As East Money Information Co.,Ltd. reported net profits exceeding 12 billion yuan for 2025, alongside a new high in market share, the market responded positively. However, behind these impressive figures, a significant transformation is underway—the company once known for disrupting the industry as an "internet broker" is increasingly resembling the traditional securities firms it sought to overturn.
More notably, as it moves closer to this conventional model, East Money's lopsided business structure is becoming more apparent: its investment banking operations are nearly negligible, asset management is still in its early stages, and its once-proud fund distribution business is facing growth challenges.
The "Quasi-Traditional Broker" Debate: Heavy Asset Characteristics Intensify In 2025, the company achieved operating revenue of 16.068 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 38.46%, and net profit attributable to shareholders of 12.085 billion yuan, up 25.75% from the previous year.
A decade ago, East Money emerged with a closed-loop model combining its website, Tian Tian Fund, and securities arm, rapidly capturing market share from traditional brokers through low customer acquisition costs and superior user experience. It was then seen as an industry disrupter.
But the 2025 annual report reveals that East Money's business structure now closely mirrors that of a traditional securities firm.
Revenue remains highly concentrated in retail brokerage and margin financing: Securities business revenue reached 12.535 billion yuan in 2025, accounting for 78.02% of total revenue. Within this, brokerage net income was 7.724 billion yuan, representing 61.6% of securities revenue, while net interest income stood at 3.435 billion yuan, a 27.4% share. This means brokerage, margin financing, and some proprietary business interest income contribute approximately 85% of securities revenue—a model heavily reliant on commission and spread-based income, similar to traditional leaders like CITIC Securities and Guotai Junan Securities.
A clear trend toward heavy assets is evident: Previously operating a light-asset model focused on monetizing traffic, East Money now shows pronounced "heavy asset" features on its balance sheet. By the end of 2025, total assets reached 392.9 billion yuan, with margin lending at 80.8 billion yuan and tradable financial assets at 109.5 billion yuan—together comprising over 48% of the total. Supporting these operations requires continuous capital infusion.
Risk exposure converges with peers: As margin financing and proprietary trading scales expand, East Money faces credit and market risks largely indistinguishable from those of any mid- to large-sized traditional broker.
Lopsided Development in Investment Banking and Asset Management While East Money excels in retail brokerage and margin financing, it lags significantly in investment banking and asset management—two core business areas.
In 2025, investment banking revenue was a mere 27.24 million yuan, negligible in industry rankings and incomparable to giants like CITIC Securities.
Asset management revenue, though growing 540% year-on-year to 134 million yuan, started from an extremely low base. This minimal presence contrasts sharply with East Money's vast retail client base.
As a "light-asset" business, asset management is key to boosting ROE and smoothing cyclical fluctuations. Failure to achieve a breakthrough in this area could impair the company's overall competitiveness.
The "Midlife Crisis" of Financial E-Commerce Financial e-commerce service revenue grew 11.99% to 3.182 billion yuan in 2025, far below the nearly 50% growth in brokerage business. This slowdown is partly due to fee reductions in public funds.
Historically, East Money's fund distribution business monetized traffic by converting user visits into fund sales, earning trailing commissions and transaction fees. However, regulatory-mandated fee cuts for subscriptions, redemptions, and sales services have directly compressed profit margins for third-party platforms reliant on such rates.
Moreover, as markets mature and investor education deepens, simplistic "recommendation-based" models no longer suffice. The era of buyer-led investment advisory has arrived. Although East Money possesses vast user data, its advisory capabilities have yet to establish a solid moat. Tian Tian Fund remains primarily a "supermarket" rather than a "wealth manager." The challenge lies in shifting from "selling funds" to "helping users earn returns."
Controlling Shareholder Family Cashes Out Over 9 Billion Yuan in Six Months Shen Yougen, father of East Money's actual controller Qi Shi (Shen Jun), was the main player in this significant divestment, executing it with notable timing:
First round (September 2020–February 2021): During a structural bull market in A-shares, with East Money's stock near historic highs, Shen sold 107 million shares via bulk auctions at an average price of 26.95 yuan per share, cashing out 2.883 billion yuan.
Second round (July 2025): Capitalizing on a market rebound, Shen sold 159 million shares through a block trade at 21.66 yuan per share, realizing 3.44 billion yuan. The transaction attracted several domestic and international institutions, including Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, and UBS.
Third round (October 2025): Shen, together with Lu Lili (Qi Shi's wife), sold 238 million shares at 24.40 yuan per share, cashing out 5.802 billion yuan. Post-transaction, Shen held no remaining shares in East Money.
In total, the Qi Shi family (including Shen Yougen and Lu Lili) cashed out over 12 billion yuan within five years, with more than 9 billion yuan realized in the second half of 2025 alone.
Comments