When looking at the three major players in the shared bicycle industry, Meituan and DiDi Global Inc. provide publicly available financial data—their bicycle operations are both recording massive losses. This strongly suggests that Hello's profitability figures are also likely to be concerning.
Hello's Challenges: A System Under Strain
Standing on the edge of a precipice under the weight of its IPO plans, Hello is experiencing an accelerating loss of control across competition, regulation, finance, and safety.
What might happen in a city on a late Friday night? For Hello, it involves fleets of "over-quota" bicycles slipping into streets and alleys under the cover of darkness.
In the early hours, on the outskirts and in hotspot areas of many cities where it lacks official allocation quotas, tightly sealed trucks carrying hundreds of Hello shared bicycles move quietly. Under the cloak of night, these trucks stop intermittently, with workers quickly unloading batches of bikes onto the roadside.
This scene, described by a Hello insider, involves "driving while dodging pedestrians and frantically dumping bikes along the route." The choice of late Friday nights is strategic, "because it's the weekend, and regulatory inspectors are less likely to check."
By Monday, these bicycles flood into the city center. In these cities where Hello has no official quota, a large number of blue bikes ridden in from the outskirts suddenly appear.
Internally, Hello calls this "infiltration." When such covert deployments in a city exceed a level of 100,000 units, the company quietly holds a celebration, termed a "surprise city launch." According to sources, a past celebration photo that leaked out once led to Hello being summoned by regulators for talks.
In the history of internet industry expansion, Hello initially rose to a leading position by perfecting this "infiltration" strategy. Now, however, this same approach is pushing the company toward an increasingly precarious cliff edge.
Long-term reliance on over-quota deployment not only brings regulatory troubles. As the timeline for a potential merger with Yong'an Xing approaches, Hello is being driven into a corner by growth anxiety fueled by KPI pressures, experiencing rapidly deteriorating control over competition, regulation, finance, and safety. Most importantly, amidst all this, Hello has yet to clearly define its future path.
The Drive for Financial Performance
Hello, a multi-service mobility platform encompassing shared bikes, autonomous driving, shared rentals, and finance, has likely reached this point due to its IPO ambitions.
Since 2023, rumors of Hello's impending IPO have circulated. According to former employees, pressure for a listing primarily comes from investment institutions. "It's a tactic to force management's hand, as investors are growing impatient," one stated, adding that founder Yang Lei and core management resisted, believing the timing wasn't optimal.
Nevertheless, Yang Lei and Hello must eventually address the IPO challenge.
Last March, listed shared-bike company Yong'an Xing announced a change in control via share transfer. Subsequently, its controlling shareholder became Shanghai Hamao (Hello's main entity), with actual control transferring to Hello founder Yang Lei.
The market viewed this as an attempt by Hello to achieve a backdoor listing. However, Yong'an Xing stated that the equity transfer did not involve asset injection and there were no plans for a Hello restructuring and listing within the next 12 months—meaning no financial consolidation for at least a year.
Industry analysts suggest this 12-month window is for subsequent capital maneuvers and, more crucially, to give Hello time to boost its valuation for an IPO. Before any consolidation deadline, Hello must demonstrate to investors its capacity for sustained high growth.
Having completed its last major funding round in 2018, Hello has gone years without new capital injection. However, shared bicycles is a capital-intensive, low-return sector. The business's weak cash-generation ability and lack of sustainability are testing the capital market's patience.
"As it gets closer to financial disclosure, the company grows more anxious, yet there's little time left to solve fundamental problems," an analyst noted. Previously used, short-term effective tactics seem to be among the few remaining options.
A Hello employee revealed that starting this year, "Hello requires business units to achieve 15%-20% annual revenue growth, but operations are already saturated, unlike the野蛮 growth period of the past."
It is understood that Hello is demanding several internal business lines achieve net profit breakeven within 3-6 months, "otherwise the entire business faces layoffs, contraction, or even shutdown."
Sources indicate Hello maintains multiple sets of data: one for regulators, one for media, one for shareholders, and one for investors, all differing. "The one shown to the boss is relatively accurate."
Financial pressure has led directly to layoffs and business contraction.
A former employee stated the company favors aggressive experimentation with new businesses, almost immediately resorting to layoffs if revenue falls short. "When I left, the employee ID number was around 20,000, but actual headcount was 5,000. Later, people laid off had IDs around 40,000, while headcount remained 5,000."
Late last year, Hello conducted another round of layoffs across multiple business lines, including the public relations team.
This move seemed particularly ironic to insiders after Hello was named during the annual Consumer Rights Day gala. Prior to that, Hello's senior management internally emphasized the importance of marketing and advertising, concluding that "PR and government relations are not important; only marketing and growth matter, using a brand mindset for PR to generate revenue."
A former employee also mentioned that at a 2024 company dinner, CEO Yang Lei publicly stated he "disliked old employees," implying that longer-tenured or older staff were not sufficiently driven or urgent about business growth. In this person's view, recent turmoil reflects Hello's operational "impatience," overly focused on immediate costs and profits.
To meet KPIs, each region and business line must find growth and more revenue.
In January 2026, Hello raised prices in Shanghai. The starting fare became 2 yuan for 60 minutes, with an overage fee of 0.1 yuan per minute, making short trips significantly more expensive than on Meituan or Qingju bikes. While official customer service cited "ensuring sustainable vehicle operation and maintenance," insiders said Hello had repeatedly asked competitors to "coordinate" on raising prices. In fact, incidents of bike vandalism and impoundment spiked during that period.
For each price hike, Hello prioritizes larger, more valuable cities. As shared bikes are a key part of urban transport, users in major cities are more price-sensitive. For Hello, the safest approach is when several companies share the pressure, i.e., "coordinated price increases."
A Vicious Regulatory Cycle
Recently, photos surfaced from a Hello employee gathering showing several individuals riding Hello bikes while stepping on competitors' bicycles. Hello quickly issued a statement, distancing itself from those involved.
Sources said the employees were from Hello's Northern region, the same area responsible for Hello being summoned by regulators earlier this year.
In April, Hello was summoned by the Beijing Municipal Transport Law Enforcement Corps for违规 over-quota deployment of unregistered vehicles and refusal to rectify. The Corps imposed administrative penalties and reduced Hello's operational scale. Similar incidents occurred in Tianjin.
Insiders revealed the penalty was due to Hello deploying "far beyond its original quota in Beijing, with one QR code used for multiple vehicles discovered by regulators." Hello was then summoned for talks, "but our people refused to admit fault, even aggressively confronting enforcement authorities, demanding more quota."
"As an employee, I find it hard to understand why the regional head would make such a decision," the insider said.
Despite the controversy, the Northern region's deployment this year far exceeded its quota, leading to KPI over-fulfillment.
After the脚踏竞品单车 incident, while Hello publicly stated it had seriously disciplined the team, the Northern region head faced no penalty and was recently transferred to another region, "still in a general manager position."
Over-quota deployment has become an increasingly relied-upon growth tactic for Hello.
According to insiders, over-quota deployment exists "in almost all regions nationwide," not just in named cities.
To circumvent regulation, a gray mechanism operates: a basic tactic is "cloning plates"—using one registered QR code on multiple bike plates, so inspectors scanning vehicles see them all as registered.
Internal employees revealed that in some cities, Hello's e-bikes were deployed on roads even before obtaining licenses. "If the government doesn't grant quota, traffic police won't allow licensing. Without licenses, bikes can't operate. So, Hello chooses to bypass both regulators and directly conduct a 'surprise city launch.'"
If quota is hard to obtain in some city areas, Hello often tries to reach agreements with specific districts or streets: meeting their investment attraction needs in exchange for extra-quota deployment permissions.
Sources described a year when Hello was summoned by a tier-1 city government for over-quota deployment, with bikes ordered for回收. However, Hello's operations staff chose to offer cash incentives at deployment sites, encouraging users to ride the bikes to other areas. Batches of bikes soon disappeared.
In late August 2024, Shanghai Minhang police and Hello jointly launched a public service campaign against online rumors. When users scanned Hello bikes, an anti-rumor audio message recorded by police automatically played. Hello claimed the message was played about 2.4 million times daily.
Given Hello's Shanghai quota of roughly 300,000 bikes, this implied each bike was ridden about 8 times daily. Industry sources say this figure is significantly higher than the average daily rides per bike locally. "In a tier-1 city like Shanghai, with the current total deployment, 3-4 rides per bike per day is relatively reasonable."
Hello's official claim also conflicts with another dataset.
In April 2025, the Shanghai Urban-Rural Development and Transport Research Institute reported that the city's shared bikes recorded a daily average of 2.784 million rides in 2024. While annual averaging includes off-peak periods, a former industry professional found "Hello's claimed deployment data is still too exaggerated."
Insiders view the 2.4 million figure as a rash mistake, "because the team was too eager, too desperate to show management results, whether in government PR or performance achievement."
If a major city's合理的 total bike quota is 1 million units, and each company deploys according to its assigned比例, operations are most efficient.
When one company over-deploys, competitors face a dilemma—order is disrupted. Not following suit means losing market share; over-deploying means higher costs, lower efficiency, and regulatory penalties.
Essentially, Hello's tactic is to force regulators' hands through aggressive deployment, insiders say. "When Hello bikes are everywhere in the city, it's troublesome for the government to impound them. After months of back-and-forth, it becomes a fait accompli, and they have to agree."
"After ten years, Hello seems stuck in the chaos of its startup phase," analyzed a former long-time employee. "While others in the industry explore how to coexist with the market and regulators, Hello remains stagnant. No matter the regulatory reforms, Hello seems to have only one idea: how to escape regulatory oversight."
But "escaping" comes at a cost.
According to obtained data, the manufacturing and operational cost per shared bike is around a thousand yuan. Therefore, every 100,000 over-quota bikes deployed costs Hello over 100 million yuan. Industry estimates suggest Hello's annual over-quota deployment in just Beijing and Shanghai totals "several hundred thousand units."
More bikes dilute the number of rides per bike. Assuming 3-4 rides per bike daily is reasonable in a large city, over-deployment extends the payback周期 per bike.
Regulatory penalties for over-deployment further entrench this cycle. Hello insiders note differing internal views on regulatory pressure. Some believe the impact is minor; others realize "after penalties, you can't participate in tenders in other cities."
Over-deployment requires more spending, creating financial压力. This pressure necessitates more bikes and rides to meet KPIs, leading to further deployment and higher costs.
This is a self-reinforcing vicious cycle.
Disorder in Competition
When street-level over-deployment still can't support KPIs, Hello's competitive tactics escalate.
A shared bike industry employee revealed that Shanghai alone now has over a hundred impound lots, many claiming authorization from traffic authorities to store和管理 over-quota违规 vehicles.
Given the large numbers, it's hard to distinguish which lots have合规资质. This person found that their own and a competitor's bikes were frequently hauled away en masse by companies自称交管单位委托 and stored in a specific lot. Joint investigation by employees from both companies found the lot's leaseholder was linked to local Hello staff.
Over the past two years, bike impoundment has evolved from normal city management into a gray/black "industry chain."
Impounding rivals' bikes not only reduces their deployment but can yield direct profit—companies must pay "fines" of tens to over a hundred yuan per bike to redeem them.
Considering the volume, total赎金 is substantial—even a medium-sized impound lot can easily hold thousands of bikes.
Photos from impound lots show thousands of bikes and e-bikes repeatedly pushed, shoveled, and even run over by loaders and excavators, stacked into mountains with wheels and handlebars tangled. This minimizes占地 and makes room for more impounded bikes.
"For a while, we found the faster we redeemed bikes, the more they impounded," said Wang Bing (pseudonym), a业务人员 from a rival firm. His team's strategy became to stop redeeming bikes altogether. "We treated it as free parking. We have the funds and time to wait it out. Without income, their expensive lot rental fees alone would hurt them."
The tactic worked. After some time, he found the bikes悄悄转移 back to streets and roadsides.
Multiple rival company employees said they considered模仿 Hello but refrained because "in the end, besides paying billions in赎车 fees annually, it brings no benefit to the industry."
Furthermore, such actions极易滋生腐败.
Surprisingly to Wang Bing, Hello's own bikes were also numerous in impound lots, "perhaps to avoid suspicion if only green and yellow bikes were there."
A former Hello employee, when asked about direct company involvement in impoundments, called it "a糊涂账, hard to prove directly. It's a competitive tactic. But some employees确实也在利用这件事搞灰产." This implies some might impound their own company's bikes, then apply for reimbursement under 'redemption' costs, pocketing the money.
When impoundment and fees aren't enough to压制对手, cruder methods emerge.
A former shared bike employee said bikes in certain regions would suddenly vanish, not from being ridden. Investigation and监控追踪 revealed bikes ended up in suburbs, mountains, or even rivers.
While during the industry's most competitive phase,调度人员 from all companies tried to physically reduce对手's vehicles, employees from multiple brands stated "Hello did this相对是最多的."
According to sources, Hello once had an internal operation called "Crossing the River Campaign," aimed at making rivals' bikes undergo a "great migration" to places users couldn't ride them, covering several fiercely competitive cities nationwide.
Sometimes舆论战 is used. A video previously circulated online showed two individuals in another company's uniforms throwing Hello bikes into a river while cursing Hello. The video spread quickly, and Hello employees condemned the actions. "We initially intended to own up to it, as it was disgraceful. But investigation found the two individuals had been employed for less than three days when the video was shot."
From over-deployment to impoundment, from destruction to the "Crossing the River Campaign," Hello's operational tactics show a clear progression—when商业规则 can't win the market, it turns to physical破坏; when that's insufficient, it edges toward violence.
Sources said Hello once devised a "Falcon Plan," listing around ten key individuals from竞争对手. "High bonuses were offered for 'taking out' people on the list."
"Taking out" methods included策反—making them resign or join Hello—and direct physical intimidation, including assault.
Several Hello employees reportedly planned to "beat up" a key rival figure. "They had details on where he lived, daily routines, and how to carry out the assault," a source said. The plan was aborted when the target became警觉.
Hello did not respond to requests for comment on the matters described by the publication deadline.
The Cost of Safety
This year's Consumer Rights Day gala exposed that some Hello e-bike rental stores违规解除限速, boosting speed to 75 km/h, far exceeding the national 25 km/h limit. E-bike rentals are one of Hello's seven key businesses.
Sources said this business operates on a platform加盟 model—Hello provides online traffic, brand, and system support, while offline stores, vehicle procurement, and daily operations are handled by third-party merchants. "Insiders were likely aware of the speeding. A major revenue-generating业务长期依靠违规打擦边球."
Prior to this, Hello faced autonomous driving safety incidents. Last June, in Zhuzhou, Hunan, a Robotaxi labeled "Hello Autonomous Driving" suddenly veered off course near a crosswalk, hitting two pedestrians, causing serious injuries.
This was the first publicly known Robotaxi accident in China resulting in injuries. It occurred less than six months after Hello entered the autonomous driving sector with 3 billion yuan in funding.
The accident wasn't without warning. A week prior, a Zhuzhou resident posted on social media about a collision between a Hello autonomous vehicle and another car during a ride, resulting in a "dented door." The passenger said the vehicle continued to the destination without emergency stopping.
After the accident, Hello suspended autonomous operations in Zhuzhou and Liyang. As of May 2026, Hello's autonomous business in Zhuzhou remained suspended.
Transitioning from safety drivers to driverless, from non-passenger to passenger operations, requires massive road test data. No company can skip this phase, and Hello is no exception. But Hello's timeline is aggressive: mass production of its first L4 autonomous model by June 2026, deploying over 50,000 units by 2027. In contrast, Baidu's Apollo Go reported 3.4 million fully driverless rides in a single quarter across over 20 cities globally; Pony.ai and WeRide both have fleets exceeding 1,000 vehicles without injury accidents.
Industry experts note that large-scale Robotaxi commercialization typically requires extensive里程的路测数据积累 for safety. "Even if test data can be purchased and technology突破短时间内, Hello's autonomous unit, from establishment to accident in just half a year,难以积累足够的路测里程数."
More critically, Hello may have made hardware "compromises." A supplier透露 that due to cost, Hello didn't install sufficient sensors on the Robotaxi's undercarriage—potentially leading to失效 in detecting "obstacles" and road debris during actual driving.
On another product line, safety issues erupted more隐蔽.
In November 2025, hundreds of thousands of Hello e-bikes nationwide suddenly experienced "service disruption"—remote定位, battery查看, and other "permanent member" functions failed. The cause was Hello's内置 2G IoT cards becoming unusable due to national 2G network shutdowns. Some models lacked mechanical locks, relying solely on蓝牙开锁, rendering vehicles temporarily "scrap metal."
Hello's financial业务 also faces user safety质疑, undergoing layoffs and contraction. Internal employees透露 that last year-end, Hello's financial technology department conducted several rounds of layoffs due to regulatory policies, potentially reaching a 50% reduction.
The financial business was recently曝光 for hidden excessive fees, with客服 responding, "complain however you want." As a cash cow, the financial business operates near the 36% interest rate上限; exceeding it is illegal. Hello lacks relevant financial licenses and has been accused of "暴力催收"—users爆料 receiving threatening calls from自称哈啰平台委托人士 after failing to repay small loans. On complaint platforms like黑猫投诉, numerous grievances involve "Hello Zhen You Qian," many concerning暴力催收,骚扰亲友,爆通讯录, and威胁恐吓.
A横向比较 of the three shared bicycle giants shows Meituan and DiDi Global Inc. have公开的财务数据—their bike operations incur巨额亏损. This likely predicts Hello's盈利数据 is also not optimistic.
The problem is Hello hasn't found a second growth curve beyond bikes. Meituan and DiDi's losses are "valuable"—shared bike traffic empowers food delivery,酒旅, ride-hailing, etc.; losses are essentially customer acquisition costs. But Hello's overall营收过于依赖单车业务所带来的现金流, with暂时还没有其他更好的变现途径.
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