In a recent podcast interview, as the battle for Hollywood giant Warner Bros. Discovery (WBD.US) intensifies, streaming and media authority Dan Rayburn delved into this potential transaction, which also involves Netflix (NFLX.US) and Paramount (PSKY.US). He also analyzed several core industry issues, including the impact of sports streaming, key investment metrics, and the vastly different strategic logics of tech giants. He strongly advised investors to abandon excessive focus on the "streaming wars" narrative and instead concentrate on verifiable financial data and business facts. The following is a transcript of the December 23rd interview between host Rena Sherbill and Dan Rayburn.
Rena Sherbill: Dan Rayburn is undoubtedly an expert in the incredibly broad field of streaming and media today. Dan has been a frequent guest, a long-time contributor to Seeking Alpha, runs the personal blog "streamingmediablog," and regularly appears on major media platforms. Dan, welcome back. First, what industry topics are you most focused on right now? Netflix is certainly a focal point, whether it's the rumored collaboration with Warner Bros., the maneuvering with Paramount, or its moves in live sports. What are your key areas of focus?
Dan Rayburn: There are indeed many topics worth discussing. Netflix is always a focal point; thanks again for having me. Just the news in sports streaming alone could fill a daily podcast, not to mention other streaming business models like bundling and pricing strategies. Sports are always a hot topic, especially over the last two quarters with developments like the NFL's deal with Apple (AAPL.US) and the finalization of Formula 1's streaming rights. It's particularly noteworthy that the NFL is leveraging streaming platforms' global reach to expand its footprint—a stark contrast to the traditional broadcast model, especially during the high-viewership Christmas period. From December 25th to 27th, five NFL games will not air on national television outside of teams' local markets. Netflix will exclusively stream two Christmas games, Amazon (AMZN.US) one, Peacock will have an exclusive Saturday game on the 27th, and the remaining game will be on the NFL Network. For investors, the core is to focus on financial data and actual business performance. But the market is rife with speculation; I've even seen claims on LinkedIn that a deal is done or that "Netflix bought Warner Bros."—such statements are absurd, and accompanying graphics are baseless. Investors must learn to discern fact from opinion.
Rena Sherbill: Let's discuss the potential Warner Bros. deal, involving either Paramount or Netflix. Since news of Netflix's preliminary interest, Paramount's hostile bid has complicated things, and as you said, speculation is rampant. With nearly 30 years in the industry, though not a speculator, what scenarios do you, as an expert, see as possible? Under different circumstances, what should investors focus on?
Dan Rayburn: I believe investors should focus on completed deals, not hypothetical "may," "should," or "might" scenarios—the variables are too numerous. Currently, there are two main proposed deals, with details still fluid and subject to change based on offers. Public information shows Paramount's funding sources are clear, and Netflix has disclosed its arrangements in regulatory filings. The core question for investors is: What impact will a deal have on consumers? Interestingly, some major unions argue that a Netflix acquisition of Warner Bros. assets would reduce competition and consumer choice. But conversely, isn't one of consumers' biggest pain points the excessive fragmentation of streaming platforms? Therefore, I don't believe this deal creates a "reduction of choice" problem. The real unknown is Netflix's integration strategy: Will it merge Warner Bros. content into its platform or keep HBO Max separate? Furthermore, many investors overlook key assets in the deal. If a Netflix-Warner Bros. deal happens, Netflix would gain TNT rights, sports broadcast rights, and exclusive streaming rights for the 2028 Olympics. Crucially, Netflix would also acquire the internal technology platform and systems Warner Bros. uses to provide HBO linear channels to MVPDs. But the key question is: Does Netflix want to be in that business? It's unclear. Speculation about massive post-acquisition layoffs is unrealistic—Netflix isn't a production studio and would need Warner Bros.' established production and distribution teams. In fact, Netflix has stated it will continue Warner Bros.' theatrical release strategy. Some find this vague and speculate about shortened theatrical windows, which is possible, but there's no definitive answer. Ultimately, investors should focus on finalized deals. I must state clearly: I do not hold stock in any companies discussed and am not a financial analyst providing investment advice. My analysis is based on industry conversations—with distribution partners, studios, theaters, broadcasters, sports leagues—combined with market data for objective judgment. This is the approach I recommend. However, it's important to note that in the current U.S. political climate, large M&A deals face greater political influence than five or ten years ago. This deal's trajectory will inevitably be tied to political maneuvering. I won't bet on the outcome, but from a content asset perspective, Warner Bros. holds immense value.
Rena Sherbill: Did Paramount's hostile bid surprise you? Has its development altered your views on the industry or related sectors?
Dan Rayburn: Not really. M&A deals of this scale always involve internal leaks—like exposed CEO chats, unauthorized insider comments, and rampant, baseless rumors. Looking back over the past decade in media and entertainment, particularly in film, streaming, and sports, it's hard to find a deal of this magnitude and potential impact. Amazon's acquisition of MGM was more focused on film production, and AT&T's (T.US) acquisition of DirecTV was a failure; besides, AT&T is a telecom operator, making it fundamentally different. Therefore, in terms of both scale and potential industry impact, this deal is a landmark event.
Rena Sherbill: What probability would you assign to Netflix acquiring Warner Bros.? 70%? Or is any prediction meaningless, and we should just wait?
Dan Rayburn: No one can accurately predict the outcome. Imagine if Paramount suddenly raised its offer to $35 per share—the entire situation could reverse overnight. That's just market speculation, not fact. I don't engage in conjecture; all analysis is based on objective data—but it's still too early to make a call. Another critical unknown is regulatory approval. Industry participants and investors can debate the pros and cons, but final approval rests with regulators. Both the EU and the U.S. Department of Justice will review it; Netflix estimates the deal could take 12 to 18 months to close. More notably, Warner Bros.' spin-off plan isn't scheduled until Q3 2026, followed by a lengthy regulatory process. Even if all goes smoothly, finalization could take two years or more. The industry landscape could change dramatically by then, making any current speculation largely meaningless.
Rena Sherbill: Can you explain why the EU is involved in the approval process?
Dan Rayburn: The EU's jurisdiction stems from the proportion of revenue the merging entities generate in the European market. If it reaches a certain threshold, EU approval is mandatory. For those unfamiliar with the rules, it's important to note that the EU typically doesn't outright block deals. While there are exceptions, like the intervention in the iRobot (IRBTQ.US) acquisition, most often the EU approves deals with a set of regulatory conditions attached. This isn't uncommon; it happened with Comcast's (CMCSA.US) acquisition of NBC—approved by the U.S. DOJ but with specific operational requirements. The EU's approach to such mergers is similar, and this constitutes a key part of the uncertainty.
Rena Sherbill: Indeed, the situation is full of unknowns. Should we analyze this by individual streaming company or by sports category?
Dan Rayburn: It's a tough question because many topics are inherently intertwined. The choice is yours, but from an audience comprehension standpoint, categorizing by sport might be easier.
Rena Sherbill: Let's start with the NFL then, especially since today is December 23rd and the Christmas games are imminent.
Dan Rayburn: Okay, let's talk NFL. Any NFL fan can feel the fragmentation of its streaming coverage—different types of content scattered across platforms with varying video quality, making it hard to keep track. But the most pressing issue is the upcoming Christmas slate. We're recording on the 23rd; yesterday, an ESPN broadcast introduced new data-enhancement technology with impressive results. Note: The five NFL games from December 25th to 27th will not air on national TV. Netflix has two Christmas games, Amazon one (part of a tripleheader), Peacock has an exclusive on Saturday the 27th, and the remaining game is on the NFL Network. So, four of the five games are exclusive to streaming platforms. Of course, all NFL games maintain over-the-air (OTA) signals, and Peacock's exclusive will also air on local NBC affiliates. But this arrangement underscores the NFL's growing reliance on streaming for global distribution—its distribution model has fundamentally changed over recent years. Remember, holiday games (Christmas, Black Friday, Wild Card) were once firmly in the grasp of traditional broadcasters. The core reason the NFL is now selling these premium rights to streamers is simple: they pay more. As consumers, we might dislike the fragmentation—it makes watching sports more cumbersome. But the public often misses a key fact: sports leagues' primary logic isn't "consumer convenience" but "maximizing league revenue." The NFL has always had the most fragmented broadcast model, far exceeding the NBA and MLB. And as MLB signs new rights deals, its broadcasts are heading towards fragmentation too.
Rena Sherbill: From a data perspective, are streaming viewership numbers comparable to traditional TV? Also, do sports rights genuinely drive subscriber growth and revenue for streaming platforms?
Dan Rayburn: You've hit on a core industry pain point—the actual value of sports content for DTC streaming platforms remains unclear. The root cause is that sports streamers, leagues, and DTC services rarely disclose detailed viewership data. When they do, it's often vague, high-level numbers without standardized definitions for "users," let alone metrics to assess their actual value. Churn rates, retention—key indicators like these are never disclosed; Netflix, for instance, has never reported churn to Wall Street.
Rena Sherbill: Is this intentional? You'd think if the numbers were good, they'd promote them.
Dan Rayburn: I don't think it's deliberate concealment; the core issue is the lack of standardized metric definitions in streaming. Traditional broadcast has clear measurement norms, but streaming still lacks uniformity. For live sports alone, there are concurrent streams, Average Minute Audience (AMA), Monthly Active Users (MAU), all measured differently across companies. Netflix recently introduced a "Monthly Active Viewer" metric, but its definition is unclear. Concepts like concurrent plays, concurrent devices, unique streams abound, with varying methodologies. Compounding this, many still use Nielsen data, which is widely criticized—even by leagues who question its reliability yet use it. Worse, Nielsen recently changed its methodology to a "Big Data + panel" model, making historical comparisons invalid. How can you compare year-over-year performance under these conditions? Take Netflix's "Monthly Active Viewer"—defined as someone who watches at least one minute of ad-supported content per month. That's it. Netflix then extrapolates total reach based on household size, using this as a core metric instead of MAU. Similarly, Amazon, at a event a month ago, claimed Prime Video had 315 million global monthly viewers, without defining "viewer"—is it two seconds, ten seconds, or just opening the page? If a user sees the Prime Video entry on the Amazon homepage but doesn't click, are they counted? Nielsen can't answer these questions either. This is the investor's dilemma: accurately judging what content gets how much meaningful watch time on which platforms is incredibly difficult. A few platforms disclose segmented data—NBC Sports might break out Peacock's NFL numbers, while Fox does not. But even then, we often only see AMA, not actual viewing duration. In short, we get fragmented data, far from sufficient to fully assess the commercial value of sports content or answer the core question: "Do sports rights drive subscriber growth and retention?"
Rena Sherbill: While you're not a financial analyst, what core metrics should investors watch for Netflix, Amazon, and other streamers? How do these relate to the industry metrics you monitor?
Dan Rayburn: Certainly. First, I must clarify I am not a financial analyst providing stock recommendations, publishing investment reports, or acting as a buy/side researcher. But my daily work involves dealing with financial data—I review SEC filings for dozens of public companies across sports, media, entertainment, cloud infrastructure, etc. Many overlook the value of SEC filings, where crucial information often absent from press releases resides. For example, "the number of users canceling traditional pay-TV services" is something Verizon (VZ.US) would never highlight in a press release, but it's detailed in SEC filings. Any investor following the DTC streaming industry knows the core focus over the past 18-24 months has shifted from "scale first" to "profitability first." The "growth at all costs" strategy prevalent during the pandemic is over. Disney's (DIS.US) DTC business was once losing a staggering $1 million per day, with quarterly losses reaching $1.1 billion. Against this backdrop, Wall Street sent a clear signal: abandon the "growth above all" mindset and achieve profitability—the burn rate was simply too high. Subsequently, Warner Bros., Paramount, and Disney's DTC businesses have turned profitable; Peacock isn't fully there but is nearing breakeven. Note, definitions of "profitability" vary, so investors must scrutinize the metrics. I believe one key metric investors should focus on is Average Revenue Per User (ARPU)—but unfortunately, many companies have stopped reporting it. Think: As an investor, would you prefer subscriber growth with declining ARPU, or a slight subscriber dip with rising ARPU? The answer is clearly the latter, as higher ARPU signifies stronger profitability. Interestingly, Netflix, Disney, Roku (ROKU.US) no longer report ARPU. Their rationale is that business models have evolved—revenue now includes subscriptions, advertising, bundled partnerships (with lower wholesale revenue), making traditional ARPU less accurate. This reasoning has merit but makes it harder for investors to track true operational performance financially. For instance, what impact do deep discount promotions (like $3-$5/month for 12 months on Black Friday) have on ARPU? Can companies actually profit from these? Likely not. That's why Peacock notably didn't run a Black Friday promotion this year—a very smart move for a platform still in the red. Beyond ARPU, investors should watch content bundling strategies, pricing changes, and content investment costs. A few companies, like Netflix, disclose annual content budgets—Netflix's is around $18 billion this year. Investors need to track trends here. In contrast, Disney reports a combined content spend for its DTC and traditional broadcast businesses, which is less insightful. Additionally, advertising revenue mix is a key future focus. Currently, few break out the subscription vs. ad revenue split for their DTC businesses, but over time, Wall Street will demand it—advertising is poised to be a major growth driver, especially for Netflix, which is improving its ad targeting and has significant potential in its own ad business. In summary, investors should focus on these core financial metrics, not get lost in social media buzz about which platform has the hotter show. Remember, a show's popularity doesn't equate to its ability to retain subscribers for the platform. Look at all the series canceled after one season:热度≠ profitability. This is a point I stress repeatedly to investors.
Rena Sherbill: Why can't popularity and profitability be equated? Is it because we lack sufficient granular data to establish the correlation?
Dan Rayburn: Precisely. Netflix has explicitly stated that some hit shows have a poor return on investment—despite their popularity, the user engagement generated relative to production costs didn't meet expectations. "Engagement" here is broad, potentially encompassing new subscribers, retention, ad impressions, CPMs, measured differently across platforms, but all revolve around viewership. Many in the industry don't realize that actual streaming numbers for major sporting events are often much lower than assumed. Take the World Cup: Fox's peak streaming audience for the 2022 World Cup was only 1.28 million. Consider that the World Cup is a ratings phenomenon on traditional TV, yet streaming numbers were that low. Look at Apple's F1 deal: According to ESPN data, the U.S. TV audience peak for F1 was 1.5 million AMA, and this year's average audience on ABC, ESPN, ESPN2 was around 1.3 million. These numbers shatter the common assumption that combinations like "Apple + F1" or "NBA + Streaming" automatically mean huge viewership. More tellingly, during the recent Thanksgiving holiday games, not a single platform volunteered streaming viewership data—the collective silence speaks volumes.
Rena Sherbill: Months ago, analyst Jack Bowman mentioned on the show the common perception that Amazon Prime is a cash cow for Amazon, when it's actually loss-making, with its core value being brand enhancement. Is the logic behind streaming platforms investing in sports similar—more about brand building than direct revenue?
Dan Rayburn: In many cases, yes. But the definitive answer is known only internally. However, a better question is: Does it really matter? For Apple, even if Apple TV+ loses $1 or $2 billion annually, it's negligible on its balance sheet—Apple can easily absorb that loss. Apple's core business isn't content; streaming is just one piece of its ecosystem. Therefore, analyzing Apple's streaming requires a completely different lens than analyzing Netflix. Netflix's core *is* content, not streaming technology—many mistakenly think Netflix is a streaming company, but streaming is merely its distribution method. In contrast, Apple and Amazon Prime Video have core businesses in tech hardware and e-commerce/ads, respectively; content isn't their primary focus. Industry analysts and Wall Street desperately want to know: What are Amazon Prime Video's actual operating costs? How much ad revenue does it generate? How many users maintain Prime memberships specifically for Prime Video? Do those members buy more from Amazon? Amazon possesses vast user data, arguably more than Google (GOOGL.US), so it knows Prime Video's true value better than anyone. But Wall Street often misinterprets. For example, reports claimed "Apple TV+ loses $3 billion a year," but this ignores the crucial question: What does Apple get in return for that $3 billion? Does it drive hardware sales? Boost overall services revenue? Analyzing these companies requires looking at the entire ecosystem. Netflix's business is relatively singular; even with its recent foray into theatrical releases, it's fundamentally different from ecosystem players like Disney or Amazon. Many media outlets and analysts wrongly compare Apple TV+ directly to Netflix, concluding "Apple is losing the streaming war"—a flawed perspective. Apple has repeatedly stated it doesn't aim to be the next Netflix. Similarly, Netflix co-CEO Greg Peters said last month that bidding for a full NFL season package didn't make business sense for Netflix because it "couldn't calculate the ROI" on such a massive rights fee, whether in terms of new subscribers or retention. Investors should note this—it means Netflix doesn't even know how to measure the success of a full-season NFL package. And that gets to the heart of your earlier question: Some companies simply lack clear short or long-term success metrics. Giants like Apple, Amazon, and Google are playing a long game in streaming. They have the capital and patience to sustain losses for years.
Rena Sherbill: How do you interpret the underlying logic behind Apple's investment in Apple TV+?
Dan Rayburn: Apple's strategic intent is quite clear—telling great stories. Apple consistently emphasizes that "storytelling" is core to its brand and culture, whether in hardware, software, content, or music. Apple's uniqueness lies in curating content with differentiated value, not pursuing breadth or depth of library. This strategy differs markedly from traditional playbooks. Long-time streaming users may recall Netflix's early expansion, heavily promoting the sheer size of its library—"50,000 or 80,000 titles." When Amazon entered, it also rapidly built a large licensed library to compete on volume. Back then, the primary user criterion was "who has more content." But Netflix soon realized competing on volume was unsustainable and pivoted to originals. Netflix explicitly told users its library might shrink but would feature high-quality originals like *House of Cards*. The success of this strategy fundamentally changed consumption habits. Today, how many people choose a streaming service based on whether it has 10k, 50k, or 100k hours of content? Very few. Only in niche verticals (like anime platform Crunchyroll) does library size remain a key competitive edge. From an investment perspective, the trend in content library composition is also worth watching, as it directly impacts production and licensing costs.
Rena Sherbill: Does this also mean content needs to align with brand identity?
Dan Rayburn: Absolutely. Take Apple's deal with Major League Soccer (MLS). Apple stated that MLS's core audience—women and younger demographics—aligns with Apple's target. Furthermore, Apple secured global exclusive rights for MLS without blackout restrictions—users can watch all games on one platform. In today's fragmented landscape, this is an exception. Yet, even here, after two years, the deal was renegotiated: the term was shortened by three years, Apple gave up its option post-2027, and the payment structure was revised. Specifics weren't disclosed, but the core reason was clearly underperformance. A significant change is the discontinuation of the MLS Season Pass standalone subscription. Starting next year, users can watch all MLS games for free via Apple TV+, no extra subscription needed. This case shows that even a giant like Apple doesn't always succeed immediately. When deals underperform, companies adjust—terms, payment models, packaging.
Rena Sherbill: Any final thoughts on Netflix, Amazon, Apple?
Dan Rayburn: I'd like to discuss the NBA's new rights deal. This year, Amazon Prime Video and Peacock secured significant NBA rights, and their broadcast quality is excellent—superior video quality, interactive features, offering a much better experience than expected. Notably, this marks the NBA's return to NBC since 2002. Peacock's season opener averaged 5.6 million AMA, peaking at over 7.1 million, a very strong result. The NBA publicly stated it wanted to "increase streaming distribution without creating consumer confusion." In other words, it sought a balance between leveraging streaming's reach and avoiding the extreme fragmentation seen with the NFL. So far, the NBA seems to have achieved that. In contrast, the NFL is the epitome of fragmentation, and MLB, with its new deals, is heading down that path. Apologies to New York Yankees fans: next year, watching all Yankees games will require subscriptions to *eight* different broadcast and streaming platforms—it's absurd.
Rena Sherbill: I know people who wanted to watch the World Series this year but didn't know where to find it.
Dan Rayburn: It's theoretically possible, but the problem is not knowing where to look. The reasons are complex: new platforms keep emerging (e.g., Fox's new service), making it hard to understand rights and pricing; ESPN's product matrix is confusing—ESPN app, ESPN Unlimited, ESPN+, content accessible via pay-TV authentication—with blurry lines. Worse, a new streaming app, the TNT Sports app, launches next year because the sports content currently on HBO Max in the U.S. will move there (other regions unaffected). Frankly, I feel for the average consumer. I've been in this industry for nearly 30 years, studying platform offerings daily, and even I sometimes wonder, "Which platform is the game on tonight?" For the average user, the streaming experience is often frustrating: complex interfaces, login issues, inconsistent video quality (e.g., Netflix's Christmas NFL games don't support HDR, while Amazon's do). Such quality disparities for the same event were unthinkable in the broadcast era—picture quality was consistent regardless of your city or cable provider. In streaming, it's common. I get texts daily asking "Where can I watch this game?" Fragmentation is a major consumer pain point.
Rena Sherbill: The streaming industry is undoubtedly in a new phase. What are your thoughts on Google and YouTube? YouTube seems to be making significant moves in streaming.
Dan Rayburn: A few points on YouTube. First, YouTube TV blogged last week about launching 10 new bundles next year. This sounds exciting but lacks crucial details—launch timing, specific content, pricing. Some media reported this as "users can finally subscribe only to the channels they want"—a serious misreading. I've confirmed with YouTube: users cannot choose 4 channels à la carte. The upcoming bundles are pre-packaged offerings, not true pick-and-choose. Sure, there might be "skinny bundles"—smaller, more targeted, perhaps sports-specific. But until content, pricing, and geographic restrictions are known, there's little cause for excitement. I'm puzzled by the media hype. Beyond this, YouTube's content strategy is fundamentally different. There's a rather pointless debate: Is YouTube TV "TV"? In my view, it's irrelevant—the definition of TV is up to the user, be it hardware or service. Some argue YouTube TV is becoming more like "traditional TV" because it secured the Oscars' exclusive broadcast rights. But this view misses the full picture: the deal includes rights to at least 10 related events (Governors Awards, nominations announcement) previously never televised. The agreement runs through 2029. More importantly, it involves collaboration with Google's Arts & Culture initiative. Google will use its tech resources to help the Academy digitize its vast collection—over 52 million items—creating a centralized digital platform. This is an advantage traditional broadcasters cannot match. For a global cultural event like the Oscars, partnering with YouTube is ideal—film and music culture transcends borders and genres, resonating globally in a way regional sports often cannot. Finally, it's crucial to emphasize that Nielsen's YouTube ratings are highly unreliable. They conflate 10-15 second Shorts with Netflix's 90-minute films and 4-hour live sports broadcasts. Comparing these is meaningless—it's like "comparing apples to bowling balls."
Rena Sherbill: Indeed, as the industry evolves, there's always an attempt to label new things—Is this TV? Is it enhanced broadcast? But from our conversation, it's clear different companies are entering streaming with their unique brand DNA, reflected in content choices, operations, and service models. Your Oscar example involves dimensions far beyond simple event broadcasting, which is fascinating. Once we break free from traditional frameworks, we see the innovation. Finally, any parting words for investors and consumers? Or anything we missed?
Dan Rayburn: First, to investors: There is no "war" in streaming. War implies armed conflict, destruction; competition among these companies is良性 and positive. Healthy competition drives diverse bundles, pricing, and marketing. But many headlines proclaim "Netflix wins the streaming war"—a baseless claim. By what metric? That Netflix will generate over $9 billion in free cash flow this year? It all comes back to data. Everyone is entitled to an opinion, but the problem today is few distinguish opinion from fact. Media loves sensational headlines, and "war" implies there's only one winner. But in content distribution, there can be many winners. These companies compete for users' time and attention—a finite resource daily. They compete across music, podcasts, news, film/TV, in varying lengths and quality (e.g., mobile viewing doesn't need 4K). Returning to your "definition of TV" question—there's no single answer. People debate, but for investors, it's not about right/wrong, and certainly not a "winner-take-all" scenario. Media loves the "war" narrative because it creates "loser" stories, but this is far from market reality. Just look at the companies' balance sheets. Second, focus on data, vet your sources. Misinformation is rampant in streaming. Even reputable outlets like the *Wall Street Journal* or *New York Times* can get it wrong. For instance, reports claimed "Hulu has 100 million users," but Disney, as a public company, reports Hulu's figures quarterly—it's 54 million. Why use unverified estimates? More surprisingly, many commenters aren't aware of key SEC filing details. For example, Disney's SEC filings mention ARPU declined this year "due to the wholesale agreement with Charter Communications (CHTR.US)"—meaning Disney receives less per user under that deal than the retail price. This never appears in Disney's press releases. So, to truly understand streaming, one must grasp the underlying drivers, and that starts with reading the data. Data doesn't lie; data tells the real story. Facts matter. Many articles today are filled with "may," "could," "perhaps"—words devoid of meaning. That's why I often post on LinkedIn emphasizing "state the facts, list the data." I cite sources, link to SEC filings, and welcome debate—but on core issues like profitability, the data is indisputable. Of course, note that profitability metrics vary (e.g., EBITDA calculations differ based on accounting principles). Investors need to understand these nuances, like GAAP vs. non-GAAP metrics, and the distinctions between EBITDA and EPS. In short, for any investor, improving data literacy is paramount.
Rena Sherbill: Yes, data must be viewed in context. Last week we discussed the cannabis reclassification news, emphasizing the need for industry-specific data analysis—very different from media. As you said, content is king, but context is crucial too.
Dan Rayburn: Context is key. As a veteran, I particularly dislike the "war" terminology. This isn't war; it's healthy market competition. The streaming industry 20 years ago was amazing—almost every quarter, someone delivered better video quality, companies pushed each other, driving progress. It was an era of innovation and fun, and that良性 competition still exists today.
Comments