On the evening of October 30, Longi Green Energy Technology Co.,Ltd. (601012.SH) released its 2026 third-quarter report. In the first three quarters, the company recorded revenue of 43.864 billion yuan, down 13.85% year-on-year; a net loss attributable to shareholders of 4.713 billion yuan, with a non-GAAP loss of 5.533 billion yuan. That works out to a loss of roughly 10.7 yuan for every 100 yuan of goods sold. On its own, this looks like an ugly set of numbers. But when you stretch out the timeline, another line emerges: losses are narrowing quarter by quarter, third-quarter operating cash flow turned positive, and the product mix has been actively rewritten. At the same time, a year-on-year loss that is still widening, margins so thin they are nearly transparent, and an industry far from recovery all remain on the table. To understand this report, you first need to see how small the table it sits at has become.
The rules of the table are being rewritten
In the 2026 solar industry, demand was cut in half, yet almost no major player left the game. The data is straightforward. In the first three quarters, domestic new installations reached 110.83GW, down 53.87% year-on-year, nearly halved. The first half was even harsher, falling 66% year-on-year, while polysilicon output dropped only 9.8% over the same period. Demand fell by more than 60%, supply retreated by only 10% — when those scissors close, prices get shredded. Polysilicon prices at one point fell more than 40% from the start of the year. The logic of heavy-asset industries is often like this: once a production line stops, depreciation, interest, and personnel costs still have to be paid, and the cost of exiting is often higher than the cost of toughing it out at a loss. So everyone is losing money, but no one leaves first. The industry's response has been "anti-involution," and the core message is just one sentence: stop undercutting each other on price, and let what should be cleared out be cleared out. The effect was almost immediate. In early August, polysilicon futures hit the daily limit up; in September, spot transactions stabilized at 40 to 43 yuan per kilogram; in September alone, new installations reached 13.64GW, up 41.2% year-on-year. But this is a "stop the bleeding," not a "recovery." That 41.2% figure needs to be placed in context. It is measured against a low base from the same period last year: after the rush installation wave faded following June last year, the base was already low; polysilicon inventories are still stuck at a high level of more than 500,000 tons. The rules of the table are being rewritten. And on this ever-smaller table, how many chips does leading player Longi still have left?
Losses rolling downhill, cash coming back to life, Longi actively switches cards
Start with the losses. The overall numbers for the first three quarters are not pretty, but when broken down quarter by quarter, the story changes. In the first quarter, revenue was about 11.2 billion yuan, with a loss of about 1.92 billion yuan — 17 yuan lost for every 100 yuan sold; in the second quarter, revenue was 15.853 billion yuan, with a loss of 1.764 billion yuan — 11 yuan lost for every 100 yuan sold; in the third quarter, revenue was 16.819 billion yuan, with a loss of 1.029 billion yuan — only 6 yuan lost for every 100 yuan sold. 17 yuan, 11 yuan, 6 yuan — that is a clear downhill path, and the final step was the biggest: third-quarter losses narrowed 41.66% quarter-on-quarter. The change in cash flow is even more noteworthy. Operating cash flow for the first three quarters was -3.467 billion yuan, but the first half had already seen an outflow of 5.818 billion yuan. Working backward, the third quarter alone had a net inflow of about 2.3 billion yuan, turning cash flow from negative to positive. Monetary funds on the books stood at 52.215 billion yuan, more than 11 times the loss for the first three quarters. At a time when industry cash flow is generally tight, losing money while turning cash flow positive at least shows that Longi is not bleeding out, but starting to generate blood. The question then follows: revenue is still declining year-on-year, yet losses are narrowing — where is the money being saved? The answer is not in the expense table, but in a shipment list, and it is quite counterintuitive: Longi actively sold less. In the first three quarters, Longi shipped 48.61GW of modules, of which BC modules accounted for 31.64GW, up 118.58% year-on-year. In the same period last year, external module sales were 63.43GW, with BC at only 14.48GW. Do a simple subtraction: BC sold about 17GW more, while non-BC products fell from about 49GW to about 17GW, a drop of about 32GW, and total shipments fell about 23%. This is not passively losing orders, but actively switching cards: moving capacity and customers as a whole toward BC, preferring to sell less rather than using low prices to fill the hole in traditional products. The cost is a shipment decline of more than 20%, but the return is that revenue fell only 13.85%. Roughly calculated, revenue per GW shipped rose about 12% — selling less, but selling dearer. Why would customers pay more? With the same land area and the same installation cost, BC modules can generate more electricity, and for power station investors, that is a real difference in returns. Profit data also confirms this: third-quarter BC module gross margin improved by 6.27 percentage points compared with the first half; the comprehensive gross margin for the first three quarters was about 3.05%, versus only 1.21% in the same period last year. Others are comparing who is cheaper; Longi is comparing who generates more electricity. The endpoint of the former is a price war, while the endpoint of the latter is pricing power. Still, a gross margin of around 3% shows that this pricing power is, for now, only a "starting price." A beautiful card switch does not mean the game is already won.
Do not let the good news blind you
The unappealing parts of this report also need to be made clear. First is the mismatch between quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year figures. In the third quarter of last year, Longi lost 834 million yuan; in the same period this year, it lost 1.029 billion yuan, so the year-on-year loss actually widened; for the first three quarters, the loss expanded by about 38% year-on-year. The word "turning point" can currently only be written into the quarter-on-quarter comparison. Second is paper-thin gross profit. Gross profit for the first three quarters was only 1.339 billion yuan, while last year's third quarter alone had 1.251 billion yuan in selling, administrative, and financial expenses. One quarter's expenses are enough to eat up more than 90% of this year's first-three-quarter gross profit. For gross profit to cover expenses, there is still a long way to go. Third is the demand ceiling. The industry expects domestic new installations this year to reach 180GW to 240GW; 110.83GW was installed in the first three quarters, so the fourth quarter still has to sprint. If end customers do not buy in, price increases cannot be passed through, and no matter how good BC is, it will hit a ceiling. So how can this game be considered won? In the future, four signals need to be watched: clearance, cost reduction, the second battlefield, and delivery. Watch clearance. Three mandatory national standards are set to take effect on January 1, 2027, drawing red lines for quality, energy consumption, and efficiency. Only when some are forced off the table can those remaining have profits to share. Watch cost reduction. Research reports mention that new metallization technology is expected to complete a 20GW production line by June 2026, and BC costs are expected to continue falling. Premiums rely on products to support them, and profits rely on costs to defend them; neither can be missing. Watch the second battlefield. Energy storage is the second growth curve Longi wants to build, with an early-year target of 6GWh of shipments. Signing orders is not unusual; delivery and gross margin are what reveal the real picture. Watch delivery. The full-year module shipment target disclosed in early-year research reports was 80GW; 48.61GW was completed in the first three quarters, so more than 31GW must be shipped in the fourth quarter to reach it, almost twice the third quarter. On profit, before the third-quarter report, brokerages forecast a full-year loss in the low 5 billion yuan range to around 5.5 billion yuan, implying fourth-quarter losses need to continue narrowing to 300 million to 800 million yuan. This is a major test for management.
Conclusion
Back to the table from the beginning. In 2026 solar, what matters is not who has the best cards, but who has the thickest chips, who switches cards earliest, and who stays seated longest. This third-quarter report from Longi seems to say: I am still at the table, and I want to play this hand well. Whether it can be played well will only become clear in the fourth quarter. (This article is only personal analysis and does not constitute any investment advice. Investing carries risk; enter the market with caution.)
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