Recently, Marssenger Kitchenware Co., Ltd. (Marssenger) faced criticism for promotional posters repeatedly referencing key life milestones such as "after having children" and "after paying off the mortgage," accused of "marketing anxiety" and conveying pressure.
Marssenger has since taken down and updated the poster content. However, netizens perceive a significant shift in the brand's narrative style—from its previous "technical symbolism" to "emotional resonance"—which may expose the company's growth anxieties.
Statistics reveal that since 2021, Marssenger has experienced four consecutive years of declining revenue and net profit. Revenue dropped from 2.319 billion yuan and a profit of 375.7 million yuan in 2021 to 577 million yuan in revenue and a loss of 218 million yuan for the first three quarters of 2025.
In an effort to improve performance, Marssenger has recently undertaken frequent personnel changes. Following the reassignment of Yang Gen, former deputy general manager and marketing general manager, the marketing general manager position has been assumed by Duan Jinxing, the newly appointed former domestic sales general manager of Vanward.
To what extent can bringing in "external reinforcements" stabilize the ongoing decline in performance?
After the "Take a Breather Kit" marketing copy sparked widespread controversy, Marssenger proactively optimized the text, removing many "potentially uncomfortable" phrases and replacing the entire advertisement.
Marssenger stated that the "original intent of the advertisement was to convey a well-meaning reminder as the year ends, suggesting that enjoyable life experiences need not be delayed." However, the urgent replacement of the "marketing copy" indirectly highlights a disconnect between the company's brand messaging and public sentiment.
According to statistics, Marssenger's revenue and net profit have declined for four consecutive years since 2021. From 2022 to 2024 and the first three quarters of 2025, Marssenger's annual revenues were 2.277 billion yuan, 2.139 billion yuan, 1.376 billion yuan, and 577 million yuan, respectively, with year-on-year declines of 1.81%, 6.03%, 35.68%, and 43.03%. Revenue has decreased annually, with the rate of decline accelerating.
During the same period, the company's net profit attributable to shareholders was 314.5 million yuan, 247.2 million yuan, 11.15 million yuan, and a loss of 218.3 million yuan, respectively, with year-on-year declines of 16.29%, 21.39%, 95.49%, and 1,546.12%. Similarly, profits have fallen annually, with the decline rate widening significantly.
Regarding this dismal performance, Marssenger explicitly stated in multiple financial reports that weak industry demand leading to decreased sales of its main product, integrated stoves, is the primary reason for the decline. But is that entirely accurate?
In discussions, a seasoned expert with over a decade in the kitchen appliance industry, Li Mou (pseudonym), remarked bluntly, "Marssenger's current predicament is partly due to the integrated stove category and industry factors, but more significantly stems from unclear internal management strategies and low organizational efficiency, facing dual challenges of 'internal troubles' and 'external threats'."
As a sector highly dependent on pre-installation in new real estate properties, the integrated stove industry's development is deeply tied to the real estate cycle. With reduced new home deliveries in recent years, business slowdown is partly environmental. However, comparing performance with peers like Robam and Vanward Electric reveals that Marssenger's revenue and profit declines far exceed those of its competitors, indicating that external factors alone are not to blame.
Why are traditional kitchen appliance companies experiencing slow sales declines, while Marssenger faces sharp drops in both sales and profits?
In Li Mou's view, operational weaknesses such as "over-reliance on integrated stoves (over 80% of product mix)," "singular product structure with insufficient innovation (low R&D expenditure)," and "excessive dependence on a 'burn money for growth' model" are the main reasons for Marssenger's sharp performance decline during critical times.
It has been noted that in recent years, Marssenger has significantly increased efforts in brand marketing. According to its financial report for the first three quarters of 2025, the sales expense ratio reached 46.8%, a sharp increase of nearly 20 percentage points from 27.47% in the same period last year.
However, this surge in marketing expenses coincided with a 43.03% revenue decline and a 1,546.12% drop in net profit attributable to shareholders for the first three quarters of 2025, performing more bleakly than Robam, Vanward Electric, and Shuai Feng.
Notably, recent significant share reductions occurred by entities acting in concert with Marssenger's actual controller, Huang Weibin. On January 14, Marssenger announced that between October 14, 2025, and January 13, 2026, Zhoushan Daxing reduced its holdings by 2,000,000 shares (0.49%) via centralized bidding and 480,000 shares (0.12%) via block trades; Zhoushan Dahong reduced holdings by 2,000,000 shares (0.49%) and 813,000 shares (0.20%) through the same methods, totaling 5,293,000 shares (1.30%).
Over the past year, pressured by continuously "deteriorating" company performance, several executives, including actual controller and chairman Huang Weibin, have collectively taken salary cuts to varying degrees.
According to Marssenger's 2024 annual report, the total compensation for directors, supervisors, and senior management was 10.2765 million yuan, a collective reduction of approximately 22% from the 13.235 million yuan actually paid in 2023. Notably, Huang Weibin, deputy general manager Huang Zecheng, and board secretary Mao Weiping saw significant cuts, with salaries reduced from 1.78 million yuan, 1.137 million yuan, and 858,500 yuan in 2023 to 1.5619 million yuan, 978,700 yuan, and 655,100 yuan, respectively, declines of 12.25%, 13.92%, and 23.69%.
Additionally, the company is attempting to revitalize organizational efficiency through internal reforms to survive.
Recently, Marssenger's management underwent drastic personnel changes. Deputy general manager Yang Gen and non-independent director Tang Rong resigned successively. Before resigning as deputy general manager, Yang Gen also held the position of marketing general manager.
However, industry sources revealed that the marketing general manager position has now been assumed by Duan Jinxing, the newly joined former domestic sales general manager of Vanward. Furthermore, following Duan's appointment, Marssenger's brand and service departments have also been reinforced with several seasoned industry professionals.
Public information shows that during his tenure at Vanward Electric, Duan Jinxing advanced from strategic planning to overall responsibility for domestic marketing, spearheading Vanward's "online-offline omnichannel linkage" customer acquisition strategy and driving digital upgrades for over a thousand stores nationwide. Latest financial reports indicate that despite the overall kitchen appliance industry downturn, Vanward Electric achieved revenue growth of 5.54% and net profit growth of 5.57% for the first three quarters of 2025.
But can introducing executives from the Vanward system help Marssenger reverse its performance "downturn"? The outcome remains uncertain.
"All companies in the integrated stove industry grew and expanded leveraging the real estate boom. During industry upswings, performance can掩盖一切问题; during downturns, all concealed organizational development issues erupt simultaneously, severely testing the adaptability of leadership and senior management. Based on the integrated stove industry's development history and recent performance, their adaptability appears insufficient," the aforementioned source commented. Future strategic choices—whether to stick solely to integrated stoves or pursue integrated kitchen solutions, focus entirely on renovation markets or deepen existing channel layouts—will ultimately impact the company's trajectory, decisions not solely resolvable by hiring a few managers.
The source even expressed concern: "Marssenger previously relied heavily on high margins and retail store survival, whereas Vanward often depends on primary agents expanding outlets and low-price bulk wholesale. Marssenger's agents largely cannot handle large-scale stockpiling or wholesale sales. Applying Vanward's mindset to Marssenger's operations and retail agents might prove ineffective."
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