In early spring, amid lingering cold weather, Jiangling County of Jingzhou City in Hubei Province conducted a planned training and qualification certification program for designated militia cadres. During assessments, participants answered fluently when questioned on topics such as militia organization standards, mobilization potential surveys, and military recruitment procedures. The training schedule covered 12 subjects across four categories—military theory, military skills, professional knowledge, and operational work—with 100% participation and no absences recorded.
This strong performance followed a painful lesson from three months earlier, when two militia cadres from the county failed their overall evaluation during a provincial-level training session organized by the Hubei Provincial Military Command, causing their unit to rank last. A review led by Jingzhou Military Sub-Command leadership identified issues such as "lack of expertise in defense duties" and "insufficient understanding of military affairs" among some cadres. It was emphasized that militia cadres, as frontline commanders and combatants in the defense mobilization system, must possess solid military knowledge and professional competence to ensure effective grassroots armed forces operations.
In response, Jiangling County authorities decided to reassign the two underperforming cadres, removing them from their positions as members of their township party committees. This decision sent ripples across the armed forces system in the county and throughout Jingzhou. The Jingzhou Military Sub-Command used the case as a teaching example, directing all local armed forces departments to thoroughly evaluate their cadres' capabilities. The review uncovered seven common weaknesses, including deficient military theory and inadequate emergency command skills. A tiered accountability system was established, with clear corrective measures and designated officers responsible for implementation.
Additionally, coordination with city and county organizational departments strengthened pre-appointment reviews and ongoing performance evaluations of militia cadres, ensuring that key personnel maintain the required expertise. The recent training and certification in Jiangling thus served as an important validation of these reforms. One trainee remarked, "I used to think doing just enough in defense work was acceptable. Now I understand the weight of responsibility." The trainee pledged to apply the training outcomes diligently in their role.
By early February, under the renewed mobilization efforts of newly appointed cadres, the number of youth participating in the first-half conscription physical examinations in the county exceeded four times the recruitment target, with a significant increase in eligible and motivated candidates.
Commentary: Accountability Drives Performance Failing evaluations leading to reassignment—Jingzhou’s approach sets a clear standard for militia cadres: underperformance triggers consequences. Military training admits no pretense; those lacking combat readiness face penalties and position changes. The primary duty of militia cadres is military affairs, and their core skill must be military proficiency. Poor assessment results not only reflect inadequate skills but also reveal complacency and neglect of duty. This corrective action serves as both a warning and a reminder: combat readiness standards cannot be compromised. Accountability, however, is not the end goal. Identifying weaknesses, implementing systematic improvements, and enforcing rigorous oversight help reinvigorate those who fall behind and motivate others to strive harder. Only through such measures can a reliable, capable, and effective militia cadre force be built.
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