How much impact can a single system bug have on a small business that has been painstakingly built over many years? According to a January 7, 2026 report, a small business owner in Zhongshan, Guangdong, Mr. Qin, discovered in November 2022 while checking his bill in the credit card repayment section of the UnionPay app that the amount due for his China Everbright Bank "Le Hui Jin" quasi-credit card was shockingly displayed as 1,000 trillion yuan.
Even before this anomalous bill appeared, Mr. Qin had already faced another credit-related distress. While using his "Le Hui Jin" card normally for overdrafts, his personal credit report showed markings of "1" and "2", which caused misunderstandings during credit approval processes, leading to multiple rejections of his loan applications. "It wasn't until October 2022 that the repayment records for this credit card were finally removed from the credit system."
How did two simple numeric markings become major obstacles in the loan application process? The report stated that "Mr. Qin operates a garment factory in Zhongshan, Guangdong. In 2015, he registered and obtained a 'Le Hui Jin' quasi-credit card from China Everbright Bank's Zhongshan branch, with an overdraft limit of 100,000 yuan. Since obtaining the card, he had never missed a repayment and paid the annual fee of 1,088 yuan on time each year."
However, in 2022, when his loan applications to other financial institutions were repeatedly blocked, he printed his personal credit report from the People's Bank of China Credit Reference Center and discovered that this quasi-credit card's repayment record for August 2021 was marked "1", and from September 2021 to July 2022, it was continuously marked "2". Loan officers interpreted these as indicating delinquency periods, thereby affecting credit approval.
The report mentioned that Mr. Qin filed multiple personal credit dispute applications which were not supported, while China Everbright Bank branches explained that "1" and "2" indicated overdraft status, not delinquency status. Nevertheless, Mr. Qin still faced the reality of being unable to pass loan reviews at other banks until October 2022, when the relevant records were finally removed from the credit system.
The key conflict here lies not in the original meaning of the "1" and "2" numeric markings, but in the inconsistent interpretations that arise when they are used across different institutions. The report cited a "Guidance Letter on Correctly Interpreting Quasi-Credit Card Repayment Records in Personal Credit Reports" issued by the Zhongshan Central Sub-branch of the People's Bank of China, which clearly stated that for quasi-credit cards, "1" represents an overdraft of 1-30 days and "2" represents an overdraft of 31-60 days, emphasizing the need to distinguish between quasi-credit card overdraft records and standard credit card delinquency records.
However, clearly defined rules did not prevent misunderstandings from occurring in real-world financing scenarios. For small business clients, financing needs are not met through a single bank's internal cycle but require obtaining funds from cross-bank, cross-product, and multi-channel sources to sustain business development. If there is room for misinterpretation between the markings presented in a credit report and the credit approval rules of different institutions, the consequences are often borne by the small business client, particularly when the client's operations rely on short-term working capital, where the impact can be more direct.
From the perspective of bank operations, this issue involves at least two levels. First, the way a client's repayment record symbols are presented in the credit report has elements that could potentially be confused with the delinquency symbols used for standard credit cards. When explanations to the client are limited to "no delinquency occurred" without mentioning the potential for misunderstanding in cross-institutional credit reviews, a discrepancy can arise between the cardholder's understanding of the record and how it is processed by other banks during their reviews.
Second, the processing timeline—from the appearance of the markings starting in August 2021 to their removal from the credit system in October 2022, exceeding one year—could mean repeated obstacles for a small business urgently needing capital turnover.
The report also cited a 2022 report noting that "some holders of China Everbright Bank's Le Hui Jin quasi-credit cards found that while using their overdraft limits normally, their credit reports sparked controversy and led to them being inexplicably 'blacklisted' by other banks. As many holders of the 'Le Hui Jin' card are small and medium-sized merchants, being shut out by other banks left them facing the risk of cash flow disruption."
Although such misinterpretations might be viewed by banks as low-probability events, the reporting indicates this was not an isolated case. For products targeting inclusive finance and small business populations, encountering obstacles at the loan application stage during critical moments can severely impact their cash flow and even business continuity.
Where did the 1,000 trillion yuan figure come from, and the dilemma faced by the client with the astronomical bill? A suddenly appearing bill for 1,000 trillion yuan in debt plunged Mr. Qin into a passive position. According to the report, in November 2022, Mr. Qin discovered this staggering 1,000 trillion yuan debt while checking his bill in the UnionPay app's credit card repayment section. "Mr. Qin stated that this 1,000 trillion yuan debt for the card only appeared on the UnionPay platform; it was not present in China Everbright Bank's own App or other transaction records. During this period, his loan applications to other banks were rejected again, and he was unsure if this was the cause. This abnormal record persisted until December 2023 before being canceled."
For small business operators like Mr. Qin, whose loan approvals heavily depend on external credit reports and billing records, it is difficult to demand that every financial institution manually verify every anomaly. Any irregularity can trigger higher approval thresholds or outright loan rejection.
More棘手的是, a stalemate emerged regarding responsibility. UnionPay customer service stated that the data was provided by the bank and suggested contacting the bank; China Everbright Bank customer service hinted that it might be a display issue with the third-party platform. For the client, the conflicting narratives from both sides created a "Rashomon" situation.
The report stated that UnionPay customer service said credit card repayment records are provided by the bank's credit card center and suggested the cardholder inquire with the bank; China Everbright Bank customer service said errors on third-party platforms could not be ruled out and required the cardholder to visit in person for inquiry and resolution. The report also mentioned that in previous media reports, China Everbright Bank had responded that Mr. Qin's SMS bills, electronic bills, and bank channels showed no 1,000 trillion yuan debt, and the reason for its appearance on third-party platforms was unclear.
This type of response—where the platform says the data comes from the bank, and the bank suggests it might be a platform issue—leaves individual clients with limited resources and energy stuck in a dilemma. Facing such a situation, if the bank confirms its own system is error-free, proactively coordinating and clarifying the cause of the cross-platform data anomaly could be an effective path to break the stalemate and help the client resolve the issue. Failing that, China Everbright Bank should have at least provided the client with a formal written clarification to help him explain the situation to other financial institutions.
Another detail is the compensation proposal. Public reports mentioned that Mr. Qin said China Everbright Bank offered to compensate for interest losses related to the period from August 2021 to July 2022, amounting to approximately over 30,000 yuan, but he did not accept this proposal. In similar disputes, the losses claimed by clients often include difficult-to-quantify aspects like reputational damage and indirect operational losses, which frequently creates a significant gap compared to the quantifiable compensation banks offer based on contract terms.
The industry-wide issues reflected by this individual case: compliance and reverence under strong supervision. Mr. Qin's experience gained attention due to the dramatic figure of "1,000 trillion yuan," but the problems it exposed—cross-institutional misinterpretation of credit markings, processing timeliness for customer complaints, and data inconsistencies across platforms—are not unique. In recent years, financial regulators have adopted a "sharp-toothed" stance, targeting penalties precisely at these fundamental areas. Reviewing contemporaneous industry regulatory trends helps understand the broader context in which such customer disputes occur.
Regulatory scrutiny covers the entire banking industry. Just between 2025 and early 2026, several major banks received multiple penalties for various violations. Among these penalties, issues related to customer data and credit information management were notably prominent. For example, several branches of China Everbright Bank were penalized for violations in early 2026, and local financial regulatory bureaus also issued fines to its branches.
On January 6, 2026, an administrative penalty disclosure from the Datong Supervision Bureau of the National Financial Regulatory Administration showed that the Datong Branch of China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd. was fined 400,000 yuan on December 30, 2025, for "inadequate post-loan management; imprudent management of forfaiting business."
On the same day, an administrative penalty disclosure from the Cangzhou Supervision Bureau of the National Financial Regulatory Administration showed that the Cangzhou Branch of China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd. was fined 350,000 yuan for "inadequate loan review."
Also on the same day, an administrative penalty information disclosure from the Quanzhou Financial Regulatory Bureau showed that the Quanzhou Branch of China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd. and relevant responsible persons were fined a total of 1.2 million yuan for "insufficient pre-lending investigation and inadequate post-lending management for individual business loans; insufficient pre-lending investigation and inadequate post-lending management for working capital loans," with warnings issued to the responsible individuals.
Furthermore, a penalty decision published on the People's Bank of China website on January 27, 2025, showed that China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd. was penalized on December 30, 2024, with a "warning, confiscation of illegal gains amounting to 2,017,703.30 yuan, and a fine of 16,770,600.90 yuan" for 11 types of violations, including breaches related to account management, clearing management, anti-counterfeiting currency operations, RMB circulation management, and violations of credit information collection, provision, query, and related management regulations.
While the specific issues in these entries do not directly correspond to the "Le Hui Jin" incident, they collectively point to one reality: regulatory authorities hold banks to extremely high standards on these fundamental issues. Once management loosens, penalties will not stop at mere orders for rectification.
Returning to the China Everbright Bank "Le Hui Jin" incident, its prominence stems not from it happening at one bank, but from it affecting small business clients who rely most heavily on credit and cash flow. Two numeric symbols in a credit report were potentially mistaken for delinquency in some loan processes, while an astronomical debt figure appearing on a third-party portal remained unresolved for 13 months, with neither China Everbright Bank's own channels nor the platform providing a consistent explanation.
It must be clearly stated that there is no direct causal link between the aforementioned regulatory penalties and Mr. Qin's specific case. However, they together outline a clear regulatory trend: regardless of size, any negligence by banks in fundamental areas like customer rights protection and data governance may face severe accountability.
The "Le Hui Jin" incident garnered attention precisely because it dramatically highlighted the fragility of the certainty small business clients highly depend on in their credit records. When technical bugs and regulatory gaps overlap, the damage extends beyond individual clients to the very foundation of the financial contract. Therefore, for banks, a more fundamental challenge than merely responding to regulations might be demonstrating the most basic respect and understanding for every client, especially those with weak risk resilience, like small businesses.
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