Global FX in 2027: Volatility to Return, Divergence to Deepen

Deep News11-16

In 2027, global foreign exchange markets may see a return of volatility and greater divergence.

(1) The expectation of synchronized tightening among major central banks may be broken, with fundamental divergence taking the lead in interest rate differentials; (2) upward momentum for the US dollar may weaken, easing pressure on non-US currencies globally; (3) fiscal issues will enter a verification phase, with risk release potentially driving currency divergence; (4) rising AI concerns may trigger global capital reallocation. Click the mini-program to view the original report.

Looking back at 2026, the characteristics of global FX market movements centered on: (1) lower volatility: despite numerous macro events, overall volatility fell to historic lows, possibly because major central bank policy directions converged, simplifying pricing logic; (2) high-yield advantage: high-yield currencies generally outperformed low-yield currencies, with interest rate spreads becoming dominant, as seen in the Australian dollar and Norwegian krone; (3) US dollar recovery: a combination of a low base from last year's sharp weakening, counter-trend economic recovery, and a Fed pivot; (4) fiscal risk: French debt and Brazilian elections had clear impacts on exchange rates, raising the importance of political and other non-traditional factors; (5) AI-driven flows: heavy global tech stock positioning and deleveraging disrupted capital flows, as exemplified by Korean stocks surging while the won fell, and Korean stocks crashing while the won rose.

Looking ahead to 2027, global FX trends may return to volatility with increased divergence, with four core threads to watch: First, potential easing of US-Iran tensions and weakening global economic growth could break the synchronized tightening expectations of major central banks, increasing the impact of fundamental divergence on interest rate spreads; second, weakened upward momentum for the US dollar may ease pressure on non-US currencies; third, fiscal issues will enter a concentrated verification period, with risk release potentially driving currency divergence; fourth, rising AI concerns may bring about global capital reallocation.

I. Review of This Year's FX Market

In 2026, the global FX market showed a stronger US dollar and divergent performance among major currencies: as of October 31, the US Dollar Index (+3.62%) trended upward with oscillations during the year. Among G10 currencies, the Norwegian krone (+9.54%) and Australian dollar (+5.38%) led gains, while the Swedish krona (-6.18%), euro (-4.99%), and Swiss franc (-3.92%) were relatively weak. Emerging market currencies diverged further, with the Colombian peso (+18.25%), Korean won (+8.29%), and Chinese yuan (+5.03%) leading gains, while the Polish zloty (-8.86%), Indonesian rupiah (-8.03%), and Indian rupee (-5.35%) lagged. Overall, the 2026 global FX market exhibited three main patterns: first, overall low FX volatility with divergent performance between high-yield and low-yield currencies; second, renewed strengthening of US dollar upward momentum; third, beyond interest rate spreads, fiscal and political risks and AI-related capital flows became key pricing factors for certain currencies.

(1) High-yield and low-yield currencies diverged, with overall low FX market volatility

Within G10 currencies, high-yield currencies generally outperformed low-yield currencies. As of October 31, G10 high-yield currencies appreciated by an average of 4.48% year-to-date, while low-yield currencies depreciated by an average of 3.25%, a stark difference. Interest rate spread advantages became the decisive factor affecting relative G10 currency performance during the year.

Global FX market volatility was generally low. Despite events such as the US-Iran conflict and joint US-Japan intervention in the yen in 2026, exchange rate fluctuations were relatively moderate overall. Especially since the second quarter, geopolitical risks did not significantly transmit to the FX market, and global FX implied volatility quickly retreated after a brief rebound. The underlying logic is that carry trades and the low-volatility environment mutually reinforce each other, forming a resonance. On one hand, when FX volatility is low, currency translation loss risk declines and position return volatility narrows, improving the risk-adjusted returns of carry strategies and driving capital allocation to high-yield currencies. On the other hand, carry trades continuously push high-yield currencies to appreciate relative to low-yield currencies, further stabilizing exchange rate expectations, forming a positive feedback loop that supports the continuation of the low-volatility environment. Since 2026, the G10 carry trade cumulative return index has continued to rise, and yen intervention did not cause significant disruption. Another explanation for the overall low FX volatility may be that major global central bank monetary policy expectations converged. In 2026, major central banks generally turned toward tightening, and market expectations for each central bank's subsequent rate hike pace were relatively consistent, reducing the impact of a single country's rate adjustment on bilateral exchange rates.

(2) US dollar upward momentum recovered

In 2025, the US dollar weakened sharply, with the Dollar Index falling more than 10% for the year. Since 2026, US dollar upward momentum has recovered, with the Dollar Index gaining about 3.62% year-to-date, showing oscillating strength. The most direct endogenous pricing factor for this round of dollar strength comes from the restart of the Fed's rate hike cycle. After Warsh received the nomination as Fed Chair-designate, the market gradually began to trade a Fed pivot toward tightening. Subsequently, the strong combination of inflation and growth in economic fundamentals further deepened rate hike expectations, with energy, AI, and consumption playing important supporting roles: on the inflation front, global energy prices surged after the US-Iran conflict, inflation picked up, and gradually showed a tendency to spread to core goods and services. On the growth front, AI investment expansion drove corporate capital expenditure growth and improved US economic growth expectations. Meanwhile, as we noted in our previous report "2027 US Economy: Will Consumption Recovery Continue?", US consumption showed better-than-expected resilience this year, also supporting upward revisions to growth expectations. On the external front, the relative weakness of the euro and yen also pushed the dollar stronger passively.

(3) Fiscal and political risks and AI-related capital flows became key pricing factors

In 2026, the impact of fiscal and political risks and AI-related capital flows on exchange rates became more apparent, with the importance of pricing factors beyond traditional interest rate spreads rising.

First, fiscal and political risks affect exchange rate performance through sovereign risk premiums. For example: concerns about France's fiscal sustainability continued to intensify during the year, the France-Germany government bond spread widened significantly, and the euro came under additional downward pressure; after Brazil's presidential election in October, the market reassessed future fiscal policy and debt prospects, and the real depreciated significantly.

Second, the AI industry cycle attracted international capital flows, making the financial account's impact on exchange rates more prominent. For example: as we mentioned in our report "Korean Stocks Fall, Why Does the Won Rise?", during the first half's sharp rally driven by Korean semiconductor stocks, position limits were triggered, causing foreign investors to passively reduce holdings and actually see large outflows, which at one point dominated won weakness; the currency of China's Taiwan region also saw its movements clearly driven by capital flows during this round of AI-related trading. The New Taiwan dollar was relatively consistent with foreign net buying trends in Taiwan stocks; since the second quarter, driven by high returns on tech-related stocks, foreign capital inflows into US equities increased, which may have provided buying demand support for dollar strength.

II. US Dollar Outlook

In the short term, the most important supporting factor for the dollar remains Fed rate hike expectations. After the release of October nonfarm payrolls and CPI data, market pricing for Fed rate hike expectations rebounded significantly: October nonfarm payrolls added 165,000 jobs, with the previous two months revised up by a combined 84,000, and professional and business services adding 70,000, reflecting still-strong corporate hiring demand and consumption resilience; October CPI rose 0.4% month-on-month, with core CPI up 0.3% month-on-month. Housing inflation showed stickiness, likely elevating the inflation center. Price increases in transportation, leisure services, and related categories further confirmed the spread of inflation pressure. The market has now fully priced in a 25bp rate hike at the December FOMC meeting and begun pricing a small probability of a 50bp hike. Meanwhile, expectations point to three cumulative hikes by the June meeting next year. Combined with recent hawkish remarks from Fed officials such as Waller, rate hike expectations are expected to continue providing strong support for the dollar, with the short-term dollar likely to show a mildly strong oscillation.

In the medium term, US dollar upward momentum may weaken, with the key being that the US economy faces downside risks, and the Fed's rate hike cycle may end or even begin rate cuts. As mentioned earlier, the three pillars supporting rate hike expectations in 2026 were: energy, AI, and consumption. Looking ahead to 2027, all three have room to decline.

On energy: changes in US and Israeli elections may help cool Middle East conflicts. After the US midterms, Democrats controlling both chambers could pressure the Trump administration through presidential impeachment, investigations into core Trump administration personnel, and congressional restrictions on war funding. After the congressional power transition early next year, the new Congress may push for de-escalation of Middle East conflicts; on the Israeli side, after the October 27 election, Netanyahu's camp lost its parliamentary majority; opposition leader Eisenkot received presidential authorization to form a government. If Eisenkot succeeds in forming a government, the existing hardline foreign policy may face adjustment possibilities, and he is more likely to cooperate in promoting peace arrangements in the Middle East. Overall, political shifts in the US and Israel may push for substantive de-escalation of Middle East conflicts, and the energy supply risk premium is expected to decline.

On AI: industry narrative slowing, financing pressure rising, regulatory intensity increasing, and capital expenditure facing uncertainty. First, there are still no positive signals of convergence between AI revenue and investment; Anthropic's October ARR marginally recovered, but the market remains cautious; second, AI financing concerns continue to ferment; since October, CoreWeave's high-leverage financing model has come under market scrutiny, and related tech companies' CDS have surged sharply; third, after the midterms, expectations for Democrats to strengthen AI regulation and slow AI infrastructure are rising. Since tech advantage is increasingly becoming a major support for the dollar, if AI narrative and investment face risks, it would be bearish for the dollar.

On consumption: the three important factors supporting US consumption resilience in 2026 all face downside risks. First, the 2024-2025 Fed rate cut cycle drove improvement in bank credit conditions and a rebound in consumer credit growth. But with the Fed restarting rate hikes in 2026, consumer credit expansion in 2027 may be suppressed again; second, the wealth effect from US stock market gains in 2026 was an important support for household consumption recovery, but with rising AI asset-related concerns, US stocks in 2027 may struggle to sustain this year's high returns, and the wealth effect may shrink; third, the fiscal tax rebate effect also faces decline. In 2026, most IEEPA tariff refunds have been completed, leaving limited remaining stimulus space for 2027. Additionally, after the midterms, it will be more difficult for the Republican government to further introduce tax cuts and fiscal stimulus policies. Overall, the triple support of credit, wealth effect, and fiscal tax rebates may weaken simultaneously, and US consumption growth in 2027 may shift from better-than-expected recovery to marginal slowdown.

Under the baseline scenario, the Dollar Index is expected to oscillate in the 97-103 range in 2027, with a strong-then-weak pattern, broadly following the Fed's policy pivot. Under the baseline scenario, even if the Fed ends rate hikes in the second half or even pivots to rate cuts, the decline in the Dollar Index would still be relatively moderate. Historically, rapid downward shifts of more than 10% in the dollar's center have often been accompanied by major macro shocks. Since 1985, among 12 dollar downtrend inflection points, only 4 saw declines exceeding 10% within 6 months, mainly corresponding to three types of situations: first, major institutional changes (1985 Plaza Accord); second, major geopolitical policy shocks affecting confidence in US dollar assets (2025 Liberation Day); third, recovery after global economic recession (post-2002 dot-com bubble, post-2009 financial crisis). Currently, as long as Trump does not make extreme policy moves in 2027, the risk of a sharp dollar decline is controllable.

Under risk scenarios, including the bursting of the US tech bubble, US and global economic recession, significant deterioration in global geopolitics, or AI application breakthroughs causing global economic overheating, the dollar's direction is highly uncertain. In a scenario of tech falsification and economic recession, if risks spread globally, extreme risk aversion could catalyze a strong dollar (as after the 2000 dot-com bubble, 2008 financial crisis, and 2020 COVID pandemic); if Trump escalates tariffs and strikes on Iran, it cannot be ruled out that the dollar depreciation trade after the 2025 tariff Liberation Day could repeat; and once AI is validated and the global economy recovers in sync, the dollar may trend weaker (similar to 2017 and the second half of 2020).

III. Key Developed Market Currency Outlook

In 2027, developed market non-US currencies may strengthen overall, but individual currency movements will still show clear divergence, mainly revolving around three threads: first, a shift in dollar momentum may provide common support for developed market non-US currencies. Second, easing energy shocks and concentrated release of fiscal risks may become key determinants of relative currency performance. Third, monetary policy repricing and growth expectation divergence may drive divergence among major currencies.

(1) Euro and British pound

In 2026, the euro weakened overall, while the pound showed wide oscillations. The euro was mainly suppressed by two factors: first, the US-Iran conflict triggered a surge in energy prices, worsening Europe's terms of trade and dragging down growth expectations. Second, French fiscal risk continued to ferment, with sovereign debt risk premiums rising, putting additional downward pressure on the euro; in contrast, the pound lacked a clear trend and showed oscillation. On one hand, rising energy prices exacerbated the UK's stagflation risk. On the other hand, the UK economy showed some resilience, with inflation persistently above target pushing the Bank of England to restart rate hikes, and higher rates supporting the pound.

Looking ahead to 2027, the euro and pound may share similar trading themes: both revolve around energy shock retreat and fiscal risk, but market pricing differs. The euro is trading fiscal and political risk in a concentrated manner in the short term, while growth pressure limits the ECB's room for rate hikes, and inflation-driven rate support is relatively insufficient; the pound is trading inflation stickiness and BoE rate hike expectations in the short term, with fiscal risk not yet fully reflected in market pricing. This misalignment in rate and fiscal risk pricing may become an important driver of subsequent divergence between the euro and pound. In the short term, the euro may continue mildly weak oscillation, while the pound is expected to maintain relatively strong performance.

On the euro side, fiscal and political risks face a concentrated release window in the coming months: France's 2027 budget faces significant parliamentary resistance, compounded by the approaching presidential election next April and the risk of a far-right political shift; Spain will hold early parliamentary elections on November 29, with uncertainty remaining over post-election coalition formation and fiscal policy direction; Belgium's governing coalition is also deadlocked over fiscal consolidation plans. Related risks may keep eurozone sovereign risk premiums elevated, suppressing short-term euro performance.

On the pound side, short-term inflation pressure and economic resilience remain strong: September core CPI rose to 2.8% year-on-year, corporate inflation expectations for the next year rebounded to 3.3%, and the BoE revised up its 2026 GDP growth forecast to 1.4%. Inflation and economic resilience together support further rate hike expectations, and the pound may maintain relatively strong oscillation in the short term.

In the medium term, euro suppression factors are expected to gradually ease, with moderate upside, while the pound may face repricing of rate and fiscal risks, with upward momentum weakening. On the euro side, if Middle East conflicts cool and fiscal and political risk events gradually materialize, the euro is expected to recover. Meanwhile, the German economy has shown signs of improvement, with the October business expectations index rising to 91.6, and the manufacturing sentiment net balance rebounding from April's low to 1.2, turning positive for the first time in nearly three years. As Germany's fiscal expansion effects gradually release, eurozone growth expectations may improve further.

On the pound side, the current market may be overpricing the BoE's subsequent tightening path: OIS pricing implies about 75-100bp of additional rate hike space in 2027, while the median of the BoE's market participants survey expects rates to peak at 4.25% in February 2027 and broadly stabilize, falling back to 4.0% by year-end. If energy shocks ease, there is room for interest rate risk premium giveback, weakening the pound's rate spread support; meanwhile, the market reaction after the UK's October 28 budget announcement was relatively muted, but the UK Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) revised up its 2027/28 fiscal year government debt interest payment forecast by 17.3 billion pounds to 134 billion pounds in October, with the 2030/31 fiscal year expected to rise further to 149.6 billion pounds, and the UK government's net debt ratio is expected to rise to 97.3% in 2028/29, with the fiscal rule margin in 2029/30 at only about 15 billion pounds, suggesting the market may be underpricing fiscal risk. Overall, the euro and pound face similar risk triggers, but current market pricing diverges, and a long EUR/GBP opportunity could be considered. Both are affected by energy shocks and fiscal risk, but the market has priced euro fiscal risk more fully, while for the pound it is trading more on rate hike expectations, with fiscal risk pricing relatively insufficient. From a real effective exchange rate (REER) perspective, the euro is currently relatively undervalued, while the pound is relatively overvalued, and there is room for relative valuation convergence. If common catalysts such as easing energy shocks and fiscal risk repricing materialize in the future, the euro could benefit from prior risk premium giveback, while the pound may face downward revisions to rate hike expectations and emerging fiscal pressure, pushing EUR/GBP higher in the medium term. However, attention should be paid to reverse risks from continued deterioration of political risk in France and other eurozone countries, and from UK inflation resilience exceeding expectations leading to an extended rate hike cycle.

(2) Japanese yen

Since 2026, yen weakness has been mainly affected by two factors: first, the US-Japan front-end interest rate spread remains high, and the yen, as a low-yield funding currency, continues to be suppressed by carry trades; second, the US-Iran conflict pushed up energy import costs, worsening Japan's terms of trade and widening the trade deficit, further increasing yen depreciation pressure. Although the Japanese government implemented two rounds of large-scale FX intervention, it still failed to reverse the yen's weak trend. In the short term, these pressures may be difficult to alleviate quickly, and the yen is expected to continue weak performance.

In the medium term, convergence of US and Japanese monetary policy and repatriation of overseas yen may provide support for the yen: first, the Bank of Japan is expected to continue gradual rate hikes, with the market now fully pricing two BOJ rate hikes through June next year, and the US-Japan front-end rate spread may gradually converge. Second, as Japanese domestic bond yields rise and the relative returns on overseas AI assets decline, Japanese investors may reduce overseas securities allocation and drive some capital repatriation, forming yen buying support. Additionally, if US-Iran tensions ease marginally, it would also improve Japan's terms of trade and support the yen.

Divergent market fund positioning may confirm the trend of short-term and medium-term yen momentum changes: leveraged fund positioning leans toward short-term carry trades, still mainly short, but positions have declined from earlier levels; asset management institution positioning leans toward long-term funds and has now reversed to net long, indicating long-term investment institutions are biased toward a bullish yen. But overall, a trend reversal for the yen still requires reversal conditions to be met, and there is currently a lack of clear one-sided long or short opportunities.

(3) Australian dollar

In 2026, the Australian dollar against the US dollar showed significant fluctuations. Early-year AUD upside was mainly supported by strong Australian employment and inflation resilience and the RBA restarting rate hikes. From March to May, the AUD oscillated widely as Middle East geopolitical conflicts fluctuated. Thereafter, narrowing Australia-US interest rate spreads and falling iron ore prices pushed the AUD weaker again, with a brief rebound in September supported by RBA rate hike expectations. Since October, dollar strength combined with declining global risk appetite pushed the AUD lower again.

Looking ahead, the AUD's interest rate support is gradually weakening, and combined with global risk appetite pressure and rising Australian economic recession risk, the AUD may face further weakening risk. First, AUD interest rate support is marginally weakening, and the rate hike cycle may be nearing its end. Although the RBA further raised rates by 25bp to 4.85% in November, the decision passed 6-3, with policy divergence widening. Meanwhile, the Australia-US 2-year government bond spread has recently narrowed significantly, and the AUD's relative rate spread advantage has clearly weakened. As the impact of earlier tightening policies gradually materializes, the RBA's room for further rate hikes may be limited.

Second, declining global risk appetite continues to suppress the AUD. After the US midterms, AI regulatory concerns are rising, and recent tech stock adjustments have driven increased market risk aversion. As a typical risk-sensitive currency, the AUD is vulnerable to negative impacts from global stock market volatility and safe-haven capital flows. If AI-related concerns continue to ferment, causing significant US stock declines and risk appetite pullback, it would also continue to suppress AUD performance.

Third, Australia may face economic recession risk in 2027, potentially further driving the AUD lower. Since the beginning of this year, the RBA has cumulative raised rates five times, and the dampening effect of high rates on the economy is gradually showing: on one hand, real estate and corporate demand are weakening simultaneously. Australia's third-quarter new housing loans fell 15.5% quarter-on-quarter, while the corporate forward orders index turned negative during the same period; on the other hand, household consumption and the job market continue to face pressure. The September unemployment rate rose to 4.7%, and the November consumer confidence index fell to 78.2, the lowest in four years. If the subsequent economic slowdown exceeds expectations, the market may shift from trading further rate hikes to pricing earlier easing, pushing the Australia-US rate spread to narrow further and increasing AUD downward pressure.

IV. Key Emerging Market Currencies

(1) Brazilian real and Colombian peso

In 2026, Brazilian and Colombian currencies performed divergently, with high interest rates providing support for both, but changes in political risk led to clear differences in exchange rate movements. On the Brazil side, early-year high interest rate advantages and commodity export resilience initially pushed the real stronger, but after Lula's surprise re-election on October 25, breaking market expectations for fiscal consolidation under a right-wing government, the real depreciated sharply after the election. On the Colombia side, the central bank continued raising rates to 12.25%, with the high-yield advantage attracting carry trade inflows; combined with the US-Iran conflict pushing up oil prices and the right-wing government's election victory improving market policy expectations, the peso continued to strengthen, appreciating about 18% against the dollar cumulatively through the end of October.

Looking ahead to 2027, the two currencies will still share the same trading themes, but currency performance may reverse, and a cautious long BRL/COP opportunity could be considered. The Brazilian real may benefit from continued high-yield advantages and retreating political risk premiums, with phased appreciation opportunities. After Lula's re-election, Brazil's central bank paused rate cuts, maintaining the policy rate at 13.75% in November, and the market expects high rates to continue through 2027, continuing to provide strong carry support. Meanwhile, after the election, the real has already experienced significant depreciation, and the market has priced in fiscal expansion risk to some extent. In November, the Lula government proposed a fiscal consolidation plan of 50-60 billion reais for 2027; if Congress subsequently pushes the plan through, it could ease debt sustainability concerns and drive exchange rate recovery.

In contrast, the Colombian peso may face dual pressure from rising fiscal risk and weakening rate spread advantage in 2027. On one hand, the 2027 budget implies a fiscal deficit ratio as high as 9.4% under a scenario lacking adjustment; although the new government proposed a fiscal reform plan to reduce the deficit ratio to 7.2%, congressional resistance is significant, and fiscal consolidation remains uncertain. On the other hand, if Middle East conflicts ease and push oil prices down, Colombia's terms of trade may deteriorate; combined with market expectations that Colombia's central bank may begin rate cuts in the second half of 2027, the high-yield advantage will gradually weaken. Considering that the peso has already accumulated significant gains this year, if fiscal reform is blocked, oil prices fall, and carry funds exit, the peso may see a relatively明显的 valuation correction in 2027.

(2) Mexican peso

In 2026, the Mexican peso showed significant fluctuations, mainly affected by carry trades and changes in US-Mexico trade policy. Early in the year, Mexico's relatively high policy rate attracted carry trade inflows, and the peso continued to appreciate. Although there was uncertainty in US-Mexico trade negotiations during the year, the relatively high rate spread advantage still supported the exchange rate, with USD/MXN once falling to around 16.9 in early September. Thereafter, as Mexico's central bank began rate cuts, the US-Mexico rate spread narrowed significantly; meanwhile, US-Mexico trade negotiations progressed less than expected, and USMCA-related risks re-emerged, causing the peso to weaken rapidly.

Looking ahead to 2027, US-Mexico trade negotiations may be the core trading theme for the Mexican peso. In July 2026, the US refused to extend the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and the two sides have differences on auto rules of origin, steel and aluminum tariffs, and Chinese investment issues. Considering that after the US midterms, the Trump administration's domestic legislative power is limited, and the policy focus may shift to trade and immigration policy, it may pressure Mexico in negotiations and seek more concessions. Mexico has high dependence on the US market, and a trade negotiation stalemate or further US tariff increases could suppress Mexican exports, manufacturing investment, and peso performance. Combined with Mexico's central bank having already cut rates to 6.25% in November, narrowing US-Mexico rate spreads will further weaken carry support, and the Mexican peso is expected to perform weakly overall in 2027.

(3) Chilean peso

In 2026, the Chilean peso weakened overall, mainly affected by copper mine production cuts and deteriorating terms of trade. On one hand, the US-Iran conflict pushed up international oil prices, increasing Chile's energy import costs and worsening terms of trade, suppressing peso performance; on the other hand, although international copper prices rose significantly, declining ore grades, equipment maintenance, and production interruptions caused copper mine output to fall sharply. Among them, the Escondida, Codelco, and Spence mining areas contributed 77.3% of the national production decline, and the Chilean Copper Commission expected full-year output to fall 8.4% year-on-year, with copper price gains failing to effectively translate into exchange rate support.

Looking ahead to 2027, copper mine production recovery and improved domestic investment are expected to drive a catch-up rally in the Chilean peso. First, copper mine production is expected to recover from this year's abnormally low level; as some mine maintenance ends, production interruptions ease, and new project capacity gradually releases, the Chilean Copper Commission expects copper output to grow 3.0% year-on-year in 2027. Meanwhile, global AI data centers and power grid construction are expected to continue supporting copper demand, and combined with relatively slow growth in global mining supply, the refined copper surplus in 2027 is expected to equal only 0.8% of demand, and copper prices are expected to remain at historically high levels, favorable for improving copper export revenue; second, domestic investment policy is expected to play a positive role. Chile officially announced the "National Reconstruction and Economic and Social Development Law" in October, promoting private investment by gradually reducing corporate income tax, simplifying environmental approval for investment projects, and enhancing tax system stability for large investment projects. Chile's central bank estimates the law will contribute about 0.5% to 2027 GDP growth, pushing 2027 economic growth back to 2%-3%. Combined with potential easing of Middle East conflicts and lower energy import costs, Chile's terms of trade and economic growth expectations are expected to improve simultaneously, and the peso has phased appreciation opportunities.

(4) Korean won

We previously mentioned in our report "Korean Stocks Fall, Why Does the Won Rise?": In mid-2026, the won was dominated by capital flows and weakened sharply at one point. The main logic was: during this year's Korean stock rally, market concentration was high, triggering foreign position limits or profit-taking, causing large foreign outflows that suppressed won performance. Looking ahead to 2027, with Korean stock high leverage and high volatility risks relatively stabilizing and foreign capital flow scale somewhat converging, the won's future may be more influenced by fundamentals. Semiconductor export prosperity and monetary policy tightening are expected to provide fundamental support for the won next year, and the won may stabilize. First, AI supply chain demand remains strong, with Korea's October semiconductor exports growing 259% year-on-year, the current account continuing to improve, and sustained export revenue growth expected to drive increased corporate settlement demand for won, providing support. Second, the Bank of Korea maintains a hawkish monetary policy stance, having cumulative raised rates twice this year, and with September core CPI at 2.8% year-on-year, combined with strong economic growth resilience, there is still room for further rate hikes in 2027, expected to improve the Korea-US rate spread. As concentrated foreign selling pressure eases, export settlement increases, and interest rate support strengthens, the won is expected to gradually return to fundamental-driven performance, showing moderate appreciation. However, vigilance is needed regarding a major US AI sector pullback that could drive sharp Korean stock declines and concentrated foreign capital exit,重新 creating depreciation pressure on the won.

V. Chinese Yuan Outlook

Since 2026, the Chinese yuan has continued to appreciate, with export resilience and international balance of payments surplus providing fundamental support. The USD/CNY exchange rate fell from near 7.0 at the beginning of the year to below 6.7 by early November. On one hand, China's exports maintained strong growth, with RMB-denominated exports growing 17.6% year-on-year in the first 10 months, and the September international balance of payments goods and services trade surplus reaching $100.6 billion, continuously providing FX supply support; on the other hand, the RMB internationalization strategy has steadily advanced, with the scope of RMB use in cross-border trade settlement, investment and financing expanding, helping to enhance international demand for RMB and its asset allocation appeal.

Looking ahead to 2027, export competitiveness and the internationalization process are expected to continue supporting the yuan, and the RMB still has appreciation room. However, current policy expectations tend to guide moderate and orderly RMB appreciation, and the pace of RMB appreciation may slow: first, on October 8, the central bank issued the "People's Bank of China Policy Stance on the RMB Exchange Rate," emphasizing maintaining RMB exchange rate flexibility and two-way floating, and pointing out that there is no simple linear relationship between the exchange rate and the current account, releasing policy signals of not pre-setting exchange rate targets and avoiding one-sided expectations. Second, on November 3, the central bank further announced raising the FX deposit reserve requirement ratio from 4% to 6%, releasing policy signals to smooth an overly rapid RMB appreciation pace. From historical experience, after the FX deposit reserve requirement ratio was raised in May 2021, the RMB saw a phased pullback and a slower appreciation pace, but the medium-term appreciation trend was not interrupted. Additionally, from the policy signals released by the RMB central parity rate: since the second half of 2026, the RMB central parity rate has continued to be weaker than the spot exchange rate, and the gap between the two has widened, further reflecting policy signals to smooth one-sided RMB appreciation expectations and guide moderate and orderly appreciation.

Risks to watch include: US inflation rising more than expected, US economic growth exceeding expectations, causing the Fed to continue tightening monetary policy, sharp dollar appreciation, rising US Treasury yields, continued US stock declines, commercial bank bankruptcy crises, and currency and debt crises in emerging markets. US economic recession exceeding expectations, causing a liquidity crisis in financial markets and forcing the Fed to pivot to easing. European energy crisis exceeding expectations, with the eurozone economy falling into deep recession, global markets falling into turmoil, external demand shrinking, and policy facing a dilemma. Global geopolitical risks intensifying, US-China relations deteriorating more than expected, uncontrolled factors in commodities and transportation, further deepening of deglobalization, continued supply chain disruption, and worsening resource competition.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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