Even as the threat of attacks in the Strait of Hormuz has recently escalated, with the smoke from renewed military friction between the US and Iran yet to fully dissipate, the major oil-exporting ports of the Middle East have not fallen silent. On the contrary, from the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia to Iran's Kharg Island, and from the Qatari peninsula to the waters off the United Arab Emirates, supertankers and liquefied natural gas carriers are still busily docking, loading, and departing. The latest shipping data reveals that energy exports from the region have not halted; instead, they are exhibiting a posture of "normalized operations under crisis." This is driven by a complex interplay of geopolitical calculations and the rigid forces of global energy supply and demand. This article will reconstruct the current loading situation around the Strait of Hormuz using the latest data and typical vessel movements, and analyze the delicate balance various parties are striking between risk and reward.
Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia: Supertankers Load in Relay, Signal 'Stealth' Becomes Routine
Located in eastern Saudi Arabia, the port of Ras Tanura is one of the world's most crucial oil export terminals. According to the latest shipping records provided by the London Stock Exchange Group, just this past Monday, a fourth very large crude carrier, with a capacity of two million barrels, docked at the terminal and commenced loading operations.
This is not an isolated incident. Over the preceding weekend, three other vessels of the same class completed loading and departed the port. However, upon leaving, they did not immediately broadcast their positions publicly. Instead, they uniformly switched off their Automatic Identification System transponders, entering a state of so-called "stealth sailing." This practice is becoming increasingly common in Gulf waters, with its core purpose being to reduce the probability of being targeted by drones or anti-ship missiles, thereby enhancing survival odds when transiting the narrow strait.
It is noteworthy that one of these tankers reactivated its transponder after exiting the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, with its course indicating a destination of Japan, suggesting that procurement demand from major East Asian consumers remains robust.
Simultaneously, on Sunday, two other very large crude carriers entered the Strait and began loading oil at a designated terminal in the UAE. Saudi Aramco maintained its customary silence regarding these movements, declining to comment on vessel scheduling or loading arrangements. Abu Dhabi National Oil Company responded by stating that, in line with corporate practice, it does not disclose specific vessel locations, headings, or routing plans.
Strait Transit Volume Cools, But Rebounds Significantly from Early Conflict Levels
In terms of product tankers, three vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, including two carrying petroleum products and a smaller fuel tanker. Although the daily transit count has declined compared to the previous week, statistics from energy analytics firm Kpler show that last week's transit volume climbed to its highest level since the conflict escalated in late February—with 29 tankers crossing on June 24 alone.
However, compared to the pre-conflict daily average of 125 transits, current shipping activity still shows a significant gap. This disparity reflects both shipowners' ongoing assessment of risk premiums and the fact that some shipping companies are still weighing the additional costs and time losses associated with rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope or waiting for naval convoys.
Iran's Kharg Island: Dual Berths Active, Rushing to Load During Washington's Exemption Window
The loading pace from Iran is particularly noteworthy. Following the US government's granting of a 60-day temporary sanctions exemption for Iranian oil exports, Tehran is clearly seizing this policy window to accelerate crude shipments. According to maritime intelligence company Windward, last Saturday, Iran's two main export berths at Kharg Island were unusually active simultaneously, marking the first instance of dual-berth loading in nearly a week.
On the same day, two Iranian-flagged very large crude carriers, the "Dan" and the "Hawk," entered the Strait of Hormuz. Over the entire weekend, approximately eight million barrels of UAE and Qatari crude were shipped out of the Gulf via four supertankers. National Iranian Oil Company has not yet commented, but market observers widely believe Tehran is attempting to maximize shipments during the exemption period to alleviate financial pressure under sanctions.
LNG Routes Unbroken: Qatari and Emirati Gas Carriers Head for India and China
Liquefied natural gas transportation has also not been interrupted by security threats. Vessel tracking data indicates that on June 26, two previously signal-darkened, ballasted vessels reappeared west of the Strait of Hormuz, while two other LNG carriers fully loaded with cargo successfully departed the Strait, bound for India and China, respectively.
Specifically, the "Mraweh," operated by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, loaded at Das Island, UAE, on June 21 and is expected to arrive at the Dahej terminal on India's west coast by July 5. The "Al Hamla," operated by QatarEnergy, loaded at Ras Laffan Port on June 18 and is scheduled to reach a Chinese coastal port by July 3. QatarEnergy has not yet responded to emailed inquiries, but the normal progression of its vessel schedules is sufficient to indicate that major gas producers are not cutting export commitments due to short-term security concerns.
Market Divergence: Is Current Oil Pricing a 'Reasonable Discount' or a 'Risk Blind Spot'?
Faced with this complex situation, financial market analysts offer divergent interpretations. Tony Sycamore, a senior analyst at IG Markets, points out that if investors expect the Strait of Hormuz to remain in a state of "intermittent openness" in the coming weeks and months—sometimes clear, sometimes disrupted—then current crude oil prices are in a relatively reasonable range, even facing slight downward pressure.
However, should the localized conflicts that erupted over the weekend escalate into broader military confrontation, then the current oil price is undoubtedly severely undervalued, and the market would face the risk of a sharp revaluation. This divergence precisely reflects a core contradiction in current energy pricing mechanisms: whether geopolitical risk premiums are already fully priced in or are still being selectively ignored by the market.
Conclusion: Rational Choices in the Eye of the Storm – Exports Continue, Game Theory Persists
In summary, despite the persistent security cloud over the Strait of Hormuz, major Middle Eastern oil and gas exporters have not chosen to halt or drastically reduce loading operations. On the contrary, from Saudi Arabia and Iran to Qatar and the UAE, all parties are flexibly adjusting their shipping rhythms based on their own sanctions exemption windows, long-term supply contracts, and strategic inventory management needs. Tactical details such as vessel "stealth" sailing, simultaneous dual-berth operations, and route diversions and signal reactivation collectively paint a complex picture of energy supply chain adaptation in a high-risk environment.
For the global market, while the risk of short-term supply disruption has not been eliminated, actual shipping data indicates that major players retain the capability to maintain export flows amidst intermittent hostilities. The true variable remains the next move at the political level—and this is precisely the fundamental reason all market participants cannot rest easy.
Frequently Asked Questions
Question 1: Given the frequent attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, why don't Middle Eastern producers simply pause loadings until the situation stabilizes?
Pausing shipments may seem prudent, but the cost is enormous. Firstly, oil and LNG exports are the absolute lifeline of fiscal revenue for countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Even a few days of停工 could result in billions of dollars in direct losses and undermine the trust of long-term clients. Secondly, global refineries and power stations are highly dependent on Middle Eastern crude and gas. A sudden supply中断 would cause international energy prices to spike instantly, triggering inflation and panic—consequences far outweighing the localized risk of vessel attacks. Therefore, producers prefer "risk mitigation" strategies, such as turning off transponders, arranging naval escorts, and adjusting loading windows, rather than a complete shutdown.
Question 2: Does turning off transponders for 'stealth' violate international maritime laws? Does it反而 increase collision or误击 risks?
Deactivating the AIS does indeed contravene the International Maritime Organization's常规 recommendations for navigational safety. However, in war zones or high-risk waters, this practice has been adopted by multiple shipowners and charterers as an "informal defensive measure." The目的 is not to evade航行 rules but to prevent real-time public disclosure of a vessel's position, reducing the likelihood of定位 and attack by hostile forces. It certainly increases避碰 difficulty for nearby vessels, so it is typically employed only in specific narrow chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and when within the coverage of escort convoys or shore-based radar, not for全程盲目隐身.
Question 3: The US sanctions exemption for Iran is only 60 days. Why is Iran rushing to load oil in such a short window? Can these shipments be顺利结算 and收款?
Although the 60-day window is brief, it represents a rare period of "legal breathing room" for Iran. During this time, importers engaging in oil transactions with Iran will not be pursued under US secondary sanctions. Therefore, Iran must race against time to convert floating storage and onshore inventories into actual export revenue. Regarding结算, most transactions are still conducted through non-USD channels—such as in renminbi, euros, or via barter trade—often routed through third-country banks. Contracts concluded during the exemption period, as long as vessels are loaded and depart within the stipulated timeframe, may still be顺利 settled even after the exemption expires, provided the运输途中 does not involve US entities or the financial system.
Question 4: Current Strait transit numbers are far below the pre-conflict level of 125 per day. Does this mean global oil supply is already substantially受损?
The decline in transit volume确实反映了 the "frictional slowdown" caused by the security premium, but it does not directly equate to supply受损. Some tankers have chosen to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope around Africa, adding about two weeks to the voyage, but this merely delays arrival time rather than reducing total volume. Others are waiting for escort convoys or favorable windows at either end of the Strait of Hormuz, causing a drop in instantaneous throughput. Judging from actual loading data, major terminals like Ras Tanura, Kharg Island, and Das Island are still operating normally. Therefore, the global physical supply of crude and LNG has not seen a断崖式下跌; it is more a matter of adjusted logistics节奏 and slower vessel周转.
Question 5: LNG carriers from Qatar and the UAE are still heading to India and China. Does this mean Asian buyers are毫不在意 about Strait risks?
Asian buyers are not毫不在意; rather, their energy security strategies dictate that they "must be concerned but cannot retreat." China and India are the world's second and fourth largest LNG importers, respectively, with Middle Eastern sources accounting for a very high proportion of their import mix. In the short term, they can hardly find替代 sources of comparable scale and price. Therefore, importers manage risks through means such as negotiating "force majeure" clauses in contracts, purchasing war risk insurance, and requiring sellers to provide alternative discharge port options. However, they will not轻易 cancel orders easily. As long as there is no确凿 signal of a complete blockade of the Strait, Chinese and Indian buyers tend to proceed with接收 cargoes as planned, given that the losses from industrial shutdowns due to gas中断 far outweigh increased insurance premiums.
Comments