Six GF Funds Land in Top 30 Worst-Performing Active Equity Funds, Wang Mingxu's "One-Man Multi-Fund" Model Suffers Waterloo, Only 1 of 8 Managed Funds Posts Positive Return

Deep News01-07

In 2025, the A-share market has generally shown an upward trend, leading to a widespread recovery in the performance of active equity funds. As of December 31 last year, observing the entire market, although the majority of active equity funds recorded positive returns, a certain number of products still exhibited weak performance.

According to statistics, among 4,711 active equity funds with performance records over the past year, 4,494 products achieved positive returns, while 217 posted negative returns. Extending the period to the past three years, among 3,792 funds with performance data, the number of funds with negative returns increased to 924, while 2,868 funds had positive returns.

Notably, within the range of the weakest annual returns, the top thirty worst-performing active equity funds across the market all had an annual return rate lower than -9.75%, with several products suffering losses exceeding 15%. Walfund Medical Innovation A led the decline list with a return of -27.13%, followed by Puying An Sheng Medical Innovation A and Xinyuan Consumption Selection A.

It is noteworthy that among the list of the thirty worst-performing funds of the year, six products under GF Fund Management made the list, all managed by fund manager Wang Mingxu.

Specifically, GF Domestic Demand Growth A recorded an annual return of -16.31%, with a three-year return of -15.10%; GF Value Advantage posted an annual return of -15.47% and a three-year return of -16.22%. The annual returns of GF Value Preferred A, GF Ruiming Two-Year Holding A, GF Robust Preferred Six-Month Holding A, and GF Balanced Preferred A also ranged between -14.55% and -12.50%. In terms of sustained performance, these products not only had negative returns over the past three years but also lagged behind their benchmark returns by over 30 percentage points, with fund sizes ranging from 284 million yuan to 2.433 billion yuan.

Over the past five years, Wang Mingxu's management scale peaked at 30.652 billion yuan in the second quarter of 2021. However, starting from that quarter, the scale has shown a continuous downward trend. By the fourth quarter of 2025, his management scale had fallen to 8.26 billion yuan. He currently manages a total of eight products, among which six simultaneously made the list of the top thirty worst-performing funds of the year.

From the perspective of portfolio structure, many funds managed by Wang Mingxu exhibit obvious characteristics of replicated operations, with highly overlapping top holdings and largely synchronized portfolio adjustments.

Taking his representative product, GF Domestic Demand Growth, as an example, this fund underwent a significant style shift in 2025 but failed to bring about performance improvement, with its annual return dropping by 16.31%. In the first quarter, its top holdings were primarily in baijiu, real estate, banking, and brokerages, including baijiu leaders such as Kweichow Moutai, Wuliangye, and Luzhou Laojiao, as well as real estate stocks like Gemdale Corporation and Binjiang Group.

In the second quarter, real estate stocks exited the top holdings, replaced by new additions in technology and manufacturing sectors such as Midea Group, Sunyard Fintech, and Longshine Technology. While the industry distribution of the portfolio appeared diversified, the effect was limited.

Entering the third quarter, banking stocks further faded out, while the baijiu allocation was strengthened. "Moutai, Wuliangye, Luzhou Laojiao" as well as Yanghe Brewery and Shanxi Xinghuacun Fenjiu all entered the top ten holdings, with the remaining spots occupied by technology stocks like Sunyard Fintech and Longshine Technology.

However, looking at the performance over the past three months, the overall performance of its top holdings has been weak. Apart from individual stocks like J&T Express, most holdings, such as Luzhou Laojiao and Longshine Technology, declined by over 10%. The best performer, Sunyard Fintech, only managed to rise for the year, with minimal gains over the past three months.

A fund manager managing multiple funds with simple replication operations leads to collective losses. This highly similar holding pattern is almost consistent across many other products managed by Wang Mingxu. For instance, the top ten holdings of funds like GF Robust Preferred Six-Month Holding A and GF Ruiming Two-Year Holding A are also concentrated in baijiu (Luzhou Laojiao, Shanxi Xinghuacun Fenjiu, Wuliangye, etc.), technology (Sunyard Fintech, Longshine Technology), and some manufacturing and logistics stocks, with highly similar individual stock weightings and rankings. In terms of sector allocation, these funds have long been biased towards sectors that have been continuously adjusting in recent years, such as consumption, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing, while having little exposure to阶段性 market hotspots, causing the portfolios to repeatedly miss the节奏 in a market characterized by accelerating sector rotation.

In the third-quarter report, Wang Mingxu stated that to improve annual performance, the portfolio underwent structural adjustments in the third quarter, reducing holdings in city commercial banks whose valuations had recovered to reasonable levels and increasing allocations to sectors like premium baijiu and software development. However, the actual performance shows that the adjustments did not yield the expected results. The baijiu sector continued to be sluggish, and technology stocks failed to provide effective momentum, instead exacerbating the overall drawdown of the portfolio. This further indicates that, under the premise of highly homogeneous holdings, partial adjustments are难以 fundamentally resolve the mismatch between strategy and market style.

Overall, the collective decline in performance of Wang Mingxu's multiple products reflects both a misalignment between his investment style and the recent market structure and exposes the operational difficulties fund managers can face when managing multiple products,容易 falling into the trap of strategy replication and risk concentration. For investors, this highlights the need to be cautious about the degree of homogenization among a "one-man multi-fund" manager's products and the flexibility of their strategies when making selections.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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