From 36% Debut Plunge to 130% Rebound: Institutional Tussle and Share Restructuring at NEW VISION CO (02632)

Stock News04-09

Despite being listed for only nine trading days, the "frenzy" surrounding NEW VISION CO (02632) has left investors astonished. After its grey market closing saw a 1.04% rise, yielding a profit of HK$23 per lot, the stock successfully debuted on the main board of the Hong Kong stock exchange on March 24. However, on its first trading day, the share price plummeted sharply, hitting an intraday low of HK$27.70, down 37.33% from its issue price. It closed at HK$27.80, marking a 36.92% decline. This performance surprised investors, especially since the IPO market had maintained a heated trend since 2026. Data from Zhitong Caijing APP indicated that in the first quarter of 2026, 40 new stocks were listed in Hong Kong, but only five experienced a debut drop—meaning only one in every eight new stocks broke issue price, and NEW VISION CO was among them.

On the second trading day, however, NEW VISION CO staged a dramatic reversal. Its stock price opened higher and surged significantly throughout the session, with intraday gains exceeding 70%, ultimately closing up 62.70%, successfully reversing the first day's steep decline. Over the next two trading days, the stock continued to rise, reaching a peak of HK$63.8 per share, accumulating a 130.32% increase from the lowest price of HK$27.7. Starting from the fifth trading day, NEW VISION CO began a consecutive correction. By the close on April 8, its share price stood at HK$40 per share, falling below the issue price again, down 9.5% from the HK$44.2 issue price and 37.3% from the peak of HK$63.8.

The trajectory over these nine trading days resembled a highly condensed capital drama, filled with intense financial maneuvers. Behind the sharp price swings, the script of capital operations seemed pre-written. From quietly accumulating shares at low levels after the sell-off, to decisively pushing prices higher during the rally, and then calmly distributing shares at high levels, the series of actions was coherent and swift, displaying a clear short-term trading rhythm. Once the major funds achieved their objectives, those who chased the rally amid the frenzy were likely left stranded at the peak.

The steep drop on the first day actually presented an opportunity to accumulate cheap shares. In fact, signs of NEW VISION CO's debut plunge were evident during the IPO phase. Issued under "Mechanism B," the company offered a total of 16.2265 million H-shares, representing 13.15% of its total shares. The public offering comprised 1.62265 million shares, accounting for 10% of the total, while the international placement amounted to 14.60385 million shares, making up 90%. Despite strong market sentiment for new listings, with the public offering being oversubscribed by 68.89 times, the international placement received a lukewarm response.

Firstly, in terms of cornerstone investors, NEW VISION CO only attracted Yingke Yihao and Hong Kong High-Tech, who collectively subscribed for 2.4875 million shares, representing 15.33% of the total offering—significantly lower than the average cornerstone subscription ratio of over 30% for Hong Kong IPOs. Although these two cornerstones are industry funds with Beijing government backing, they are related to the company's old shareholders, lacking endorsement from market-oriented long-term institutions, international capital, and industry giants.

Secondly, after cornerstone investors subscribed to approximately 17.03% of the international placement, the international placement was only oversubscribed by 1.34 times, placing it at the lower end of institutional participation among new listings in the first quarter of 2026. This indicated tepid interest from institutional investors. Notably, despite the冷淡 international placement, NEW VISION CO did not perform a "reverse clawback" like Tong Shifu (00664), which would have allocated more shares to retail investors amid weak institutional demand.

Abandoning the greenshoe mechanism was another key reason for the debut plunge. As the company failed to secure sufficient institutional orders during the pre-marketing phase, it decided to forgo the greenshoe option. The greenshoe mechanism is a common IPO price stabilization tool that allows underwriters to oversell up to 15% of shares, which can be used to support the stock price within 30 days of listing. Without this mechanism, the stock price relies entirely on secondary market forces, making it highly susceptible to sharp fluctuations if faced with selling pressure early on.

Although NEW VISION CO's stock price saw a slight uptick in the first ten minutes of its debut, after a brief rise of less than 3%, it quickly plummeted. By 10:30 AM, the stock had fallen over 30% and began oscillating at low levels. With no price recovery by the close, investors rushed to cut losses, exacerbating the decline. From a capital flow perspective, the core reason for the debut plunge was the "dumping" by institutional investors in the international placement. According to estimates from Futu Securities, on March 24, Haitong International was the absolute main force in net selling, offloading 623,000 shares, though this was far less than the day's total turnover of 5.22 million shares. This suggests that funds at Haitong International's席位 may have repurchased shares at lower prices, resulting in a relatively smaller net sell figure.

It is worth noting that Haitong International is a joint sponsor of NEW VISION CO and primarily holds shares for cornerstone investors and top international placement participants. Since cornerstones are subject to lock-up restrictions, it is highly likely that the top international placement investors executed the above operations through Haitong International's席位. While Haitong International was selling, Phillip Securities recorded a net sell of 84,400 shares, indicating that many retail investors were cutting losses. Of course, some investors also seized the opportunity to buy at the bottom; for instance, Futu Securities recorded a net purchase of 157,600 shares that day. (Estimated data, for reference only.)

Thus, the direct trigger for NEW VISION CO's debut plunge was selling by institutional investors in the international placement. The absence of a greenshoe mechanism meant there was no effective stabilizing force to cushion the selling pressure, leading to a rapid price decline. However, this process effectively served as a passive "stress test." It not only flushed out weak hands, reducing future selling pressure, but also facilitated share exchange at lower levels, providing technical room for institutional funds accumulating at lows to execute subsequent operations and for the stock to rebound from oversold conditions.

The sustained rally and calm distribution at high levels became evident by March 25, the second trading day. The sharp reversal, dubbed "dramatic" by the market, further supports the likelihood that institutional investors in the international placement had accumulated sufficient cheap shares at low levels on the debut day. With selling pressure alleviated, NEW VISION CO exhibited remarkable爆发力 on the second day, opening higher and surging significantly, with intraday gains exceeding 70% and closing up 62.70%. Such a sharp reversal in a short period often correlates with rapid re-concentration of share holdings and aggressive buying support.

Capital flow data corroborates the direct link between the surge and international placement investors. According to Futu Securities estimates, on March 25, Haitong International Securities was the dominant buyer, with a net purchase of 152,600 shares. With the day's total volume reaching 2.03 million shares, a maximum net buy of only 152,600 shares suggests that institutional investors at Haitong International may have begun gradually realizing floating profits after driving up the price. The highest net seller was Mayin Securities, with a net sell of approximately 250,000 shares. As one of the main custodians for international placement shares beyond cornerstones and top participants, this selling indicates that some institutional investors with smaller allocations chose to take profits after the sharp rebound. (Estimated data, for reference only.)

From the third trading day (March 26) onward, profit-taking by major funds gradually tapered. That morning, NEW VISION CO's stock price exhibited a volatile pattern of "rally-retreat-consolidation." After the afternoon session began, the price was quickly lifted, with intraday gains nearing 40%. However, within half an hour of the peak, the stock sharply reversed, turning from gains to losses, down over 6% at the lowest, with a daily amplitude接近 50%. Such rapid swings are typically seen as classic signs of major funds distributing at highs. After dipping to -6%, the stock gradually recovered toward the close, ending up 3.17%. This intraday V-shaped movement may reflect some funds employing a two-way strategy: realizing部分 floating profits at highs, then buying back at lows after the quick retreat, capturing spreads amid volatility while maintaining market attention by lifting the closing price to attract follow-on funds.

This strategy proved effective, as on the fourth trading day, NEW VISION CO's stock price opened higher and continued rallying, with intraday gains up to 28.10% and closing up 23.93% at HK$58 per share, though it did not surpass the previous day's high of HK$63.8. Notably, the fourth day's surge was likely the "last gasp." Volume plummeted from 1.42 million to 659,500 shares; a price surge on more than halved volume suggests major funds were leveraging remaining buying interest and locked-up shares for a "low-volume rally," while slowing distribution at highs. This is not genuine strong accumulation but a sign of weakening short-term momentum, warranting caution—a point confirmed by subsequent trends.

Starting from the fifth trading day, NEW VISION CO began a five-day consecutive correction, with a maximum drop exceeding 36%. By April 8, the stock closed at HK$40 per share, falling below the issue price again. This ongoing correction resulted from selling pressure outweighing buying interest after institutions that acquired low-cost shares realized profits, naturally leading to a price retreat.

Share holdings may have concentrated among a few active institutions. Data from Zhitong Caijing APP shows that over the first eight trading days from listing to April 2, Futu Securities recorded the highest net buy at 530,300 shares, indicating retail investor interest. Haitong International Securities had the highest net sell at 1.4361 million shares, yet its holding ratio in NEW VISION CO stood at 10.55%, not significantly lower than the initial 11.86% post-listing. The maintained high holding ratio at Haitong International's席位 could imply two scenarios: some institutions took profits while others held on, or intense share turnover and re-concentration occurred within the席位, keeping the overall ratio stable. The latter seems more plausible, supported by three factors: the international placement's slight oversubscription reflected low initial institutional interest; the debut plunge without greenshoe support triggered some institutional selling, but the same席位 saw large反向 buying the next day, indicating internal divergence and intense博弈; and the sharp rebound from lows, exceeding 50% above the issue price, provided clear波段操作 room, likely prompting share exchange and re-concentration among different investors under the same席位.

Through the violent price swings, NEW VISION CO's shares have been redistributed among a few active institutions, with major funds achieving both波段 profits and optimized holding costs via intense volatility. However, retail investors who cut losses on the debut day or chased the rally later became the clear losers in this博弈. The entire process resembles a fierce, albeit silent, capital tussle. The further concentration of shares amid大幅波动 raises questions: does it signal institutional recognition and locking in of long-term value, or merely preparation for a larger-scale move? This may be a signal worth watching more closely than short-term price fluctuations.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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