A recent grassroots investigation into new retail and dining formats reveals a starkly authentic business reality unfolding not in boardrooms, but directly on the streets of Fuzhou's alleys, Changsha's intersections, Jinan's commercial districts, and Shenyang's communities. The deeper one looks into these markets, the clearer this picture becomes.
This is the first article in a series documenting these observations, focusing on the value-for-money snack store sector.
An initial public offering does not represent the climax for a single company; rather, it serves as a ceiling signal for the entire industry. On January 28, 2026, BUSYMING (01768.HK) was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. While media celebrated the birth of the "first value-for-money snack stock," treating it as a pinnacle moment—a market validation for one enterprise—a different narrative emerges from the storefronts of regional brands like Dai Yong Hong. From this vantage point, the listing appears less a corporate celebration and more like a final gavel strike for the industry, definitively capping the growth potential of the entire sector.
Why a "ceiling"? This business model does not follow the conventional script where the market leader's IPO paves the way for the second and third players to follow suit. The underlying logic of value-for-money snacks is more akin to "piling earth to form a mountain." Once scale reaches a critical threshold, the scale itself becomes an insurmountable moat. Therefore, BUSYMING's listing not only grants it a financing ticket but also declares the endgame of the "scale competition."
With a store count now exceeding 20,000, BUSYMING's scale is undeniable. For other top-ten industry players, especially regional ones, the pressing question is no longer whether to try harder, but whether continuing on the same path holds any meaning when faced with the procurement reach and bargaining power of a 20,000-store behemoth.
The most brutal rule in the value-for-money snack business is this: the more you lower your prices, the more you advertise for the market leader. Superficially, this business is about being "cheap." In essence, it operates on a three-step chain reaction: 1) Larger scale enables lower purchase prices and stronger product customization rights; 2) Lower prices easily cement a "lowest-price perception" in consumers' minds; 3) Once this perception is established, every price cut by a competitor inadvertently reinforces the leader's position. This creates a counterintuitive situation where regional brands, by desperately matching prices, only train consumers to believe that the absolute lowest price belongs solely to the dominant player.
This is why BUSYMING's listing signals more than just financing capability; it's a starker indicator that competitors must find new paths to survive. Many perceive "ten thousand stores" as the finish line. However, observations suggest the potential for China's top value-for-money snack brand is at least 100,000 stores. The current "ten-thousand-store" mark merely signifies the initial formation of the market structure. Once scale surpasses the critical point, the dividing line shifts from "who works harder" to three dimensions of overwhelming advantage:
1. From "Cost Saving" to "Pricing Power": A 20,000-store level means you are not just buying goods; you are redefining them. Basic items are used to break price barriers, customized items supplement profit margins, and private-label products reshape the shelf. Consumers see "cheap," while competitors feel the "landscape has changed." 2. From "Promotions" to "Mindset Monopoly": BUSYMING has turned "saving money" into a public consensus. Not shopping there makes consumers feel they are "losing out." When "paying more = being cheated" becomes the default narrative, local brands' claims of "understanding local tastes better" become weak justifications. 3. From "Expansion" to "Inertia": Post-IPO store openings are driven by a systemic, algorithm-powered inertia. The frontline only advances; it never retreats.
In this emerging duopoly landscape, latecomers chasing on the same path are not just slightly slower; they are fundamentally mistaken in their direction.
Brands like Dai Yong Hong are not losing due to scale, price, or even speed, but because they are following an outdated "era script." As a pioneer in Hunan's local snack scene, Dai Yong Hong succeeded in the pre-scale era through community density, repeat business from familiar customers, and understanding local tastes. The current predicament is that Dai Yong Hong solves "understanding you better," while BUSYMING solves "cheaper and more reliable." In the value-for-money context, where reliability becomes the primary demand, "understanding you" transforms into an expensive premium. The more a brand explains this, the faster it loses customers. This is not a failure of execution by Dai Yong Hong, but a case of bringing the right answer from the pre-scale era into the post-scale era's examination hall.
To survive alongside giants, regional players must not flee but change course. "Continuing to match prices" is not a strategy; it's merely a delay tactic. To survive, regional companies must exit the scale competition and move into areas where scale is weak or unwilling to operate. This can be summarized as three new paths, each requiring a fundamental capability upgrade:
Path One: Transform from a "Snack Store" to a "City-Level Curator." Stop competing on national lowest prices and start competing on being the best local selector. Shift the shelf focus from "more savings" to "more local": regional flavors, city memories, limited combinations, and recommendations from trusted local sources. Scale can buy generic products, but it struggles to buy "taste landmarks."
Path Two: Retreat to "Short-Shelf-Life, Freshly Made" Items, Operating in Scale's Blind Spots. Scale models inherently prefer standardization, high turnover, and easy replication. Conversely, short-shelf-life items, freshly made products, and in-store partnerships with local bakeries, marinated food shops, or hot food vendors are troublesome, fragmented, and difficult to replicate. Their advantage is that they feel "more like life, less like price comparison."
Path Three: Acknowledge Boundaries, Become a Long-Term Company for One City. Not every company must go national. The best outcome for some brands is to become the store in a city "where you've eaten since childhood." In the age of giants, a more dignified approach for regional companies is to turn their boundaries into moats: deeper community relationships, stronger service stickiness, and more stable repeat-purchase scenarios.
Why Hunan? Why does this region consistently breed such business models? Hunan acts as a natural testing ground, where new consumption is not a concept but a daily reality on every street. Three factors explain this: 1. High Frequency: Snacking is not an "occasional treat" but more like "daily sustenance." High frequency enables viable chains, buildable density, and a pressurable supply chain. 2. Street-Level Store Density: Community street shops possess stronger vitality, making "opening near home" a highly replicable model. 3. Willingness to Scale: From single stores to chains, from small businesses to large operations, people here are familiar with scale, explaining why major industry players emerge from this region.
The story extends beyond value-for-money snacks. After BUSYMING's listing, what truly changes is not just the store density on a few streets, but the industry's "default script": the path of pure scale has essentially been exhausted. The task for brands like Dai Yong Hong is not to prove they can also go national, but to answer this strategic-level question: In an era where scale itself is a barrier, what do I possess that scale cannot buy?
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