China News Service, Sichuan, September 21 (Reporter Liu Zhongjun) - On September 21, the Sichuan Bureau of the National Mine Safety Administration (hereafter referred to as the "Sichuan Bureau") released its sixth batch of typical law enforcement cases for non-coal mines in 2026, using these cases as warnings to urge mining enterprises to strengthen their awareness of lawful and regulated operations.
Case 1: Collapse of Safety Management at a Phosphate Mine
During a recent joint inspection with regulatory authorities, the Sichuan Bureau identified multiple serious issues at a phosphate mine. The mine had insufficient emergency exits, as only one of the two exits in Panel 2 was accessible, with the other passing through a mined-out area (with a minimum height of approximately 0.5 meters) and located on a cliff, making it impassable. Additionally, the surface-underground comparison maps, level plans, and ventilation system diagrams misrepresented the positions of several mined-out areas compared to actual conditions, such as incorrectly marking the 320 stoping area as a mined-out zone. The treatment of mined-out areas failed to meet design requirements, with some zones not fully backfilled to the roof, retaining walls not reaching the roof (with a gap of about 1 meter), and sealing walls measuring only 1.5 meters thick versus the design specification of 3 meters. The mine's survey report on hidden disaster-causing factors identified 23 mined-out areas (the largest covering 183,731 square meters), yet no three-dimensional numerical simulation stability assessments or special treatment measures were conducted for individual areas exceeding 2,000 square meters or volumes exceeding 30,000 cubic meters. Underground operations were conducted in areas without ventilation or with weak airflow, including micro-ventilation at the 321 excavation face in Panel 2 and no mechanical ventilation at the 913 stope. Furthermore, the 321 and 326 excavation faces in Panel 2 lacked video surveillance and reader substations. The No. 4 explosive magazine was stored in a tunnel-style warehouse approximately 10 meters from the intake shaft mouth, with several workers residing just 10 meters away inside the shaft mouth or in caves, along with over ten other personnel housed in the shaft mouth or mountain caves. These hazards meet the criteria outlined in the "Standards for Determining Major Accident Hazards in Metal and Non-Metal Mines" (Mine Safety [2022] No. 88) and the "Supplementary Situations for Determining Major Accident Hazards in Metal and Non-Metal Mines" (Mine Safety [2024] No. 41), and were classified as major accident hazards. The inspection team issued an "On-Site Safety Handling Decision for Non-Coal Mines" and referred the case to local regulatory authorities for investigation and legal action. The phosphate mine exhibited systematic failures across multiple safety protocols, including emergency exits, mine plans, ventilation, mined-out area management, monitoring systems, and explosive management, reflecting a severe lack of safety awareness, ineffective safety barriers, and superficial technical management, creating significant risk of serious accidents.
Case 2: Loss of Compliance Control at a Lead-Zinc Mine
During a joint inspection with local regulatory authorities, the Sichuan Bureau found that a lead-zinc mine had commenced construction without approval for major changes to safety facilities. Instead of developing the +2000-meter level adit as designed, the mine used the +2060-meter level adit for downhill mining of the +2030-meter and +2040-meter auxiliary levels. The R4-4 working face did not form a full ventilation pressure system as designed, instead using a local fan for roadway-style mining. Additionally, key personnel in the outsourcing project were not present on site, with no underground attendance records for the mining, geological, and electromechanical technical staff of the outsourced unit's project department. These hazards meet the criteria under the "Standards for Determining Major Accident Hazards in Metal and Non-Metal Mines" (Mine Safety [2022] No. 88) and were classified as major accident hazards. The inspection team issued an "On-Site Safety Handling Decision for Non-Coal Mines" and referred the case to local regulatory authorities for investigation and legal action. The lead-zinc mine disregarded the "three simultaneous" management requirements for safety facilities, failed to follow approval procedures for major safety facility changes, practiced "subcontracting instead of managing" for outsourced projects, and left key safety controls unattended, rendering it unable to identify and handle dynamic risks during operations, reflecting a lack of lawful and regulated mining awareness.
Case 3: Disordered Ventilation Management at Another Lead-Zinc Mine
During a joint inspection with local regulatory authorities, the Sichuan Bureau found that the mining face at the +856-meter level of a lead-zinc mine was using diagonal ventilation, while the mining points arranged at the 8-19 excavation face and the 8-3 mining face had not formed proper ventilation systems, resulting in operations with no or weak airflow. The ventilation system diagram failed to mark the 8-19 and 8-3 mining points, and information on airflow volumes and ventilation facilities was also incomplete. These hazards meet the criteria under the "Standards for Determining Major Accident Hazards in Metal and Non-Metal Mines" (Mine Safety [2022] No. 88) and were classified as major accident hazards. The inspection team issued an "On-Site Safety Handling Decision for Non-Coal Mines" and referred the case to local regulatory authorities for handling. Diagonal ventilation has poor airflow stability and is prone to airflow reversal. The ventilation system diagrams did not match actual site conditions, with critical information such as mining point locations, airflow volumes, and ventilation facilities omitted, rendering the diagrams ineffective for guiding ventilation management and emergency response. The mine's ventilation technical management was perfunctory, field operations were disconnected from diagram-based control, and dynamic risk identification was absent.
Case 4: Intertwined Systemic Hazards at a Copper-Gold Mine
During an on-site random inspection conducted under the surveillance plan, the Sichuan Bureau found that at a copper-gold mine, the +2699-meter, +2718-meter, +2749-meter, and +2768-meter sublevels were not plotted on relevant mine plans. Abandoned exploration tunnels were temporarily sealed with wire mesh and ventilation ducting fabric rather than being properly closed. Some tunnel intersections lacked support, and anchor mesh support overlaps were non-compliant. The diamond drilling working face in the south haulage tunnel at the +2749-meter level had no local ventilation facilities, leading to operations with no or weak airflow. The project department had appointed an ungraduated college student as the mining technician and had not appointed a ventilation technician, with professional and special operation personnel not being formal employees of the parent legal entity but only contracted with the project department. The dry beach length sensor of the tailings dam online monitoring system had been offline since March 1, 2026, and remained unrepaired. These hazards meet the criteria under the "Standards for Determining Major Accident Hazards in Metal and Non-Metal Mines" (Mine Safety [2022] No. 88) and were classified as major accident hazards. The inspection team issued an "On-Site Safety Handling Decision for Non-Coal Mines" and referred the case to local regulatory authorities for handling. The copper-gold mine suffered from overlapping major hazards in mine plan management, tunnel sealing, roof support, underground ventilation, outsourcing management, and tailings dam online monitoring, with an absent technical management system and layers of failed on-site safety controls. With multiple intertwined risks, a roof collapse, toxic gas poisoning, or abnormal tailings dam operation could easily trigger a production safety accident.
Case 5: Total Failure of Risk Management Across All Links at an Underground Mine
During an on-site inspection conducted jointly with provincial, municipal, and county emergency management departments, the Sichuan Bureau found that at an underground mine, a sedimentation tank was set up in a tunnel at the +1050-meter level, with overflow water discharged through a ventilation shaft to the +968-meter level, rendering the emergency exit unusable between the +968-meter and +1050-meter levels. Although the mine had seven shafts, the ventilation system diagram and escape route map only showed six shafts, omitting the +1080-meter adit. A mined-out area in the middle of the +1100-meter level haulage tunnel was not sealed as designed. The original safety facility design used the open-stope mining method without a backfilling system, and while a change to the mining method was planned, the relevant departments had not yet approved it. However, two backfilling stations had already been built at the shaft mouth industrial square, and extensive backfilling pipelines had been installed at the +1050-meter and +1100-meter levels. The established safety monitoring, personnel positioning, and communication systems did not comply with national regulations, and the "three major systems" underground were incomplete and non-functional during the inspection. These hazards meet the criteria under the "Standards for Determining Major Accident Hazards in Metal and Non-Metal Mines" (Mine Safety [2022] No. 88) and were classified as major accident hazards. The inspection team issued an "On-Site Safety Handling Decision for Non-Coal Mines" and referred the case to local regulatory authorities for handling. The mine demonstrated total failures in emergency exits, mine plan management, mined-out area treatment, construction procedures, system construction, and personnel allocation, reflecting weak safety awareness, suspended main responsibilities, and out-of-control site management.
Case 6: Risk Management Failure at an Open-Pit Mine
During an on-site inspection of an open-pit mine, the Sichuan Bureau found that the final slope bench height exceeded the design height, and the haul road gradient exceeded the design gradient by more than 10%. These hazards meet the criteria under the "Standards for Determining Major Accident Hazards in Metal and Non-Metal Mines" (Mine Safety [2022] No. 88) and were classified as major accident hazards. The inspection team immediately issued an "On-Site Safety Handling Decision for Non-Coal Mines," ordered the enterprise to evacuate personnel from the hazardous area, and sent a "Supervision Letter for Rectification of Major Accident Hazards in Non-Coal Mines" to the local mine regulatory department, requiring the enterprise to promptly rectify and close out the hazards and to file and investigate the violations. The open-pit mine's safety facility design was treated as a mere formality, safety technical management was absent, and risk identification, control, and hazard investigation systems were not properly implemented, with safety management reduced to a superficial exercise. Such hazards can easily lead to haulage accidents and landslides, causing mass casualties, and must be strictly investigated and thoroughly rectified.
Case 7: Failure of Road Transport Safety Control at Another Open-Pit Mine
During an on-site inspection of another open-pit mine, the Sichuan Bureau found that certain sections of the mine's haul road had gradients reaching 15 degrees, exceeding the designed gradient of 9.3 degrees by more than 10%. These hazards meet the criteria under the "Standards for Determining Major Accident Hazards in Metal and Non-Metal Mines" (Mine Safety [2022] No. 88) and were classified as major accident hazards. The inspection team sent a "Supervision Letter for Rectification of Major Accident Hazards in Non-Coal Mines" to the local mine regulatory department, requiring the enterprise to promptly rectify and close out the hazards and to file and investigate the violations. The mine haul road is the core infrastructure for open-pit mining operations, with the road gradient being a critical control parameter for ensuring the safe operation of mining transport vehicles, determined by preliminary design based on a combination of vehicle load, braking performance, and operating environment. Once this critical threshold is exceeded, the braking load on loaded downhill vehicles increases sharply, and braking distances extend significantly, making vehicle runaway, rollback, rollover, and collisions highly likely. The mine arbitrarily exceeded the designed mining parameters, resulting in the failure of road transport system safety controls.
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