Wang Mingxu, a prominent fund manager overseeing billions at GF Fund, has been labeled the "most unfortunate fund manager" of 2025.
As 2025 concluded, the annual performance rankings of major public funds were released. Wind statistics indicate that among 4,711 active equity funds with performance records for the year, 4,494 achieved positive returns, while 217 ended in negative territory.
Overall, fund performance presented a highly fragmented picture. The top 10 performing funds all yielded returns above 130%, with the highest, Yongying Technology Intelligent Selection A, reaching an impressive 233%. Conversely, the bottom 10 performers all suffered declines exceeding -10%, with the worst drop approaching 20%.
With over ninety percent of funds generating profits, those in the red became exceptionally conspicuous.
Astonishingly, four of the ten worst-performing funds were products from GF Fund, all managed by the same individual—Wang Mingxu.
Expanding the scope to the twenty worst-performing funds reveals GF Fund's presence increases to six funds, all of which are also managed by Wang Mingxu.
Some investors expressed disbelief, questioning how such significant losses could occur during a bull market and pondering when GF Fund's performance became so lackluster.
01 Six Funds Suffer Over 10% Losses Last Year, Seven Solely-Managed Funds Collectively Lose 1.135 Billion Yuan According to data from Tian Tian Fund Network, Wang Mingxu currently manages eight fund products. Apart from GF Shengjin Mixed, which he co-manages with another fund manager, the remaining seven funds are managed independently by Wang Mingxu.
Remarkably, all seven of these funds incurred losses over the past year, placing them at the bottom of their respective peer groups.
Specifically, GF Domestic Demand Growth Mixed A reported a return of -16.31% last year, GF Value Advantage Mixed yielded -15.47%, GF Value Preferred A returned -14.55%, GF Ruiming Two-Year Hold A yielded -13.34%, GF Robust Preferred Six-Month Hold A returned -12.60%, and GF Balanced Preferred A yielded -12.50%.
Even the newly established GF Value Steady Advance A, launched in June of last year, recorded a return of -6.54%. Its net asset value per unit only recovered to above 1 after the start of 2026.
The only fund with a positive return was GF Shengjin A, which he co-manages with Duan Tao, achieving a return of 13.93% last year.
Based on fund announcements, the losses for the first three quarters of 2025 were as follows: GF Domestic Demand Growth Mixed A lost 98.015 million yuan, C class lost 42.3956 million yuan; GF Value Preferred Mixed A lost 37.827 million yuan, C class lost 13.6835 million yuan; GF Balanced Preferred Mixed A lost 312 million yuan, C class lost 20.7446 million yuan; GF Ruiming Two-Year Holding Period Mixed A lost 65.6364 million yuan, C class lost 37.827 million yuan; GF Robust Preferred Six-Month Holding Period Mixed A lost 101 million yuan, C class lost 65.153 million yuan; GF Value Advantage Mixed lost 321 million yuan. The newly established GF Value Steady Advance Mixed in June lost 16.0897 million yuan for A class and 4.2281 million yuan for C class.
Combined, the seven funds managed solely by Wang Mingxu incurred total losses reaching 1.135 billion yuan.
It is noteworthy that several of Wang Mingxu's underperforming funds were primarily products established during the market peak of 2020-2021. The total assets under his management once surpassed 10 billion yuan, reaching a high of 30.652 billion yuan in the second quarter of 2021. By the end of last June, his management scale had shrunk to 10.89 billion yuan, teetering on the edge of the 10-billion-yuan threshold.
Currently, Wang Mingxu's assets under management stand at 8.26 billion yuan, officially falling below the 10-billion-yuan mark.
02 Two Major Portfolio Adjustments Mistime the Market Rhythm Veteran Billion-Dollar Fund Manager "Stumbles" Wang Mingxu is not an unknown figure in the industry.
His profile shows previous roles including Strategy Researcher at Northeast Securities Research Institute, Portfolio Investment Manager at Life Insurance Asset Management Center, Senior Investment Manager in the Asset Management Department of Hengtai Securities, and Chief Strategist at Oriental Securities Research Institute. He joined GF Fund in 2018, accumulating seven years of tenure. He currently holds the positions of General Manager Assistant and Head of the Investment Management Department at GF Fund Management Co., Ltd.
With nearly 20 years in the industry and over 16 years of portfolio management experience, Wang Mingxu is considered a seasoned veteran.
Historically, his performance has been relatively stable.
Taking GF Domestic Demand Growth, the fund he has managed the longest, as an example, over the six years from 2019 to 2024, it consistently ranked in the top 50% of its peer group and outperformed the CSI 300 Index in almost every year except 2023.
While not top-tier, it was certainly a relatively strong performer among its peers.
So, why did Wang Mingxu incur such significant losses in 2025?
The answer lies in his portfolio holdings.
Wang Mingxu's investment style has consistently leaned towards undervalued and large-cap blue-chip stocks.
In the third-quarter reports of several funds for 2024, Wang Mingxu explicitly stated, "With the strengthening of pro-growth policies, expectations for macroeconomic improvement in the fourth quarter are strong, which is expected to drive a significant earnings recovery for A-shares, especially in sectors like finance, real estate, and consumer goods."
Based on this outlook, he executed substantial portfolio adjustments across multiple funds. The turnover rate of the funds he manages showed a noticeable increase starting from the fourth quarter of 2024.
Using GF Domestic Demand Growth Mixed as an example, its top holdings in Q4 2024 were heavily concentrated in real estate, baijiu, securities brokers, and banks. Examples include Luzhou Laojiao, Kweichow Moutai, CITIC Securities, Guotai Junan Securities, Gemdale Corporation, and Binjiang Group. Compared to previous holdings, he reduced exposure to airlines and energy, while adding baijiu, securities brokers, and banks.
However, the real estate and baijiu sectors did not perform as anticipated, leading directly to consecutive losses for the fund in Q4 2024 and Q1 2025.
In Q1 2025, he further increased holdings in Luzhou Laojiao but began reducing exposure to real estate. Among the top 10 holdings, only Gemdale Corporation and Binjiang Group remained as real estate stocks.
In Q2 2025, Wang Mingxu conducted another round of significant adjustments, reducing holdings in real estate and securities brokers while increasing positions in city commercial banks. He heavily invested in home appliance themes like Midea Group and Hisense Visual Technology, as well as companies related to stablecoin themes such as Sinodata and Longshine Technology Group.
Simultaneously, he increased holdings in "premium baijiu companies expected to see a turnaround from difficulties, with valuations at historically low levels." The Q3 report showed Shanxi Xinghuacun Fen Wine, Wuliangye, Kweichow Moutai, Yanghe Brewery, and Luzhou Laojiao among the top 10 holdings.
Nevertheless, the results remained disappointing.
The structural bull market since 2025 has favored growth stocks, with sectors like AI, technology, and innovative drugs showing strong activity. In contrast, baijiu, real estate, and similar sectors have underperformed. Wang Mingxu's portfolio adjustments failed to align with the market's rhythm, causing his performance to significantly trail that of peer products.
Furthermore, the multiple funds managed by Wang Mingxu exhibited clear replication in their operations, with highly overlapping top holdings and largely synchronized adjustment步伐. This led to the collective underperformance and losses across all his independently managed funds last year.
Criticism from investors targeting Wang Mingxu has been rampant on stock forums. Many have questioned his persistent focus on baijiu stocks, casting doubt on his investment research expertise.
03 Management Fees Collected Regardless of Performance In summary, the collective losses of Wang Mingxu's products last year were primarily due to misjudged portfolio adjustment strategies that failed to capture the market's rhythm. This not only resulted in underperformance against peers but also caused losses for investors.
Meanwhile, GF Fund, as the management company, continued to collect substantial management fees regardless of the performance outcome, a model often described as "earning fees rain or shine."
According to the mid-2025 reports, the seven funds managed solely by Wang Mingxu generated total management fees amounting to 55.94 million yuan for the fund company.
Can the long-standing principle of "creating value through professionalism, prioritizing client interests" upheld by this established public fund manager continue to inspire investor confidence?
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