On November 5, 2026, Douyin Group Vice President Li Liang posted a single line on Weibo: "I was recently criticized by the company for making intense remarks."
That sentence seemed casual and understated, yet it brought a ten-day public debate to an unflattering pause.
A vice president of a company valued at hundreds of billions of dollars had sparred with others on social media across multiple rounds, escalating from "pure nonsense" to "either malicious or foolish," and ultimately ending with "criticized by the company."
On the surface, this looks like a PR incident caused by a senior executive's failure to manage his personal emotions. But if you stretch the timeline and examine Li Liang's two public pushbacks this year side by side, a more intriguing picture emerges: ByteDance 鈥?the most aggressive growth machine in Chinese internet over the past decade 鈥?is showing an almost allergic anxiety toward the "monopoly suspicion" in its public opinion environment.
This anxiety is not unfounded. When a single platform accounts for nearly 40% of Chinese mobile internet users' total time spent, when its overseas e-commerce business devours the market at a pace that doubles every year, and when its AI capital expenditure dwarfs that of the vast majority of listed companies, it inevitably faces one question: Does this count as a monopoly?
And Li Liang's two pushbacks have precisely exposed how ByteDance has struggled to find its footing when confronting that question.
First Pushback: Using "Accounting Standards" to Deflect Profit Questions
Let's go back to April 2026. At the time, a stunning piece of news was circulating in financial circles: ByteDance's 2025 net profit had plummeted more than 70% year-on-year, shrinking from approximately $33 billion in 2024 to just over $9 billion, with net profit margin falling off a cliff from 25% to single digits.
For a company that is not publicly listed but whose valuation has long ranked among the highest globally, such figures were enough to trigger a chain reaction of panic among suppliers, advertisers, and global partners.
Li Liang's response was swift. On April 20, he reposted a related blog post on Weibo and issued a clarification. His core message was that the 70% decline was a book figure under international accounting standards, which included "non-operational substantive factors" such as changes in preferred stock and option costs, and that after excluding these factors, the company's revenue and profit were still growing.
He also acknowledged that slowing growth in Douyin e-commerce and increased investment in emerging businesses had indeed caused a "slight decline" in operating profit margin, but that it was far less dramatic than rumors suggested.
From a PR technique standpoint, this response was competent. It was timely, specific, backed by data, and did not attack the questioner. But what truly deserves attention is another set of information Li Liang incidentally disclosed in his clarification: ByteDance's full-year 2025 revenue was approximately $186 billion, up 20% year-on-year; overseas business growth was close to 50%, with its revenue share exceeding 30% for the first time; TikTok e-commerce GMV surged nearly 70% year-on-year, approaching the $100 billion mark.
At the same time, the company's full-year capital expenditure exceeded 150 billion yuan, primarily directed toward AI chips, computing infrastructure, and large model research and development.
Put these numbers together and the picture becomes clear: ByteDance isn't incapable of making money 鈥?it's reinvesting the money it earns at an astonishing speed. The 150 billion yuan in capital expenditure amounts to more than one-tenth of annual revenue, all bet on AI, a field that has yet to generate returns at scale.
This is a classic "trade profit for the future" strategy, not uncommon among tech giants. But the problem is that when a company simultaneously holds over 40% of user time share, nearly $100 billion in e-commerce GMV, and capital expenditure capacity sufficient to stir the global AI computing market, using "accounting standards" to explain profit declines is hard not to be interpreted as a defensive move in the court of public opinion.
The real target of Li Liang's first pushback was not so much the anonymous "person familiar with the matter" as it was public doubt about ByteDance's profitability. He needed to use "still growing" to stabilize market confidence, but it was precisely this eagerness to clarify that made outsiders realize: ByteDance itself is well aware that its size has grown so large that any slight disturbance will be magnified and scrutinized.
Second Pushback: When the Word "Monopoly" Is Placed on the Table
If April's profit controversy was merely a minor friction at the financial level, then the "ByteDance Time" debate that erupted in late October directly touched ByteDance's most sensitive nerve.
On October 26, veteran media figure Qin Shuo published an article on "Qin Shuo's Friend Circle," citing QuestMobile data from a Nomura Securities report, pointing out that ByteDance-affiliated apps accounted for more than 40% of time spent on China's mobile internet, and raising a question: Is China's internet transitioning from "Tencent Time" to "ByteDance Time"?
The framing itself was not new. Over the past few years, discussions about ByteDance products capturing user attention have never stopped. But Qin Shuo's identity and choice of words gave it different weight: a veteran media figure who has long observed Chinese business, using a "changing of eras" framework to describe ByteDance's rise. This meant that "monopoly" was no longer just an emotional label in internet comment sections 鈥?it was beginning to enter the realm of serious business discourse.
Li Liang's reaction was more intense than most observers expected. On October 27, he publicly responded that the characterization was "extremely imprecise and pure nonsense." Over the following days, the two sides engaged in multiple rounds of exchange over data methodology.
Li Liang pointed out that the Nomura report's data only covered the top 50 mobile apps, without including long-tail apps or PC-end usage time, and that using this data to derive a "ByteDance Time" conclusion was not rigorous.
From a statistical standpoint, this rebuttal had merit. Any time-spent statistic based on top 50 apps will overestimate the concentration of leading platforms while underestimating the dispersity of the long-tail ecosystem.
But Li Liang did not stop at the data-level rebuttal. On November 4, after Hu Xijin publicly criticized him for "lacking the demeanor of a major company," Li Liang posted again, escalating his language further. He called Qin Shuo "either malicious or foolish" and offered a surprising explanation: Qin Shuo's characterization of "ByteDance Time" was "extremely sinister" because it "undoubtedly releases Tencent from the 'monopoly' it has struggled with for decades, and pins ByteDance within a narrative of 'possible monopoly,' shifting the offense-defense dynamic."
He even said: "If this positioning becomes consensus, Qin Shuo will become the greatest 'benefactor' in Tencent's history!"
This passage carries enormous implications. It shows that what Li Liang truly cared about was never the analysis article about Hongguo short dramas and user time itself. What he truly feared was the "monopoly" label transferring from Tencent to ByteDance.
In his narrative, Tencent is the one that has long relied on the exclusivity of its WeChat ecosystem to suppress competitors 鈥?he specifically brought up the old matter from eight years ago when WeChat restricted Douyin link sharing, and noted that the related litigation remains unresolved to this day. And once the "ByteDance Time" framing becomes consensus, the public will forget Tencent's historical problems and instead scrutinize ByteDance through the magnifying glass of monopoly.
Li Liang's logic is not entirely without basis. WeChat's blocking of Douyin links did indeed persist for years, and the related litigation has indeed been dragging on. But the problem is that the method he adopted in arguing this point precisely undermined the credibility of the argument itself.
A vice president publicly accusing a media figure of being "either foolish or malicious" on a public platform, implying that his "articles are priced" and that he "shills for companies," yet failing to produce publicly verifiable evidence 鈥?this appears to outsiders more like an offensive-as-defensive public opinion tactic than a serious industry discussion.
The reason Hu Xijin's criticism resonated so widely is precisely because this tactic genuinely came across as "lacking the demeanor of a major company."
What's more subtle is how Li Liang wrapped things up on November 5. He said he was "criticized by the company," but did not specify who issued the criticism, in what form, or whether it meant he acknowledged his previous remarks were wrong. This vague statement 鈥?part apology, part complaint 鈥?only made outsiders more convinced: ByteDance internally has not formed a calm, persuasive strategy for handling the "monopoly" narrative.
The Root of Anxiety: When Growth Itself Becomes the Problem
Looking at the two pushbacks together, a pattern emerges. In April's profit controversy, Li Liang used "accounting standards" to deflect external doubts about ByteDance's profit quality. In October's time-spent debate, he used "imprecise data" and "impure motives" to deflect external questions about ByteDance's market position.
The common thread between the two responses: strongly defensive, strongly aggressive, and both attempting to shift the discussion from "Is ByteDance too big?" to "Is the questioner problematic?"
Behind this defensive posture lies a structural dilemma facing ByteDance. Its growth story has been so successful that success itself is becoming a burden.
The 2025 revenue of $186 billion, a global app matrix with 4 billion monthly active users, TikTok e-commerce's explosive overseas expansion 鈥?these numbers would be boast-worthy achievements in any business narrative. But when a Chinese company simultaneously challenges Meta's social empire, Amazon's e-commerce heartland, and OpenAI's AI race on a global scale, it inevitably faces scrutiny from all sides: Where are your boundaries?
In the history of China's internet, no company has entered so many fields simultaneously at such speed and scale. Tencent's monopoly controversy centered mainly on social networking and gaming, Alibaba's on e-commerce and forced exclusivity, while ByteDance's tentacles reach into content, e-commerce, local services, AI infrastructure, overseas payments, and even enterprise services.
Douyin Life Services' 2025 paid GMV is projected to exceed 850 billion yuan, competing head-on with Meituan; TikTok Shop's GMV grew approximately 25-fold in three months after launching in Brazil, and about 20-fold in four months after launching in Japan. These numbers mean that in every newly entered field, ByteDance rapidly becomes a force that cannot be ignored.
This is precisely the most dangerous soil for the "monopoly" narrative. The core concern of antitrust law is not market share itself, but the abuse of market dominance. But in public perception, share is original sin. When concepts like "ByteDance Time" appear, they provide a concise, easily communicable framework that allows ordinary people to understand a complex reality: your attention, your consumption, your creativity are being organized by the same set of algorithms and the same platform ecosystem.
Li Liang can rebut data methodology, but he cannot rebut this intuition at the level of daily experience.
A deeper anxiety perhaps stems from ByteDance's sensitivity about its own "origins." Unlike Tencent and Alibaba, ByteDance is the only Chinese giant that rose during the mobile internet era and truly went global. It did not experience the baptism of monopoly controversies from the PC era, nor did it accumulate response experience from those famous antitrust public opinion battles in the 2010s.
When the "monopoly" label was seriously applied to it for the first time, its first reaction was anger and denial, not dialogue and deconstruction. Li Liang's "either malicious or foolish" is essentially a stress response of a newcomer facing interrogation in the style of the old order.
The Words Left Unspoken
In Li Liang's long post on November 4, there was one sentence that may have been the most honest expression throughout the entire debate. He said: "Some thoughts perhaps should stay in the heart and not be said directly."
The thought he did not say aloud might be something like this: ByteDance is indeed very large 鈥?so large that even it doesn't know where the boundary should be drawn.
Douyin e-commerce is slowing in growth rate, but its volume is still expanding; TikTok faces unrelenting political pressure overseas, yet remains the fastest-growing engine; AI investment devours tens of billions of dollars in profit annually, but no one dares to stop, because stopping means ceding the future to competitors.
In such a situation, any discussion about "monopoly" is like asking a person sprinting at full speed: "Are you running this fast because you've blocked everyone else's path?" And his only possible answer is "I haven't," and then he keeps running.
Li Liang's two pushbacks 鈥?one using accounting terminology, one using moral accusations 鈥?neither truly answered the question that was repeatedly raised. But their value lies precisely in this: they let outsiders see ByteDance's true state when confronting this question.
A truly composed company does not need its vice president to argue with people on Weibo. A company with genuine security can respond to doubts with a detailed report or a candid communication meeting, rather than dismissing the questioner's qualifications with "either malicious or foolish."
Whether ByteDance's monopoly position holds ultimately requires serious legal and economic analysis to determine, not a single column or a single Weibo post. But Li Liang's anxiety is real, and this anxiety has its rationale.
When a platform's user time share approaches the monopoly threshold, when its capital expenditure is enough to affect supply and demand across the entire AI industry chain, when its overseas expansion simultaneously touches the nerves of regulators in multiple countries, it indeed has reason to worry: Will the next one pushed onto the antitrust defendant's bench be itself?
The problem is that anxiety itself cannot become a reason to refuse discussion. Li Liang said Qin Shuo's characterization was "sinister," but perhaps he should think about this: If "ByteDance Time" really were just an imprecise statistical inference, why would it resonate so widely? Why do so many people express unease about platform power under this topic?
This unease may not all be rational, may not all be based on complete data, but it genuinely exists, and it will not disappear just because a vice president says "pure nonsense."
The November 5 statement that he was "criticized by the company" may mean that ByteDance internally has realized that waging public opinion battles through an executive's personal account is not the way to solve problems. But what comes after the criticism?
If ByteDance cannot produce a framework more persuasive than "accounting standards" and "questioning motives" to address monopoly concerns, then the next time a "ByteDance Time"-style framing emerges, it may still only be able to send another executive to say "either malicious or foolish" on Weibo once again.
And the public's patience will not forever wait for a vice president to learn how to speak properly.
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