies and a low base effect. "Low prices" have been the core weapon for So Young's self-operated clinics to rapidly penetrate the market, yet this strategy inherently carries multiple risks that pose a significant threat to the company's sustainable profitability. Furthermore, So Young's aggressive pricing tactics have directly undermined the price systems painstakingly maintained by upstream manufacturers, leading to ruptured relationships with several major suppliers. The company has been placed on "non-official cooperation" lists by some manufacturers and has even faced supply cuts from others.
The core business continues its sluggish performance, with Q3 information and booking service revenue down 34.5%. Have repeated transformation attempts instead dragged down performance, leaving medical aesthetic services to shoulder the burden? In May 2019, So Young listed on the NASDAQ, becoming the first publicly traded stock among internet medical aesthetics service platforms. In recent years, impacted by factors such as intensifying industry competition and reduced willingness of medical aesthetic institutions to pay for services, So Young's performance has been far from optimistic. In 2024, So Young experienced a double decline in performance, achieving total revenue of 1.467 billion yuan, down 2.1% year-over-year; meanwhile, net loss attributable to shareholders skyrocketed to 587 million yuan, hitting a four-year high. Behind these figures lies a triple threat: core business contraction, soaring transformation costs, and the blow-up of historical investments.
Firstly, the core business is shrinking, meaning the information and booking service segment—So Young's foundational business—has suffered a cliff-like decline. As an internet medical aesthetics platform, So Young operates between medical aesthetic institutions and end-market consumers, primarily generating revenue from information services and booking services. Simply put, this involves advertising fees extracted from medical aesthetic merchants and commissions taken from medical aesthetic transactions. Specifically, booking fees are commissions So Young earns when consumers book medical aesthetic procedures and products through its platform; information service fees refer to advertising fees paid to So Young by medical aesthetic institutions and product providers listed on its platform.
In 2024, revenue from So Young's core information and booking services sharply decreased by 19.3% year-over-year to 929 million yuan, with its contribution to total revenue plummeting from 76.8% in 2023 to 63.4%. Entering 2025, this segment's performance remained weak. In Q1-Q3 of 2025, revenue from So Young's information and booking services was 143 million yuan, 135 million yuan, and 117 million yuan respectively, representing year-over-year declines of 34.1%, 35.6%, and 34.5%.
This decline stems directly from three major structural issues: (1) Declining efficiency in converting platform traffic, leading to reduced willingness among medical aesthetic institutions to pay; (2) Deteriorating competitive landscape within the industry, with content platforms like Douyin and Xiaohongshu diverting customer resources, thereby diluting the value of the traditional intermediary model; (3) As the company itself began opening "Youth Clinics," it created competition with the medical aesthetic institutions on its platform, leading to a loss of partner institutions and accelerating the contraction of the traditional core business.
From operational data, So Young's quarterly mobile MAUs, the number of users paying booking fees per quarter, and the number of paying medical institutions on the platform have all shown a downward trend. So Young has also mentioned in its financial reports that the decline in information and booking service revenue is primarily due to a reduction in the number of medical service providers subscribing to information services.
Faced with a declining core business against the backdrop of fading traffic dividends and intensified competition in the medical aesthetics industry, So Young embarked on a series of business diversification attempts to break through the ceiling of the traditional platform model. For instance, in 2021, So Young spent 790 million yuan to acquire Wuhan Qizhi Laser, moving into equipment R&D; in 2022, it secured exclusive distribution rights for the "ELASTY® Lumilax" hyaluronic acid; in 2023, it partnered with companies like Xihong Pharmaceutical and Aotaikang to launch products such as hydrating injections, "youth-preserving" injections, and hyaluronic acid.
However, business diversification has not helped So Young reverse its performance decline; instead, it has dragged down the company's profitability. Wuhan Qizhi Laser's revenue saw a mere 0.3% year-over-year increase in 2024, while its net profit attributable to shareholders plunged by 38.81%. Notably, the subsidiary's contract liabilities fell by 15.72% compared to the previous year, and revenue from its core product, light therapy equipment, decreased by 8.51%. In 2024, So Young recorded a one-time goodwill impairment charge of 540 million yuan for its subsidiary Wuhan Qizhi Laser, which was the main reason for the company's massive loss.
Under these circumstances, in November 2024, So Young announced the launch of a new light medical aesthetics chain brand, "So Young Youth Clinic," aiming to provide consumers with "consistent quality," "affordable," and "accessible" medical aesthetic anti-aging solutions, helping Chinese consumers achieve "medical aesthetics freedom." With this strategy of acting as both referee and player, how has So Young's operational performance fared in 2025?
A massive shift in revenue structure and worsening losses: relying on low-price customer acquisition for a difficult transformation, yet being "blacklisted" by upstream suppliers. The latest financial report indicates that So Young's offline self-operated medical aesthetic services have undeniably become its new growth engine, with revenue achieving multi-fold growth for several consecutive quarters. Historically, this segment has now replaced the traditional online platform business as the company's largest revenue source. This strategic pivot is interpreted by the market as a "last-ditch effort" following the depletion of internet platform traffic dividends.
The barrier to entry into the midstream of the medical aesthetics industry chain is relatively low, but it faces challenges including a fragmented competitive landscape, severe profit margin compression from both upstream and downstream players, and high customer acquisition costs. By opening its own medical aesthetic institutions, So Young seems to have found a compelling narrative. Currently, So Young's light medical aesthetics chain business is in its start-up phase, rapidly expanding its store network, showing impressive growth rates.
In the first quarter of 2025, revenue from So Young's self-operated medical aesthetic services surged by over 290% year-over-year. In the second quarter, the year-over-year growth rate further expanded to approximately 350%, and for the first time, quarterly revenue from this segment surpassed that of the traditional online information and booking services, marking a complete shift in the company's primary business pillar. By the third quarter, revenue from this business continued its growth trajectory, increasing over 300% year-over-year to reach 183.6 million yuan, solidifying its position as the company's number one revenue source.
This growth stems directly from So Young's heavy bets on the offline sector. The company is rapidly expanding its offline service network through large-scale new store openings and acquisitions of existing institutions. These self-operated clinics promote transparent, standardized light medical aesthetic services and have rapidly gained market recognition through their highly disruptive low-price strategy, attracting a large number of price-sensitive consumers.
For example, in April 2025, So Young launched "Miracle Youthful Face 1.0," pricing Puli Yan's "youth-preserving" injection at 4,999 yuan per syringe, compared to the manufacturer's suggested retail price of 16,800 yuan. In June 2025, So Young introduced "Miracle Youthful Face 2.0" priced at 5,999 yuan, utilizing Aierlan from Sinobroma, which has a market average price of around 18,800 yuan. In September 2025, So Young collaborated with Xihong Biology to launch a customized "Suti Yan" (Miracle Youthful Face 3.0), pushing the price down to 2,999 yuan per syringe, and further introduced a group-buying version for just 949 yuan per syringe.
"Low price" is the core weapon for So Young's self-operated clinics to quickly capture the market, but this strategy itself harbors multiple risks that pose a significant threat to the company's sustainable profitability.
Firstly, So Young's low-price strategy has directly shattered the price systems meticulously maintained by upstream manufacturers, leading to ruptured relationships with several major suppliers and placement on "non-official cooperation" lists. For instance, Sinobroma issued a statement accusing So Young of "procuring through unauthorized channels" and listed over 20 So Young Youth Clinics as non-official partners; Puli Yan, in November, published a list questioning the product sources and physician qualifications of clinics under So Young; Feiman Biology also stated it had stopped supplying its "Fuman" product to So Young. This confrontation not only potentially affects the stable supply of high-quality products in the future but also positions So Young against the interests of the entire traditional industry alliance.
Secondly, the current "trading price for volume" strategy essentially involves exchanging losses for market share and user growth. With average spending per customer being drastically compressed, while rigid costs such as rent, labor, and compliance remain high, the gross margin per store and for the overall business is under pressure. If long-term low-price subsidies cannot successfully transition to a stable profit model, growth will be unsustainable. In the third quarter of 2025, the company's net profit shifted from a profit in the same period last year to a loss exceeding 60 million yuan.
Finally, So Young's initial model chose a light-asset approach, earning primarily from institutions' advertising spending. However, operating medical aesthetic institutions is a heavy-asset business requiring substantial upfront investment. With the core business revenue declining and net profits in the red, large-scale offline expansion could subject the company to significant funding pressure.
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