Tianhong Fund's Second Largest Shareholder Auctions Off Equity Stake

Deep News10-26

On September 24, information published on the Beijing Public Resource Trading Service Platform, based on Tianjin Equity Exchange data, showed that a 4.99% stake in Tianhong Fund was listed for transfer once again, with a floor price of 1.4106874 billion yuan and a listing period of five working days.

This is not the first time the stake has appeared on the property rights market. On August 3, the stake was listed for the first time with an initial floor price of 1.567 billion yuan, with information disclosure running until August 31. After more than a month without a buyer, the second listing saw the floor price discounted by nearly 10%, and the listing period was also significantly shortened.

This equity transaction is not merely a transfer of property rights; it also provides an important window for the market to reassess the long-term value of Tianhong Fund. As a leading institution in China's public fund industry, Tianhong Fund once rose rapidly on the back of Yu'e Bao and expanded its product lineup by leveraging a massive user base.

However, as money market fund yields have continued to decline, the growth dividend from a single blockbuster product has gradually faded. Financial performance has also revealed new pressures. In the first half of 2026, the company's operating revenue grew only 0.63% year on year, while net profit fell 2.32% year on year.

Looking at comparable periods, the company's net profit has declined for two consecutive years: 936 million yuan in the first half of 2024, 917 million yuan in the same period of 2025, and further down to 896 million yuan in the first half of 2026. For a fund company whose assets under management exceed one trillion yuan, whether its scale advantage can continue to translate into profit growth has become an important dimension for assessing its development quality.

When Yu'e Bao's seven-day annualized yield falls below 1% and the profit growth of a trillion-yuan fund company shows signs of fatigue, how much this equity stake is actually worth becomes more than just a question of transaction price. It points more directly to Tianhong Fund's core question: beyond Yu'e Bao, where is the new growth space?

Valuation Behind the 1.4 Billion Yuan Equity Stake

Based on the floor price of 1.4106874 billion yuan for the 4.99% stake, Tianhong Fund's implied overall valuation is approximately 28.27 billion yuan. Compared with the approximately 31.4 billion yuan valuation implied by the initial floor price of 1.567 billion yuan in August, the company's overall valuation has been revised down by more than 3.1 billion yuan in just over a month.

The seller this time is Tianjin Trust, the second largest shareholder of Tianhong Fund. Before this transaction, Tianjin Trust held a 16.8% stake in Tianhong Fund; if the 4.99% stake is successfully sold, its shareholding will drop to 11.81%. The listing documents also disclosed that existing shareholders such as Ant Group and Inner Mongolia Junzheng have waived their right of first refusal, meaning the stake will be open to external investors through public bidding, with the market setting the price independently.

The motivation behind Tianjin Trust's reduction is not difficult to understand. Although Tianhong Fund is extremely important to Tianjin Trust—in 2025, Tianhong Fund contributed 317 million yuan in investment income, accounting for 63% of Tianjin Trust's full-year net profit of 506 million yuan—Tianjin Trust's own operations are not optimistic: in the same year, its trust asset scale grew from 266.5 billion yuan to 516 billion yuan, yet both operating revenue and net profit declined, and it recorded 474 million yuan in credit impairment losses for the full year. Against the backdrop of scale expansion failing to drive profit growth and credit risk continuing to erode performance, transferring part of its high-quality equity to recover funds may help ease liquidity pressure and also aligns with the trust industry's trend of returning to its origins and optimizing asset allocation.

What is difficult to explain is why no institution is willing to take over. From an operating data perspective, Tianhong Fund's profitability is not weak. In 2025, Tianhong Fund's operating revenue was 5.746 billion yuan and net profit was 1.885 billion yuan. Based on the September floor price, its valuation is about 15 times its 2025 net profit. On this metric alone, the valuation is not high.

But valuation cannot be based only on how much money was made in the past; it also depends on whether future profits can continue. In the first half of 2026, Tianhong Fund's operating revenue was 2.798 billion yuan, up 0.63% year on year; net profit was 896 million yuan, down 2.32% year on year. Compared with 936 million yuan in the first half of 2024 and 917 million yuan in the first half of 2025, the company's net profit has declined for two consecutive comparable periods.

Peer comparisons also reveal the gap. According to public reports, among trillion-yuan public fund institutions that have disclosed relevant interim data, Tianhong is the only one whose net profit declined year on year, while Fullgoal Fund saw net profit rise 24% year on year and China Universal rose 90% year on year. With trillion-yuan scale but profits continuously falling behind within the top tier, weak business growth will inevitably have some impact on its valuation.

Profit pressure is closely related to the revenue structure. According to Choice data, as of the end of the second quarter of 2026, Tianhong's assets under management were about 1.29 trillion yuan, of which money market funds totaled 741.889 billion yuan. Yu'e Bao alone reached about 679.9 billion yuan, accounting for 52.7% of total scale. In the first half of 2026, Tianhong Fund's management fee income was about 2.044 billion yuan, but Yu'e Bao alone contributed 1.064 billion yuan, accounting for 52.05% of total management fee income.

Whether in total management scale or management fee income, Yu'e Bao remains Tianhong's core pillar. But Yu'e Bao is not faring well: currently Tianhong Yu'e Bao's seven-day annualized yield has fallen below 1%, with income per 10,000 units at only about 0.23 yuan; and its scale has dropped from a peak of nearly 1.7 trillion yuan in 2018 to about 679.9 billion yuan at the end of the second quarter of 2026. The shrinking scale and declining yield of its flagship product directly suppress the company's overall profit ceiling.

At the same time, channel maintenance costs are also rising. In the first half of 2026, Tianhong Fund's customer maintenance fees were 367 million yuan, up about 23.8% year on year, and their share of management fee income rose from 14.75% in the same period last year to 17.98%. With limited growth in management fee income, customer maintenance fees growing faster means the revenue space available to cover other operating costs and generate profit is being squeezed.

Therefore, what the market really cares about is not just how much revenue Yu'e Bao can currently contribute, but whether Tianhong can gradually reduce its dependence on a single product and build a stable second growth curve with profitability.

The Transformation Curve Remains to Be Validated

Beyond Yu'e Bao, Tianhong has not been without attempts. Even before Yu'e Bao exploded in popularity, fixed income was Tianhong's traditional base. In 2010, the company issued China's first A/B separately raised graded bond fund, the Tianhong Tianli Bond Fund, and in 2012 launched fixed income products such as Tianhong Ankang Yiyang. However, bond funds never grew into a mainstay of scale.

In 2015, Tianhong Fund topped the industry with 673.9 billion yuan in scale, with money market funds accounting for as much as 95%, and Yu'e Bao alone accounting for 92%. Money market fund management fees are inherently low, and Yu'e Bao also needs to pay sales service fees and technical service fees to Ant Group. This has meant that although Tianhong leads the industry in scale and revenue, its profit level has not simultaneously risen to the top.

In 2015, Tianhong's operating revenue was 5.122 billion yuan and net profit was 1.125 billion yuan, ranking behind China AMC, ICBC Credit Suisse, E Fund, and Fullgoal. In the same period, China AMC's net profit was 1.414 billion yuan.

It was also at this stage that Tianhong began actively seeking business breakthroughs, extending its product line from fixed income to equity and index products in an attempt to reduce its single dependence on money market funds. In early 2015, the Tianhong Fund Taobao store launched, and soon after it introduced the "Rongyibao" series of index funds, covering broad-based, sector, and thematic directions, with the product line once expanding to 19 funds. Tianhong positioned it as an "advanced service for Yu'e Bao," and its approach was direct: entering the market with low fees, with some products charging only half the management fee of peers, aiming to capture demand spilling over from money market funds with low costs.

In the early days after "Rongyibao" launched, market enthusiasm was high, with single-day sales once exceeding 200 million yuan. But the good times did not last. After the sharp adjustment in the A-share market in 2018, the scale of multiple funds in the series continued to shrink, and many products eventually moved toward liquidation.

After that, Tianhong did not abandon the indexing direction. In 2019, the company made its first ETF layout, and from 2020 to 2021 it continued issuing broad-based and sector index products, gradually increasing the scale of its index business. In 2022, index fund scale exceeded 88 billion yuan, but within the company's trillion-yuan overall portfolio, the index segment still accounted for a limited share and was not yet enough to hedge money market fund volatility.

The real acceleration came in recent years. At the end of 2023, Gao Yang became general manager of Tianhong Fund and proposed expanding the company from a single money market fund advantage toward comprehensive asset management. Since then, Tianhong has successively brought in professionals in equity, indexing, and fixed income to strengthen its investment research team. In 2025, the company's index product issuance further accelerated: 33 new funds were launched during the year, 25 of which were index funds. By the end of that year, Tianhong's index fund scale was close to 200 billion yuan, an increase of nearly 63.2 billion yuan year on year; by the end of the second quarter of 2026 it had further grown to 224.2 billion yuan, making the index business an important segment beyond Yu'e Bao.

In terms of non-money-market scale, transformation has also made some progress. Based on statistics excluding the market value of ETF feeder funds, Tianhong's non-money-market scale in the first half of 2026 was about 482.4 billion yuan, accounting for about 39% of total public fund scale and ranking 15th in the industry. Compared with about 44.8 billion yuan in the same period of 2019, a 3.72% share, and a 38th-place industry ranking, non-money-market scale has grown more than tenfold in seven years, and the business structure has clearly improved.

Tianhong's transformation has taken a step forward, but the company's underlying structure has not yet been completely changed. First, index funds have taken on the main role in expansion, but they currently account for less than 20% of total scale, and their management fee rates are concentrated in the low range of 0.15% to 0.50%, so the incremental management fee income corresponding to scaling up is limited. Second, active equity remains an obvious weak spot, with scale of only about 23.56 billion yuan at the end of the second quarter of 2026, accounting for 1.83% of total scale, and it has hardly formed effective supply in a business line priced by investment research capability. In addition, although the company's QDII business ranks high in the industry, its overall volume is relatively small, with current scale of only 36.15 billion yuan, insufficient to hedge the gap left by declining money market fund profits.

In short, the current expansion of the company's non-money-market scale is more of a "low-fee, low-profit-elasticity" growth. This explains why Tianhong's "second curve" has not yet been fully reflected in the equity transaction valuation. For financial investors, scale is only the operating foundation; sustained profit and cash returns are the important basis for measuring investment value. At this stage, although Tianhong's non-money-market business has achieved relatively rapid growth, whether it can further translate into stable management fee income and profit remains to be seen.

Ultimately, what Tianhong needs to do is not simply expand its product list, but build a set of business combinations that can continuously contribute revenue, remain competitive, and have reasonable profit space. Scale growth is only the first step after scaling up. For Tianhong Fund, the real test is whether these newly added products can settle into stable scale and then translate into sustained management fee income and investor returns.

From the issuance side, Tianhong has launched products in batches in recent years, but some products have weak retention capacity. According to Choice data, since 2024 the company has established 103 new products (calculated with different share classes combined, leaving 102 after excluding liquidations), of which 30 had latest scale below 50 million yuan, accounting for nearly 30%. In the index fund track, the main force of expansion, of the 65 index products established since 2024, 15 saw latest scale shrink by more than 50% from their launch size.

Some products have seen particularly obvious scale contraction. As of the end of June 2026, A100ETF Tianhong fell from an initial 507 million yuan to 12 million yuan, a shrinkage of 97.7%; Tianhong SSE 180 ETF dropped from 549 million yuan to 39 million yuan, a shrinkage of 92.9%; in addition, products such as the FTSE Free Cash Flow Index, Hang Seng Dividend Low Volatility Index, and CSI 300 Index Quantitative all saw scale shrink by more than 90%.

Scale shrinkage will further affect product survival. In recent years, multiple products under Tianhong Fund have faced liquidation or winding-up pressure. In February 2026, Tianhong Wenxing Bond triggered the automatic liquidation conditions stipulated in its contract because its net asset value was below 50 million yuan for 50 consecutive working days. It is worth noting that the fund was established in June 2025, had existed for less than one year, and had scale of only about 7 million yuan at liquidation; in July of the same year, two initiated FOFs, Tianhong Retirement Target Date 2045 Five-Year Holding and Tianhong Yongfeng Balanced Retirement Target Three-Year Holding, triggered automatic contract termination clauses on the same day because their net asset value had never reached the 200 million yuan survival threshold after three full years since establishment, with net assets at liquidation of only about 16.21 million yuan and 13.31 million yuan, respectively.

In addition, funds such as Tianhong Jiangxin Zhenxuan Mixed and Tianhong Emerging Industry Mixed have long hovered below the 50 million yuan red line and face liquidation risk. Behind the loss of product scale, investment returns are also worth noting. In the first half of 2026, funds under Tianhong Fund generated a combined profit of 16.136 billion yuan, but overall profitability does not mean all investors achieved positive returns. By type, equity funds profited 13.968 billion yuan, index funds profited 13.154 billion yuan, mixed funds lost 363 million yuan, and QDII business lost more than 4 billion yuan, showing very clear performance divergence.

Looking at specific products, as of October 20, 2026, Tianhong had a total of 277 funds (counting only initial share classes), of which 78 had negative returns since inception, including 54 index funds. The performance of newly issued products is also not optimistic: of the 42 new funds established since 2026, 34 have suffered losses so far, accounting for about 81%.

In addition to scale and returns, compliance is also testing the company's operating quality. In June 2026, Tianhong Fund was given a warning and fined 40,000 yuan by the Tianjin branch of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange for failing to submit financial accounting reports, statistical statements, and other materials as required. Although the amount is not large, for a leading public fund manager with more than one trillion yuan in assets under management, such basic compliance issues expose room for improvement in internal control processes. As business lines such as QDII, indexing, fixed income, and FOF continue to expand, the number of products and the complexity of cross-border data and cross-institution collaboration rise, and compliance, risk control, and operational capabilities must keep pace; otherwise, the larger the scale, the stronger the management friction may become.

Yu'e Bao once helped Tianhong Fund quickly establish a scale advantage, but in the next stage, scale alone is no longer enough to answer the growth question. Only when businesses such as indexing, active equity, and fixed income form a more balanced revenue structure and translate scale expansion into sustainable profit growth can Tianhong truly escape its dependence on a single blockbuster product. This is both the key to the company's transformation and an unavoidable question for the market when assessing the value of its equity.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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