Investor calls for the removal of fund manager Pan Lingzi have finally been heeded by Dongfang Alpha.
On June 13, Dongfang Alpha Zhaoyang Mixed Fund and Dongfang Alpha Technology Select Fund both announced that fund manager Pan Lingzi would step down due to "personal reasons," leading to his dismissal from the fund manager role without reassignment to other positions within the company.
As early as June 4, the company had already appointed Zhou Mi to co-manage the Dongfang Alpha Zhaoyang Mixed Fund with him. Nine days later, Pan Lingzi was removed. This move was executed swiftly and decisively, without any transition period.
For as long as investors have been hoping for this change, the fund has been declining.
The Dongfang Alpha Zhaoyang Mixed Fund A, established in March 2021, has fallen over 60%, with its current unit net asset value at only 0.386 yuan. This means an initial investment of 100,000 yuan would now be worth just 38,600 yuan after five years.
Combined with investor redemptions, the fund's total size at launch was approximately 1.12 billion yuan, but it has now dwindled to just 240 million yuan, a severe contraction.
In the fund community's comment section, investor sentiment is overwhelmingly unified: "We strongly demand a change of fund manager."
While investors have now seen this wish fulfilled, whether their money can be recovered remains uncertain. Adding to the irony, Liu Ming, the founder of Dongfang Alpha, also managed this fund for an extended period, with performance even worse than Pan Lingzi's.
A 30-Cent Fund Unsalvageable Even in a Bull Market
Pan Lingzi's resume is not lacking. He holds a Bachelor's in Insurance from Nankai University and a Master's in Accounting from the University of Hong Kong. He joined Dongfang Alpha Fund Management Co., Ltd. in 2019, specializing in macro strategy analysis with deep research in sectors like automotive, financial real estate, construction materials, and non-ferrous metals cycles.
However, the performance of the two funds he managed tells a different story.
In June 2025, he began managing the new Dongfang Alpha Technology Select Fund. This fund was soon co-managed by two, then three individuals, with Pan Lingzi, Zhou Mi, and Liang Shaowen jointly overseeing it. Now just over a year old, Pan Lingzi's tenure return is nearly 65%, compared to a peer average of 36%, which initially appears impressive.
But the other fund reveals his true performance level.
The Dongfang Alpha Zhaoyang Mixed Fund A was established in March 2021. Pan Lingzi joined its management in November 2024, with a cumulative tenure of 567 days through co-management and solo management, resulting in a total tenure return of -25%.
The fund has accumulated a loss of 61.4% since inception, ranking at the very bottom of the market. Pan Lingzi's management period contributed nearly half of these losses.
Some have defended him, arguing the fund's issues are not solely his fault. Indeed, all four fund managers who have managed it have recorded losses.
Calculating the actual contribution to net asset value during each manager's tenure, Liu Ming, the founder and general manager of Dongfang Alpha, incurred the most significant losses. He managed the fund alone or jointly for over three years, with respective tenure returns of -15.21%, -16.44%, -28.92%, and -6.29%, compounding to a massive -67%.
Subsequent manager Gao Fengchen lost 16%. Then Pan Lingzi, at the helm for about a year and a half, lost 25%. The latest addition, Zhou Mi, managed it for 10 days and also lost 2.48%.
Overall, Liu Ming's performance was even worse than Pan Lingzi's, creating a quartet of loss-making managers. Of course, as the boss, Liu Ming would not fire himself.
Now, only General Manager Liu Ming remains from this "loss-making quartet," but he currently has no funds to manage. Looking back, neither Gao Fengchen nor Pan Lingzi, both recruited by Liu Ming, managed to achieve positive returns on this fund, and both have since left. The pressure now falls on Zhou Mi.
Heavy Military Holdings and Fragile Investment Research
The question arises: with all departing managers recording losses, is it merely bad luck?
Losses before 2024 could be attributed to a bear market. However, from 2024 to the present, it has been a solid bull market. Particularly during Pan Lingzi's tenure, which coincided with the golden period of the bull market, losses continued unabated. Investors' anger is truly justified.
This fund has long been heavily invested in the military sector. In the first-quarter 2026 report, the fund manager stated they "continue to be optimistic about the rise of China's high-end manufacturing represented by the military industry, while also paying attention to certain small metals and military materials in the upstream military supply chain with strong demand, supply constraints, and pricing power."
The logic may seem sharp, but the execution has been chaotic.
The military industry sector often sees more speculative trading based on concepts than sustained performance-driven gains, typically experiencing short-lived surges following geopolitical events followed by prolonged declines. Heavy investment in this sector first requires enduring significant beta volatility. The CSI Military Industry Index has gained 30.65% from 2024 to date, underperforming even the Shanghai Composite Index.
Stock selection is the true test of a fund's quality. As of the end of the first quarter of 2026, the fund's top holdings included Hongdu Aviation Industry Co Ltd, Chengdu Aircraft Industrial (Group) Co Ltd, Aerospace Nanhu Co Ltd, AECC Aviation Power Co Ltd, Zhenhua Co Ltd, and Guorui Technology Co Ltd. This year, these have mostly trended downward, with Hongdu Aviation falling over 20%. It did not hold any of the well-performing military industry leaders or small metals leaders that have risen.
This pattern of being heavily invested and consistently trapped is no longer a matter of luck; it exposes a critical weakness in Dongfang Alpha's investment research capabilities. The company's name includes "Alpha," sounding impressive, but it has delivered negative alpha to its investors.
As a purely employee-owned public fund manager, Dongfang Alpha's assets under management peaked at 14 billion yuan in 2021 but have since fallen to just over 7.4 billion yuan. Moreover, its products are almost entirely equity funds, which rely heavily on research, yet many have underperforming net asset values.
After General Manager Liu Ming stepped down as fund manager, he passed the troubled portfolio to Pan Lingzi, who struggled for over half a year before also being overwhelmed by poor performance. Management's strategy of "changing personnel like changing tools" has now broken two tools in succession. Investors' capital has been repeatedly eroded.
Renowned Manager from Shenwan Lingxin Also Exits
June 13 was not only Pan Lingzi's last day.
Shenwan Lingxin Fund also announced that fund manager Jia Chengdong would step down due to "personal reasons," relinquishing all his managed funds.
Jia Chengdong had been with Shenwan Lingxin for less than two years. He joined from China Merchants Fund at the end of 2024, arriving with the光环 of a billion-yuan fund manager. Within just three months of joining, he was appointed deputy general manager, overseeing investment research. The company even custom-created the Shenwan Lingxin Industry Select Mixed Fund for him, with an initial offering size of 1.219 billion yuan. The fanfare was significant, and investor expectations were high.
The result? By the time of his departure, his tenure return on the fund was -29.96%, ranking 4544th out of 4567 similar products over the past year, nearly at the very bottom. The fund's size shrank from 1.219 billion yuan to 328 million yuan, a 70% evaporation in one year.
Looking at the net asset value trend, it briefly reached a new high of 1.1291 yuan on January 29 this year, then began a half-year-long decline. The Shenwan Lingxin New Power Mixed Fund, which he co-managed with Gong Xiao, also recorded a tenure return of -8.72%, ranking at the bottom of its category.
Examining his investment style, Jia Chengdong's issues are also apparent: extreme sector rotation, with top ten holdings rarely held for more than a year. His portfolio in the fourth quarter of last year was relatively balanced, involving metals, energy, healthcare, and wind power. In the first quarter of this year, he suddenly shifted heavily towards the non-ferrous metals sector, with new heavy positions in Shandong Gold Mining Co Ltd, Zhaojin Mining Industry Co Ltd, Chifeng Jilong Gold Mining Co Ltd, and Xingye Silver & Tin Co Ltd.
He precisely bought at the peak. Since 2026, intense divergence within the non-ferrous metals sector led to a sharp drop in the fund's net asset value.
Most ironically, shortly after his departure, metal stocks began a strong rebound. Yet the fund's net asset value curve continues to decline. Did he perhaps sell at the bottom again to chase other hot sectors?
Shenwan Lingxin paid a high price for what turned out to be a complete failure.
Different companies, the same outcome. Fund managers who cannot be saved even by a bull market are unlikely to succeed, regardless of the platform they switch to.
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