Jiuxing Investment September Report: A-Share Investors' Odyssey

Deep News09-30 16:23

Another National Day has arrived, and first of all, happy holidays to everyone. After watching Christopher Nolan's recent epic film "The Odyssey," I was deeply moved. The name of the protagonist Odysseus means "a long and perilous journey." For investors, this word could not be more fitting, so in a sense, we are all protagonists of an Odyssey. In Nolan's lens, Odysseus, after winning the Trojan War, did not receive a triumphant return but instead embarked on a ten-year drift across the seas. Storms, siren songs, island temptations, and inner guilt came in turn. The endpoint of this expedition was never a victory, but rather "crossing the fog, holding fast to one's original heart, and returning to one's own Ithaca." This is exactly a true portrayal of current A-share investors: we have just passed through a "bull market," market storms continue unabated, temptations rise one after another, and short-term gains and losses constantly disturb the mind. The Odyssey of investment lies not in chasing every round of hot trends, but in the long voyage through cycles.

The main thread of global asset pricing in September shifted from the AI high-growth imagination of the first half of the year to a triple test of interest rate constraints, inflation disturbances, and earnings verification, like the first storm Odysseus faced after setting sail. In overseas markets, rising U.S. Treasury yields became the core variable in global asset pricing. The Federal Reserve's hawkish stance, combined with geopolitical conflicts pushing up inflation expectations for energy and agricultural products, drove long-term government bond yields broadly higher worldwide, and volatility in equity markets in Europe, the United States, Japan, and South Korea amplified. Within U.S. equities, divergence was pronounced: the AI main line fluctuated repeatedly under earnings realization expectations, growth stocks were highly sensitive to interest rates and saw periodic pullbacks; European, Japanese, and South Korean markets came under simultaneous pressure, risk appetite contracted rapidly, and global capital entered defensive mode. Overseas markets were no longer a one-way tailwind of gains, and tidal changes in interest rates continued to transmit valuation pressure to emerging markets.

By contrast, A-shares showed relatively independent resilience. In September, the overall pattern was one of stock-game competition, shrinking-volume oscillation, and internal divergence. Under the impact of large external fluctuations, the index decline was significantly smaller than that of surrounding markets. The market characteristics were very clear: high-valuation growth sectors were more volatile due to the spillover effects of U.S. Treasury yields; defensive sectors such as dividend, high-dividend, infrastructure, and power formed a support force; a large number of individual stocks weakened, the money-making effect was relatively weak, market buyers stayed on the sidelines, and incremental funds showed insufficient willingness to enter. The essential contradiction in the September market was the game between external interest rate headwinds and domestic expectations for earnings repair. The change in global capital pricing logic is like the wind and waves stirred up by the sea god: it will not directly capsize the ship, but it will continuously test the hull's resilience and force investors to reassess asset valuations and rethink position safety margins.

Nolan's version of "The Odyssey" reinterprets the "Trojan Horse": what was once a winning strategy later became an inescapable original sin in the protagonist's heart. A clever short-term victory often plants long-term hidden dangers. Mapped onto A-share trading logic, the market is bidding farewell to the Trojan Horse-style short-term speculation of recent years—"grasping the main line, betting on sectors, and gaming expectation gaps"—and the core trading logic is undergoing profound change. Previously, the market was accustomed to trading future imagination in advance and assigning high valuations to long-term stories. Starting in September, funds no longer paid for purely forward-looking narratives, and the pricing anchor shifted to real orders, cash flow, and the realization of industrial profits. Concept speculation receded, and targets based purely on themes and without earnings support were continuously abandoned by funds; only industry leaders able to continuously realize revenue and profits could obtain valuation support. The market no longer rewards imagination, but instead rewards verifiable fundamentals.

With aggregate market conditions absent and expectations for a broad bull market cooling, the market entered a "turning over stones" phase. The era of index-level broad gains came to a phased end, and funds sought structural opportunities in segmented tracks: high-tech manufacturing, high-end equipment, independent controllability, supply-demand repair in some cyclical goods, and stable cash flow from dividend assets. Trading difficulty increased significantly, the model of lying flat and winning by relying on broad market gains became ineffective, and research depth and individual stock screening ability became core competitiveness.

After multiple rounds of volatility, the market's awareness of the risks of leverage and heavy position concentration rose significantly. Just as Odysseus witnessed the destruction brought by the siren songs, more and more investors actively reduced risk exposure, no longer pursued extreme returns, and prioritized controlling drawdowns. The focus of trading shifted from "how to earn more" to "how not to be severely damaged in one blow." Ergodicity replaced get-rich-quick fantasies and became the underlying principle for institutions and rational individual investors. To summarize the change in trading logic in one sentence: in the past, it was betting on hot trends and seeking elasticity; now, it is looking at cash flow, calculating valuation, and guarding safety cushions.

The most moving part of Nolan's "The Odyssey" is not the monsters and storms, but the inward test. The siren songs and Calypso's temptation of immortality do not come from external enemies, but from human greed, fear, and wishful thinking, which are also the greatest obstacles on the current investor's Odyssey.

In the fourth quarter, this A-share Odyssey voyage will continue. The core variables in the external environment remain U.S. Treasury yields, overseas inflation, and geopolitical disturbances; internally, the focus is on domestic demand repair, corporate earnings realization, and the intensity of policy implementation. The overall environment is unlikely to produce a one-sided strong beta market and will remain a structural opportunity within oscillation. The voyage strategy should shift from "aggressive sprinting" to "steady long-distance sailing."

Based on the philosophy of long-termism, when applying it to fourth-quarter strategy, the first step is to do a good job in asset allocation and control maximum drawdown. Just as a long voyage must retain ballast, in allocation, use high-dividend and stable-cash-flow assets as the base position to withstand market storms; growth positions should be moderately diversified to avoid heavy bets on a single track. Do not use high leverage, retain cash to cope with extreme volatility, and prevent a single storm from ending the voyage outright. The premise of long-termism is being able to stay at the table. In a stock-game market, high-return opportunities come with high risk. Actively lower annual return expectations and abandon the fantasy of doubling in the short term. In the face of market hot spots, like Odysseus resisting the siren songs, use trading discipline to restrain impulses.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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