On the evening of November 9, Tech-Bank Food Co.,Ltd. (002124.SZ) announced that Tongwei Group had been confirmed as the restructuring industrial investor, with a Restructuring Investment Agreement signed. Tongwei Group plans to acquire 1.47 billion newly issued shares at 0.98 yuan per share, with a total investment of 1.441 billion yuan. Upon completion of the restructuring, it is expected to become the controlling shareholder of Tech-Bank Food Co.,Ltd. and has committed not to transfer the shares for 60 months.
On the final trading day before the announcement, Tech-Bank Food Co.,Ltd. had already hit the daily limit up in advance, closing with a market capitalization of only 4.89 billion yuan. A feed giant whose core solar business has lost money for two consecutive years and whose stock price has fallen by 80% is stepping in to take over a pig farming company with a debt-to-asset ratio exceeding 91% that is mired in pre-restructuring. The logic of this deal does not lie at the peak of the cycle, but in the industrial gap between two entities each trapped in their own difficulties.
The foundation of Tech-Bank: repeated slaughter by the pig cycle, pre-restructuring dragged on for two years
The profit trajectory of Tech-Bank Food Co.,Ltd. is almost a textbook sample of the pig cycle: a net loss attributable to shareholders of 4.462 billion yuan in 2021, a brief profit of 490 million yuan in 2022, another loss of 2.883 billion yuan in 2023, a "turnaround" of 1.459 billion yuan in 2024 relying on non-recurring gains such as asset disposals, and a renewed loss of 1.309 billion yuan in 2025.
The deterioration in 2026 outpaced any previous cycle. Revenue for the first three quarters was 5.374 billion yuan, down 20.01% year-on-year; net loss attributable to shareholders was 1.658 billion yuan, compared with a profit of 260 million yuan in the same period last year, swinging from profit to loss; net loss after deducting non-recurring items was 1.933 billion yuan. As of the end of September, the debt-to-asset ratio had risen to 91.84%, with monetary funds of only 58.2469 million yuan, a decrease of 74% from the beginning of the period.
The full cost of fattening pigs fell to 12.63 yuan per kilogram, but the average price of commercial fattening pigs was only 10.17 yuan per kilogram, with the selling price and cost inverted by about 2.46 yuan per kilogram. The more pigs sold, the more money lost. The debt crisis did not begin in 2026. In March 2024, Tech-Bank Food Co.,Ltd. voluntarily applied to the court for restructuring and pre-restructuring, a case of "proactively defusing the bomb" rather than being pressured by creditors.
Since then, the pre-restructuring period has been extended five times, with the latest expiration pushed to May 9, 2027. During this period, the initially selected industrial investor Jianfa Wuchan unilaterally terminated the contract because state-owned asset approval was not granted, and Nanning Liyuan and 11 financial investors withdrew one after another. Tongwei was only selected as the takeover party in the second round of public recruitment.
Tech-Bank has previously experienced ST status. During the previous phase when debt and loss pressures were concentrated, the company's stock was subject to other risk warnings, with restructuring expectations and delisting risks intertwined for a long time. This time, if the court formally rules to accept the restructuring, the stock will be subject to delisting risk warnings; if the restructuring fails, there is a possibility of bankruptcy and termination of listing. What Tongwei is buying is a target that has not yet emerged from pre-restructuring and could be labeled *ST at any time.
The foundation of Tongwei: the solar "money printing machine" stops, losing nearly 20 billion yuan in two years
If Tech-Bank's problem is the pig cycle, Tongwei's problem is the solar cycle, and on a larger scale. During the 2022 polysilicon super-cycle, Tongwei Co., Ltd.'s market capitalization once reached 305 billion yuan, with the stock price peaking at 60.04 yuan (adjusted). Polysilicon prices fell from a high of 300,000 yuan per ton to 30,000 to 40,000 yuan per ton, a decline of more than 85%, and Tongwei's profit machine subsequently shut down.
Net loss attributable to shareholders was 7.039 billion yuan in 2024, widening to 9.553 billion yuan in 2025, the largest annual loss since listing; in the first three quarters of 2026, the loss continued at 6.759 billion yuan, with the debt-to-asset ratio rising further from 72.63% at the end of 2025 to 75.60%. At the group level, the two-year cumulative loss approached 20 billion yuan.
The collapse in the stock price occurred simultaneously. From 60.04 yuan in July 2022 to 10.32 yuan in July 2026 (the lowest price since 2022), Tongwei Co., Ltd. fell by about 83% cumulatively, with market capitalization evaporating by more than 240 billion yuan. As of November 2026, the equity pledges of the controlling shareholder and concert parties had touched the estimated liquidation line, with pledged shares accounting for about 36.56% of their holdings. Short-term debt stood at 28.895 billion yuan, while broad monetary funds were 26.582 billion yuan, with monetary funds no longer sufficient to cover short-term debt.
Tongwei does have a "ballast stone." The agriculture and animal husbandry segment contributed 2.771 billion yuan in main business profit in 2025, with a gross margin of 9.47%, remaining stable while solar declined across the board; but 2.7 billion yuan in agricultural and animal husbandry profit, in the face of 9.5 billion yuan in solar losses, can only offset, not reverse.
The synergy is not in solar, but in the downstream gap in feed
The market easily interprets this deal as a "solar company crossing over into pig farming," but the intersection between Tongwei and Tech-Bank began long before solar entered a downward cycle. In 2021, Tech-Bank Food Co.,Ltd. transferred all of its aquatic feed assets and some pig feed business equity to Tongwei Co., Ltd. for a consideration of 1.271 billion yuan.
After the transaction, Tech-Bank transformed to focus on pig farming, while agreeing that all its future pig feed needs would be purchased from a joint venture 51% owned by Tongwei, making Tech-Bank a major downstream customer of Tongwei's feed business. This industrial chain relationship became the underlying logic of the restructuring five years later.
Tongwei started with aquatic feed, and the scale and cost advantages of its agriculture and animal husbandry segment in feed are already quite mature, but in pig farming, the largest downstream segment of livestock and poultry feed, it has never established a sufficient volume of its own outlet. Tech-Bank has a considerable scale of pig slaughter, with cumulative sales of 6.2629 million commercial pigs from January to October 2026, still growing year-on-year. Controlling Tech-Bank means Tongwei's feed capacity gains a stable, controllable internal demand pool, shifting from "selling feed to farmers" to "supplying feed to its own farms." The 60-month lock-up period also indicates that this is not an exit-oriented financial investment, but a long-term calculation of vertical industrial chain integration.
The problem is that the premise for this synergy logic to hold is that Tech-Bank can survive until the pig cycle recovers. Tongwei's 1.441 billion yuan investment needs to be prioritized for paying bankruptcy expenses, common benefit debts, and repaying bankruptcy claims, with any remainder used to supplement Tech-Bank's working capital. This money solves the creditors' repayment problem, not directly Tech-Bank's inverted breeding costs and selling prices. Tech-Bank's future cash flow still depends on whether pig prices can return above the cost line.
The double bet of counter-cyclical takeover
The essence of this deal is that Tongwei uses the stable profits of its feed main business and the cash still on its books to buy a downstream outlet at the bottom of the pig cycle, while bearing the dual risks of Tech-Bank's restructuring failure and its own solar main business continuing to bleed. For Tech-Bank, Tongwei's entry ends the previous deadlock of successive industrial investor withdrawals and gives creditors a repayable plan to move forward.
For Tongwei, the vertical filling of the feed industry chain is a genuine industrial demand, but after investing 1.441 billion yuan, what it buys is a pig farming company that has not yet emerged from pre-restructuring, with a debt-to-asset ratio of 91.84% and quarterly losses still expanding. The smoothness of industrial logic does not automatically dissolve the uncertainty of the restructuring itself—whether the court accepts it, whether the creditors' meeting approves it, and when pig prices return above the cost line, none of these variables have been settled.
A solar company that lost nearly 20 billion yuan in two years is stepping in to take over a pig farming company with a debt-to-asset ratio exceeding 91%. This is not mutual salvation at the bottom of the cycle, but more like two people each trapped in their own cycle, choosing to push their chips onto the same table of the industrial chain.
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