Once the leading e-commerce tea bag brand CHALI, the company is now deeply mired in operational difficulties.
Recently, some CHALI employees received court notifications stating that, after investigation, CHALI Company has no executable assets, leading to the termination of the enforcement procedure. This means the employees' efforts to reclaim their back pay through legal channels have temporarily reached a deadlock.
According to information obtained from multiple CHALI employees, salary delays began in June 2024. By January 2026, over a hundred employees were owed wages and housing provident fund payments, with some employees reporting unpaid amounts exceeding 100,000 yuan.
Simultaneously, in December 2025, the main entity, Guangzhou CHALI Group Co., Ltd., became an enforcement subject in multiple new enforcement cases, with one case involving a target amount as high as 141 million yuan. Also last year, several CHALI-affiliated companies were listed as dishonest persons subjected to enforcement, and CHALI's founder, Tan Qiong, was restricted from high consumption.
What exactly happened behind the scenes at CHALI?
The company has no assets available for enforcement. Recently, a "case closure due to lack of assets" notice from the court dashed the hopes of CHALI employees seeking unpaid wages again. The enforcement ruling shows that, upon court investigation, CHALI's subsidiary Guangzhou Zhongshen Food Co., Ltd. has no property available for enforcement, hence the enforcement procedure was terminated. This signifies a temporary impasse in the employees' legal battle for their salaries.
Li Ming (a pseudonym), who joined CHALI in 2022, is also among those owed wages; by the time he left, he was owed over 100,000 yuan in total unpaid salaries and housing fund contributions. He estimates conservatively that more than a hundred employees, from factory workers to middle-office and sales departments, have had their wages withheld.
Li Ming recounted his experience seeking back pay. He recalled that CHALI's wage payment issues first emerged in June 2024. "Initially, it was just delays; the June salary, due on the 15th, was pushed back to the end of the month. By July, it was delayed by a full month. The August salary wasn't paid until October. At that time, the company entrusted its JD.com self-operated business, bringing in about 8 million yuan in payments, which was used to cover the August and September salaries."
Also in July of that year, CHALI began layoffs. After months without receiving his salary, Li Ming eventually chose to resign and filed for arbitration. In July 2025, he applied to the court for compulsory enforcement but ultimately received feedback stating "no property available for enforcement."
It was noted that in December 2025, the main company, Guangzhou CHALI Group Co., Ltd., became an enforcement subject in several new cases, with one enforcement target reaching 141 million yuan. As early as 2024, several CHALI-affiliated companies had already been listed as dishonest persons subjected to enforcement, and founder Tan Qiong was placed under restrictions on high consumption.
A failed "big gamble" on bottled tea. Before the crisis, CHALI was a darling in the eyes of capital and the market. According to its official website, CHALI was founded in 2013, owning the high-end fast-moving consumer goods tea brand "CHALI" and the high-end wellness tea brand "Yushou Tea," focusing on whole-leaf tea bags, bottled ready-to-drink tea, freeze-dried tea blocks, tea powder, and other tea product forms. Its partners include Hilton, China Southern Airlines, Sheraton, etc.
According to Tianyancha data, CHALI underwent nine rounds of financing. The last was a B+ round in May 2024, invested by Wanlian Guangsheng Investment Co., Ltd. and Guangzhou Guangjin Mingrui Equity Investment Fund Partnership. Previous rounds featured prominent institutions like GGV Capital, Country Garden, CEC Capital, and JD Technology.
Li Ming admitted, "By 2023, the company's annual sales revenue had reached hundreds of millions of yuan, its e-commerce channels were leading the industry, and the overall business was profitable."
So why did CHALI collapse so rapidly? In the view of several employees, the core reason lies in its aggressive investment strategy, particularly the failure of its foray into the bottled tea business, which became the "final straw" that broke the company's cash flow.
Public information shows that in June 2022, CHALI first launched its bottled oolong tea drink "Yashi Dancong," entering the ready-to-drink tea market. In January 2023, CHALI's self-built bottled tea production base was completed and expected to officially commence operations in the second quarter of 2023. That same year, CHALI also signed actor Xiao Zhan as its brand ambassador.
According to media reports, founder Tan Qiong once publicly stated that she had wanted to start with tea beverages initially, but the startup team lacked the capital and capability. In an April 2023 interview, she said, "Our goal is to surpass Suntory's (tea drink) sales in China within two years."
Li Ming stated that in 2023, to promote bottled tea, the company hired sales staff on a large scale and invested heavily in offline channel promotion, but the returns fell far short of expectations. In an internal business meeting, he learned that in the first half of 2023 alone, the cumulative losses from the bottled beverage business reached tens of millions of yuan.
Furthermore, CHALI's bottled tea failure stemmed from product development issues. "Even as internal employees, we felt the bottled tea had a strong artificial flavor, and its taste was noticeably inferior to established brands like Nongfu Spring's 'Oriental Leaf' and Suntory, making repeat purchases unlikely."
Li Ming said, "By the second half of 2023, the boss expressed unwillingness to continue losses and began taking measures to cut losses. In 2024, the offline sales team saw massive layoffs; the whole process was like a rollercoaster ride."
It was observed that CHALI's bottled tea is currently not sold in its official online stores and is also absent from many mainstream supermarkets.
After financing stalled, Li Ming indicated that CHALI's expansion relied mainly on bank loans. "The company mortgaged its factory and office building to the bank." However, multiple loans may now be overdue. According to Tianyancha, besides wage disputes, CHALI also has financial loan contract disputes with institutions like ICBC, Bank of Guangzhou, and China Zheshang Bank.
Asset transfer: "Shedding the shell"? The path to reclaiming wages is long, and CHALI employees discovered that while the main company is entangled in lawsuits and has empty accounts, business seems to be operating normally through other CHALI-affiliated companies. Employees suspect asset transfer, suggesting core operations and funds were moved to new entities through layered holdings by affiliated companies.
Li Ming outlined the asset transfer chain he deduced. He revealed that CHALI's original offline distribution business was transferred to Shenzhen Chasen Commercial Management Co., Ltd., incorporated in September 2024 and 60% controlled by CHALI's subsidiary Guangzhou Feibili Health Food Co., Ltd.
"The reason for this move is that the original CHALI entity's accounts were frozen, and incoming payments would be seized. After transferring to the new entity, funds can flow normally," Li Ming said. Currently, salaries for remaining CHALI employees are being paid by Chasen Commercial, and some employees were required to sign new labor contracts with this company.
Similar operations occurred for online business. The business license for CHALI's Tmall flagship store has been changed to Guangzhou Baichatai Technology Co., Ltd., which is controlled by Guizhou Baichatai Technology Co., Ltd., whose majority shareholder is Zhu Zehua, a long-time CHALI employee.
The cloud of suspected asset transfer directly hinders employees' enforcement applications. The legal entities targeted for enforcement, like Guangzhou CHALI Group Co., Ltd. or Guangzhou Zhongshen Food Co., Ltd., have become shells with almost no funds flowing into their accounts, making court enforcement impossible.
Regarding the next steps for the labor disputes, Li Ming stated they will continue legal proceedings. Some CHALI employees also mentioned that, despite obstacles, they have resubmitted applications to add other shareholders and CHALI-affiliated companies to the enforcement list and reopened the cases.
Regarding the issues of unpaid wages and suspected asset transfer, multiple attempts were made to contact the business registration phone number of Guangzhou CHALI Group Co., Ltd., but no connection was made by the time of publication. Customer service for the CHALI Tmall flagship store stated that wage issues do not affect online purchases.
In November 2024, CHALI's official public account issued a statement claiming that online rumors about "widespread salary arrears" and "impending bankruptcy" were false. However, it was noted that several of CHALI's official social media accounts have been inactive since January 2025.
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