BC cells fail to turn the tide; future prospects lie in perovskite technology.
Longi Green Energy Technology Co., Ltd. reported Q3 revenue of RMB 18.1 billion, down 9.78% year-on-year, with a net loss attributable to shareholders of RMB -834 million—a significant reduction from the previous year's loss of RMB -1.26 billion.
This trend is not unique to Longi. Across the solar industry, Q3 earnings reports show substantially narrowed losses, confirming a profitability bottom—particularly in the polysilicon segment. The improvement stems from rising polysilicon prices, driven by anti-internal competition policies targeting the most oversupplied upstream sector.
The entire photovoltaic supply chain—from polysilicon to wafers, cells, and modules—has benefited from these policies, reversing price declines. Market speculation, from May 2025 rumors of "six polysilicon giants planning mergers of tail-end capacity" to October whispers of "17 companies signing off on industry-wide capacity reserves," fueled a rally in solar stocks from September to November.
However, on November 12, an online rumor claiming a JA Solar executive stated the reserve plan had collapsed triggered a sector-wide sell-off, despite official denials.
While capacity reserves could alleviate industry-wide losses—given the unsustainable pressure of internal competition—acquiring outdated capacity is unlikely to prevent new overcapacity or spur innovation. Longi emphasized in its earnings call that China aims to phase out obsolete capacity through innovation.
Longi's strategy focuses on self-improvement and technological advancement, particularly cost reductions and efficiency gains in BC cells, including metal solutions and BC battery upgrades. A misstep in 2023–2024 was prematurely scaling BC cell production before achieving a cost advantage over TOPCon, leading to significant inventory and equipment impairments.
The company has since upgraded to BC 2.0, maintaining a 20–30W power advantage over TOPCon. By August 2025, Longi achieved a 97% yield rate for HPBC 2.0, with mature technology and monthly capacity reaching 2GW (currently ramping up).
Q3 BC cell sales hit 14.48GW, with Longi targeting 50% high-efficiency BC capacity by year-end. HPBC 2.0 now dominates at over 95%, while HPBC 1.0 fades. Full-year BC capacity is projected at 50GW, with BC modules exceeding 25% of shipments.
Management expects Q4 gross profit to offset operating expenses, though net profit may remain slightly negative due to investments. However, industry profitability and stock performance remain tethered to anti-internal competition policies, with capacity rationalization posing execution challenges. Even by 2026, a rapid solar sector recovery appears unlikely.
Longi's BC cells lack a decisive cost edge over TOPCon, making perovskite technology the ultimate battleground. Recent stock declines persisted despite Chairman Zhong Baoshen completing a RMB 100.69 million buyback (slightly above the planned RMB 100 million) on November 26.
Separately, speculation about Longi acquiring an energy storage firm—a logical move given peers' solar-storage integration to stabilize power output—holds limited significance. Longi has historically avoided storage, conceding rivals like Sungrow and CATL hold insurmountable leads. Competitors such as Trina, Jinko, and JA Solar already have years of storage deployment experience.
Instead, Longi prioritizes green hydrogen via its "green power + green hydrogen" strategy, excelling in electrolyzer production—a key differentiator from peers.
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