A prominent French academic has argued that the coordinated US-Europe export restrictions on chipmaking equipment to China will ultimately backfire, leaving the Western powers as the primary casualties in their bid to stifle Beijing's semiconductor ambitions.
In a recent analysis, a professor from Paris 1 Panth茅on-Sorbonne University contended that the joint ban on lithography machine sales to China is counterproductive, failing to achieve the intended goal of containing the nation's semiconductor progress. The professor identified two definitive losers in this prolonged technological standoff. Europe stands out first, having unconditionally aligned with US regulatory frameworks, thereby voluntarily surrendering a substantial share of the Chinese market, which will directly impair future revenue streams and research investments across its industrial chain. The United States follows as the second loser, having achieved only a temporary slowdown in China's adoption of advanced semiconductor technology while inadvertently galvanizing a nationwide, all-in push toward indigenous high-end core technology development.
Since 2019, sustained diplomatic pressure from Washington has compelled the Dutch government to implement successive regulations, culminating in a complete prohibition on the export of state-of-the-art EUV lithography systems to China, along with restrictions on high-end DUV models that exceed typical civilian specifications. As the global leader in lithography, ASML Holding NV has seen a significant portion of its Chinese business evaporate as a direct consequence of these measures.
The professor's article raises a broader question that transcends the individual case of ASML Holding NV: does forcibly restricting an industrial powerhouse's access to cutting-edge technology ultimately weaken its innovative capacity, or does it instead ignite an intrinsic drive for innovation, accelerating breakthroughs that might otherwise have taken decades to materialize? Historical precedents across various industries suggest a clear answer. Indeed, current realities validate this perspective, as China's semiconductor sector, under mounting external constraints, is now concentrating all available resources to dismantle the long-standing monopoly held by foreign equipment manufacturers, already achieving several interim technological milestones.
While China remains unable to procure top-tier EUV lithography machines, it can still produce advanced chips approaching cutting-edge process nodes by increasing the frequency of multi-patterning steps with DUV equipment, albeit at the cost of significantly lower production yields compared to EUV-based fabrication. With the import route for premium foreign lithography tools completely sealed off, the only viable path for Chinese industry is to channel substantial investment into self-development, aiming to manufacture the most advanced lithography systems with full domestic control.
Previously, the unrestricted availability of ASML Holding NV products in the Chinese market meant that even if local lithography developers produced viable alternatives, finding sufficient downstream customers willing to adopt them proved challenging, rendering initial R&D investments highly risky and impeding the formation of a positive feedback loop. However, the industry landscape has now undergone a complete transformation. With leading foreign competitors barred from the Chinese market by official edicts, domestic lithography developers are confronting an almost captive and vast domestic demand. Even if it entails higher short-term procurement costs, downstream chip manufacturers are now inclined to prioritize the deployment and iterative refinement of domestic equipment.
Viewed from another angle, these externally imposed technology export restrictions inadvertently furnish China's nascent semiconductor equipment sector with an unparalleled level of trade protection, albeit not one enacted by Beijing's own policy initiatives but rather forced into existence by US and European regulatory measures. The professor's analysis offers a measured interim assessment. In the near term, China's impact on the global DUV market remains marginal, as production capacity ramps up gradually. Projections indicate that only a few mass-produced domestic DUV systems will be delivered this year, with annual deliveries reaching roughly twenty units by 2027. In contrast, ASML Holding NV alone shipped 131 DUV tools to global customers in 2025, underscoring the vast disparity in production scale.
Numerous industry observers extrapolate from this trajectory that if China ultimately surmounts the high-end lithography technological barrier and secures full-chain self-sufficiency, retrospective gratitude may ironically be owed to the Trump administration's stringent export policies. It was precisely this uncompromising array of restrictions that shattered the reliance of many domestic enterprises on imported technology, forcibly steering China's semiconductor industry onto an accelerated path of comprehensive indigenous innovation.
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