CITIC Securities: Assessing the Impact of the U.S. Commerce Department BIS Remote Access Rules on Chinese Tech Assets

Deep News11-18

On November 15 U.S. time, the BIS unveiled new rules on remote access to advanced semiconductors, further tightening the channels through which Chinese domestic models can obtain overseas computing power. This round of rulemaking was unusual in tone, with political signaling more prominent than before.

Although the pace of implementation and the scope of restrictions from the U.S. Congress exceeded prior expectations, the actual enforcement posture of the White House still needs to be watched. If the new rules are strictly enforced, they are expected to bring threefold impacts to China's technology industry.

Domestic computing power: In the near term, the demand for and strategic value of advanced process nodes become more prominent, but tighter tape-out restrictions may further suppress overall domestic computing power supply. Over the medium term, domestic computing power is at the starting point of becoming the mainstay of China's compute base. As domestic HBM and advanced process and packaging capacity make breakthroughs, self-sufficient computing power supply is expected to keep expanding.

Domestic models: In the near term, the gap between Chinese and U.S. models may widen further, and commercialization revenue may come under periodic pressure. Over the medium term, joint tuning of domestic models and domestic chips is the key to breaking through, using efficiency to buy room for iteration, while policy support may also offer a path forward.

Domestic CSPs: Cloud revenue may face systemic pressure, ensuring business continuity becomes the main contradiction, and existing computing power reserves become an important safeguard for future model training. We suggest paying attention to investment opportunities in strategic assets such as advanced process nodes and the Ascend supply chain.

Key event: The BIS published new rules on remote access to advanced semiconductors, further tightening the overseas computing power supply channels for Chinese domestic models, but the ultimate impact still depends on enforcement intensity and effectiveness. According to the official website of the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), on November 15, 2026, the BIS issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR) titled "Restricting Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors," intending to implement a new advanced chip export control regulation in the form of an interim final rule, further tightening the overseas computing power leasing channels for domestic models. According to the IFR document: 1) Overseas computing power leasing is brought under global control: regardless of which country the data center is located in, providing more than 12 million aggregate TPP of computing power to restricted entities such as Chinese-funded enterprises will trigger export, re-export, or in-country transfer license requirements for relevant controlled chips and servers; computing power is aggregated for interconnected computer rooms that share resources over networks and operate uniformly. 2) Five Southeast Asian countries add chip export license requirements: exports, re-exports, or local transfers of relevant controlled chips and servers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, and Thailand will in principle require a license. 3) Customer verification penetrates to the ultimate parent company: control is based on the headquarters location of the customer and its ultimate parent company; data centers must conduct KYC to verify direct and indirect ownership and control relationships, and whether third-country customers are training models on behalf of Chinese enterprises. 4) Existing leases are also covered: data centers that have already provided computing power above the threshold to relevant enterprises must obtain a license within 90 days after the rule takes effect if they wish to continue service, with applications reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Interpretation: This new rule is unusual, with political motives more prominent, highlighting intense jockeying within the White House and a tendency to seek immunity under congressional scrutiny, with the subsequent enforcement posture still to be observed. The rule issued by the BIS explicitly states that it was completed under the guidance of the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. National Security Council, which is inconsistent with usual administrative practice and may indicate intense internal White House debate as well as a tendency to seek immunity under congressional scrutiny. Three subsequent issues may affect the enforcement intensity of the above bill and rules. First, although the U.S. Congress's inclination to further strengthen chip export controls has grown, the control tools remain in the hands of the executive branch, and strict inspection and approval also require substantial administrative resource allocation; rule implementation often requires a high degree of coordination between the White House and Congress. But as analyzed above, this event instead highlights intense jockeying within the White House and between the White House and Congress, so the enforcement posture remains to be seen. Second, attention should be paid to opportunities for China-U.S. meetings at this year's APEC and G20 summits; looking back to around September 2025, China and the U.S. also engaged in jockeying over export controls and ship port fees, and defused extreme risks at the Busan meeting in October 2025. Third, bipartisan jockeying in the U.S. over the U.S.-Iran conflict may become an obstacle to advancing the National Defense Authorization Act (passed annually by the U.S. Congress), and will have knock-on effects on packaged China technology control bills.

Domestic computing power: Companies with complete self-sufficient supply chain capabilities are facing historic opportunities, while capacity remains the primary bottleneck. This is the fifth round of controls after October 2022, October 2023, December 2024, and January 2025. The previous four rounds mainly focused on advanced chips, manufacturing equipment, HBM, and foundry reviews, while this round, while restricting overseas computing power leasing, continues to tighten overseas tape-out paths, making the demand for and strategic value of advanced process nodes more prominent. In the near term, tighter tape-out restrictions may further suppress overall domestic computing power supply, and DeepSeek's efficiency innovation and Ascend's self-sufficient computing power adaptation value become even more prominent. Over the medium term, domestic computing power is at the starting point of becoming the mainstay of China's compute base. However, whether replacement demand can translate into large-scale shipments and earnings still depends on supply-side factors such as advanced process capacity and yield, domestic HBM, and supporting breakthroughs in advanced packaging.

Domestic models & CSPs: Training computing power restrictions may further widen the gap between Chinese and U.S. models, and inference-side revenue may come under near-term pressure, with self-sufficient computing power being the key to breaking through. On the training side, with upgraded restrictions on overseas computing power, the training scale and iteration speed of frontier models may be constrained, and the capability gap between Chinese and U.S. models may widen in the near term; on the inference side, there is still room for domestic computing power to share with overseas providers, but businesses relying on self-leased overseas computing power are restricted, and part of the open-source market share may be seized by overseas token factories. Against this backdrop, domestic models may in the future need to focus limited resources on efficient training and model iteration. In the long run, the breakthrough still lies in coordinated tuning of domestic models and domestic chips such as DeepSeek and Ascend, and upgrades in domestic super nodes and AI Infra, using efficiency to buy room for iteration and self-sufficient computing power to solidify the foundation of a commercial closed loop. For domestic CSPs, in the near term cloud revenue may face systemic pressure, ensuring business continuity becomes the main contradiction while ROI becomes secondary, and existing computing power reserves become an important safeguard for future model training.

What to watch next: The scope of controls is tightening, and existing-customer reviews, list adjustments, and license approvals will determine the degree of impact. According to the IFR document, new remote access licenses are reviewed case by case according to the public text, and the continuation of existing services still depends on approval outcomes. Three areas should be closely watched going forward: first, the enforcement of customer penetration reviews and the 90-day arrangement for existing services, which affects continuity of current services; second, enforcement beyond the five countries and adjustments to the destination list, which affect the availability of incremental computing power in different regions; third, the standards for license approval and the application of exceptions, which affect the scope of business adjustments.

Risk factors: The risk that export control policies and enforcement intensity change more than expected; the risk that relevant license applications are not approved or approval progress falls short of expectations; the risk that adjustments to overseas computing power services affect business continuity; the risk that domestic chip R&D, supply, and cluster deployment progress fall short of expectations; the risk that heterogeneous adaptation and model migration costs exceed expectations; the risk that AI demand growth and commercialization fall short of expectations; and the risk of valuation volatility in related assets.

Investment strategy: Pay attention to investment opportunities in domestic chips along the advanced process and Ascend domestic foundry supply chain, as well as related upstream and downstream industry chains. The difficulty of obtaining overseas computing power is expected to increase, which structurally benefits domestic chips that rely on the domestic foundry supply chain. We suggest grasping opportunities along three lines: 1) The status of advanced process and packaging is historically strengthened, and strategic attention should be paid to leading domestic advanced process wafer foundries. 2) Domestic computing power chips and servers with complete self-sufficient supply chain capabilities, with attention to the conversion of replacement demand into orders and deliveries. 3) The coordinated ecosystem of domestic models and domestic chips such as Ascend, with attention to the AI Infra segment for efficient training, inference optimization, and heterogeneous cluster capabilities, and to the ramp-up of domestic super nodes, using efficiency to buy room for iteration.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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