“Do you have a membership?” “No.” “Would you like to sign up for a free one? Points can be used as cash.” “No, thank you.” “Alright, that will be 59 yuan.” This was a recent exchange at the checkout counter of a MINISO Group Holding Limited (HKG: 09896) store in a Beijing shopping district. Previously, however, the checkout experience at some MINISO stores was far from this smooth. Topics like #MINISO won't let you pay without a membership# and #MINISO's membership rules are getting more absurd# have trended on social media, with many consumers complaining online about being repeatedly questioned by staff at checkout, even for buying a bottle of water, and some even reported being unable to complete a purchase without scanning a code to register as a member. Facing public criticism, the company initially responded that only blind box, vinyl figure, and other trendy toy products were restricted to members for purchase, with other product categories unaffected. This meant that requiring membership registration to buy a bottle of water was against policy. During recent visits to several offline stores in Beijing, the aggressive membership barriers were no longer present, but the questions raised by the online controversy remain unresolved. Why would a global retail giant with over 8,500 stores and recently reported revenue and profit growth risk alienating consumers with such an off-putting tactic as forced membership? Who is ultimately responsible for this situation?
The Pressure Behind the Push for New Members
While online debate raged, offline employees also felt significant pressure. The "forced member acquisition" that annoyed customers was also a burden for staff who had to meet targets. "Regional stores are ranked daily on new member acquisition data. To hit our targets, we had no choice but to push it," revealed Xiao He (a pseudonym), who worked at a MINISO store for six months, describing the daily routine. "I usually only pushed it when the store manager was nearby; nobody wants to constantly bother customers. But the manager also applied pressure. I got fed up and left." Xiao He's comments partly explain the contentious atmosphere at the checkout. The aggressive tactics or distorted implementation of member drives likely stem from top-down performance pressure. Li Weihua, an associate professor at China University of Political Science and Law and an expert in chain store management, noted that this situation reflects a contradictory "wanting both" mentality from headquarters: "They want to convert public foot traffic into private consumer data through scanning codes, while also wanting to sell products smoothly." Under MINISO's fully managed franchise model, franchisees provide capital while headquarters handles operations. Li Weihua pointed out that it's not just MINISO; in the current battle for traffic, many consumer chain brands in retail, food, and lifestyle sectors include relatively strict "new member or follower acquisition" targets in their franchise KPI assessments. Consequently, whether in company-owned or franchised stores, pressure from managers to staff is high, often leading to various tactics to induce or even partially force customers to scan codes. "Under this pressure, frontline staff might resort to shortcuts, focusing less on improving the environment and service, and more on crafting scripts or even setting barriers to turn consumers into members." Regarding the current situation where stores no longer require membership for any product, Li Weihua added, "In the short term, the stores bear the brunt of customer anger, but in the long run, it's the entire brand that suffers. When consumers become aware and firmly refuse, the 'no purchase without membership' bottom line naturally collapses."
The Other Side of Impressive Financial Reports
If store staff anxiety comes from managers, where does headquarters' anxiety originate? The answer may lie within MINISO's financial reports and its dance with capital markets. On the surface, recent financial results appear stellar. For the full year 2025, the company achieved revenue of 21.44 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 26.2%. In the Q1 2026 report (for the period ending March 31, 2026), revenue maintained strong growth of 28.5% year-on-year to 5.688 billion yuan, while period profit surged 199.7% to 1.248 billion yuan. Founder Securities noted in its latest earnings commentary that positive same-store sales growth both domestically and internationally in Q1 2026 drove the better-than-expected revenue performance. While the surface looks robust, a closer look at the profit structure and overall market performance reveals more complexity. Bai Wenxi, Deputy Chairman of the China Enterprise Capital Alliance, offered a more nuanced view of these figures: "The massive surge in Q1 net profit was largely dependent on early investment gains from the AI unicorn MiniMax. The financial report shows that fair value changes from this investment in the AI industry brought 874.6 million yuan in unrealized gains. Excluding these non-recurring gains and exchange rate effects, the year-on-year growth of its adjusted net profit was actually only 8.1%." Looking back at the full year 2025, net profit decreased by 54.0%, impacted by factors including investment losses in Yonghui Superstores. This indicates that, setting aside the volatility from cross-sector investments, MINISO's core physical retail business also faces certain challenges. From a broader perspective, overseas markets are now taking the lead in growth. AJ Securities pointed out that overseas MINISO stores, using a direct-operated model to replicate the mature mainland China retail system abroad, have become the segment contributing the largest incremental revenue to the group. In 2025, overseas markets contributed 8.63 billion yuan in revenue, a 29.3% increase. However, the competitive landscape in the domestic home market is becoming increasingly complex. Bai Wenxi noted that core business districts in China's first- and second-tier cities are nearing saturation, while competition in lower-tier markets is intensifying. The "ten-yuan store" model is inherently low-margin and volume-driven. Continuing rapid domestic store expansion inevitably risks diluting per-store revenue; the logic of "trading scale for growth" is facing a severe test. In fact, while domestic stores increased by a net 182 in 2025, overall same-store sales growth was only in the mid-single digits. With offline foot traffic seemingly hitting a ceiling, the narrative for capital markets must turn inward, focusing on private traffic. By the end of 2025, MINISO had over 112 million cumulative registered members in mainland China, with registered members contributing 59.5% of that year's GMV. "In capital valuation models, a massive member pool signifies the potential for private traffic monetization and attractive customer lifetime value," Bai Wenxi stated, adding that MINISO is in a transitional phase of pain, moving from "scale expansion to member monetization and valuation reconstruction." Forced member acquisition through rigid rules aims to increase this GMV contribution share, thereby telling a more compelling story to the capital markets. The question remains: How valuable are members acquired through coercion? A large number of involuntary "zombie members" could lead to market overvaluation. If these hundreds of millions of members cannot be converted into highly engaged, repeat customers, the lofty valuation will inevitably face scrutiny.
The Rocky Road of IP Strategy
On its path toward "interest-driven consumption," IP is seen as a key lever to increase premium pricing and repeat purchases. Huaxin Securities mentioned in a research report that MINISO is undergoing a "transition from a retailer to a global IP operation platform." AJ Securities also emphasized that its self-operated supply chain, deeply integrated supplier network, outright purchase procurement, and high-frequency new product launches support continuous gross margin improvement, with the group's gross margin reaching 45.0% in 2025. This is why the company, in its official response, dared to use high-heat IP products like blind boxes and figurines as a shield for member exclusivity. However, the fact that purchasing blind boxes offline neither requires limits nor membership makes this shield seem tenuous. Industry analyst Zhang Shule believes that using a membership system to prevent scalpers from hoarding trendy toys is a rigid and simplistic defense. "The premise is that your product is worth hoarding. This doesn't stop real scalpers who can also hoard memberships. Instead, it exposes the haste and confusion in MINISO's foray into the trendy toy sector." According to a breakdown by Huaxin Securities, IP licensing fees account for 5%–10% of MINISO's costs. Zhang Shule added that MINISO's fast-fashion brand positioning requires constant rapid iteration to attract consumers, forcing intense internal competition in design and frequent new launches. This naturally leads to controversies, such as earlier accusations by an original designer on social media that a MINISO Harry Potter-themed ring涉嫌抄袭 (allegedly plagiarized), which本质上 (essentially) stems from the deep-seated anxiety to boost purchase frequency. Bai Wenxi's assessment also hits the core issue: "The lack of strict enforcement of real-name systems for blind boxes at the terminal exposes that its IP operation still relies on channel control rather than content barriers. Without truly strong IP support, relying solely on channel control is难以构建护城河 (difficult to build a moat)." "It shows that the current MINISO is essentially still a retail channel operator, not an IP operator," Bai Wenxi concluded. When the path to offline member acquisition is blocked, pressure inevitably spills over. Li Weihua pointed out that MINISO faces a very complex situation. Financially and managerially, its acquisition of Yonghui Superstores for over 6.2 billion yuan remains a burden requiring continuous investment and transformation. In the trendy toy sector, its second growth curve, TOP TOY, generated 1.915 billion yuan in revenue in 2025 but still lags behind Pop Mart in full-chain operations. Meanwhile, its once-proud labels of "affordability" and "Japanese-inspired design" are gradually being diluted in today's domestic consumer market where everyone competes on value. In the business world, any shortcut that attempts to challenge consumer common sense often faces a market backlash. MINISO's swiftly concluded "forced member acquisition" controversy resembles a market test and course correction. It also serves as an important reminder for similar brands: On the retail playing field, solid product quality and a sincere shopping experience are the cornerstones of long-term customer retention. No matter how large the member pool or how grand the IP strategy, they must ultimately be built on a foundation of consumers willingly opening their wallets.
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