The realm of financial fraud and falsification consistently adheres to two unshakeable principles. First, institutions with high visibility and outstanding performance are more likely to be targeted by imposters. Second, content that is excessively hyped and mystified is often fraudulent. The underlying logic is straightforward: legitimate professional institutions typically disclose information with restraint, while counterfeiters tend to make extravagant and baseless claims without inhibition.
Following a year of bullish market conditions, towards the end of last year and the beginning of this year, several renowned asset management firms actively issued risk advisories, cautioning unsuspecting investors to be vigilant against scams. Notably, a prominent domestic multi-billion hedge fund and an overseas insurance giant found their names unexpectedly used by the same group of fraudsters. These imposters created a new scheme purportedly backed by both a "well-known hedge fund and a foreign insurance giant," employing novel technical tools to facilitate the deception. This development certainly warrants investor alertness.
The specifics of this counterfeit case reveal distinct characteristics. On January 30, February 3, and February 4, the well-known domestic private fund firm Springs Capital issued three consecutive risk advisory notices, warning investors to be cautious of illegal activities conducted by individuals misusing its name. The firm stated it became aware of不法分子 posing as Springs Capital or its employees, engaging in illicit activities such as unauthorized stock recommendations, illegal fundraising, and project investments online and offline, aiming to defraud investors.
It was learned that after discovering a suspicious fake platform, an investor proactively contacted Springs Capital for verification. The firm's compliance department thus became aware of these illegal securities activities and, for the same case, released three "counterfeit alerts" within a single week, continuously advising investors to mitigate risks.
While such announcements are not uncommon in the private fund industry—several multi-billion private funds have issued similar statements in recent years—the perpetrators in this instance clearly had additional objectives. The difference lies in the incorporation of more entities and strategies into the fraud.
The related advisory notice exposed several key points: Firstly, the不法分子 created a counterfeit application to enhance the deception's credibility. Secondly, the application's design included numerous details: for instance, the interface used the confusing English name "Springs Capital"; it displayed investor rewards and fund lists, featuring text such as "daily return rate of 1%," "minimum investment of 4500 yuan," "continuous rewards for inviting friends," and "check-in benefits." Evidently, the fraudsters developed a fully-featured fake application.
Deconstructing these details reveals several tactics: The scammers deliberately used English within the app to create an illusion of professionalism and internationalization. The "daily return rate of 1%" might seem modest, but when compounded, the annualized return approaches 37 times, far exceeding normal investment returns. The "continuous rewards for inviting friends" mechanism is a classic referral strategy aimed at rapidly spreading the scheme through social networks.
Furthermore, the entire app interface mimicked the layout and color schemes of numerous legitimate financial institution apps, particularly resembling well-known wealth management platforms. This design makes inexperienced users more likely to lower their guard, mistakenly believing they are using a genuine institutional investment tool.
An insurance company was also drawn into the scheme. It was noted that Springs Capital's announcement also included a complete investment contract from this counterfeit platform. This contract not only misappropriated the name of Springs Capital but also prominently listed another renowned foreign institution—AXA Tianping Property & Casualty Insurance Company Ltd.—explicitly designating it as the "Party C (Guarantor)."
The contract involved three signing parties: "Party A: Springs Capital Investment Management Co., Ltd.; Party B: Investor; Party C: AXA Tianping Property & Casualty Insurance Company Ltd. (Guarantor)." Subsequent clauses stated: "Party A shall transfer principal and returns to Party B's account by the stipulated repayment time," "Repayment times are unaffected by public holidays," and "All invested funds from Party B are held in a platform-designated third-party security account, with the principal frozen until the project cycle concludes." These elements constructed a semblance of professionalism and authenticity.
However, these seemingly rigorous terms actually violate industry regulations. Specifically, regulatory requirements prohibit private fund managers from promising capital preservation or guaranteed returns to investors. Thus, the claim of "full return of principal and earnings on time" is itself a signal of fraud. Secondly, the concept of a "platform security account" does not exist within the legitimate financial system. Funds for private funds must be custodied by banks or securities firms with custody qualifications, not held in an account established by an unverified internet platform. This account is purely part of the scam.
Particularly alarming is the inclusion of "Party C: AXA Tianping Property & Casualty Insurance Company Ltd. (Guarantor)." AXA Tianping is a wholly foreign-owned property and casualty insurer, fully controlled by the French AXA Group, operating in mainland China with main businesses including auto insurance, accident insurance, and liability insurance. In terms of premium income, it ranked 18th among mainland P&C insurers. Beyond its listing as Party C at the contract's outset, the scam artists provided no specific description of its guarantor role within the agreement details.
A relevant representative from AXA Tianping responded, clarifying that its business scope does not include guaranteeing investment principal or returns for fund wealth management products. This indicates that the inclusion of a P&C insurer as a guarantor in such a contract is not based on a real collaboration but is a deliberate "borrowing" by the fraudsters to enhance the scheme's credibility.
In contrast, previous cases of name misuse in the private fund sector often involved activities like forming groups for stock recommendations, forging fund manager identities, or creating imitation websites. This time, the perpetrators directly fabricated a legal document featuring dual backing from both "private fund + insurance," attempting to present the entire scam as having a complete compliance chain. In reality, no direct cooperation scenario exists between private funds and property & casualty insurance companies. The core of private funds is entrusted asset management, relying on investment capability to earn performance fees, while insurers focus on risk underwriting, relying on actuarial models and capital to fulfill claims obligations—their business logics are fundamentally different.
This scheme essentially forges trust through a fabricated sense of "international sophistication." For investors with insufficient risk awareness, seeing two well-known financial institutions' names together in one agreement can easily create an illusion of safety. The uniqueness of this fraud lies in the scammers' deliberate construction of an "international feel." On one hand, they used only the English abbreviation for Springs Capital within the app, intentionally avoiding the full Chinese name. On the other hand, selecting AXA Tianping as the "guarantor" capitalizes on its background as a Chinese subsidiary wholly owned by a French insurance giant. Both elements carry distinct "international" labels, combining to create a false sense of authority. Thus, this trust fabrication, disguised under a veneer of international sophistication, is brazenly presented to investors. Yet, the more elaborate the presentation, the more likely it is to be fraudulent.
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