Duan Yongping's HK$1.8 Billion Paper Loss and What It Reveals

Deep News11-09

Over the past year or so, POP MART (09992) shares tumbled from a peak of around HK$337 to a recent low of roughly HK$140, wiping out about HK$260 billion from a high of HK$440 billion in market value — a decline of nearly 60%.

Even Duan Yongping, who carries the reputation of China's Buffett, has seen his bet sour. Since he built a large position in POP MART around April 2026 at an average cost of about HK$150 per share, he had lost nearly HK$1.8 billion to HK$2 billion by October of this year — in less than six months.

Of course, this is closely tied to the report card POP MART recently delivered. In the third quarter of 2026, the company's overall revenue fell 45% to 50% year on year, with the Asia-Pacific region down 65% to 70% and the Americas down 70% to 75%.

Yet when you connect these dots, they point to one fundamental issue — POP MART has changed. This change is not a shift in some business model or a major strategic pivot. It is a structural change in the growth logic that once supported the company's lofty valuation in the capital markets. Can a company whose growth engine is random hit products ever match the market's expectation of long-term, stable value?

The fragility of emotional value

It is well known that POP MART's business model is essentially an emotional consumption system that uses visual symbols as its entry point, a blind-box mechanism as its amplifier, and an IP matrix as its content. What sets it apart from other IP companies is that its consumption motive is not narrative-driven like traditional content firms, but image-driven. Molly's pout and Labubu's fangs require no prior story background; users simply project their own emotions, aesthetics, and identity into them.

This kind of blank setting has extremely low communication costs in the social media era. Users can participate in fan art, styling, and scene-building without learning a worldview, allowing the brand to leap from a niche circle to mass consumption in a short time. The blind-box mechanism further turns consumer purchasing into participation. The surprise of uncertainty, the social bragging rights of pulling a hidden figure, and the compulsive satisfaction of completing a set together form a consumption loop and emotional container with high repurchase, high sharing, and high topicality.

However, the essence of this emotional system is very fragile. POP MART's IP value comes mainly from users' momentary emotional projection, not from a story world that can be continuously expanded. Public sentiment can be drawn to Labubu today and carried away by something else tomorrow, with almost no visible pattern behind it. In other words, unlike Disney's Mickey or Sanrio's Hello Kitty, which have thickened their emotional assets through decades of content, POP MART relies on direct emotional and state connections to create short-term hits. This model lacks an IP skeleton narrative and finds it hard to build character bonds and worldview depth, so its popularity depends heavily on the current trend cycle.

This kind of victory is not a true victory in IP operations, but a multiplier effect triggered when a super symbol detonates within a specific window. A hit product is both a revenue pillar and a traffic pillar. Once the emotional valve narrows or shifts, hit output drops rapidly, and both effects contract at the same time, driving up customer acquisition costs and inventory pressure. Rising costs then further constrain market returns, forming a negative loop.

The cliff-like decline in POP MART's third-quarter revenue is precisely the concentrated realization of this set of structural contradictions, and the stock market decline is also a value clearing after the high-emotion wave recedes. Management attributes the cause to the high base in the same period of 2025. That is certainly a fact, but a high base can explain why the decline was so large; it cannot fully explain why it was so broad and so rapid.

The tension between random hits and stable performance

Data shows that in 2025, the THE MONSTERS series, which includes Labubu, contributed RMB 14.16 billion in revenue, accounting for 38.1% of total revenue, while the combined revenue of the second through fifth-ranked IPs was less than this single series. In fact, a heavy reliance on hit products for revenue performance is a double-edged sword.

A key measure of the trendy toy industry is not the eternal popularity of any single IP, but the ability to continuously create the next hit. Yet continuously creating hits is itself a probabilistic event, which naturally conflicts with the capital market's expectation of stable long-term value.

This points to a more fundamental problem than the cooling of Labubu: POP MART's hit engine is not a machine that can be scheduled quarter by quarter. It is more like a screening system with an element of luck. Chief Operating Officer Si De himself admitted this, stating clearly in the first quarter of 2026 that 2025 relied on luck and 2026 would rely on team effort. The problem is that when facing the natural randomness of the IP life cycle, what effort can change is probably very limited.

Moreover, the randomness of hits greatly increases the company's operating volatility. Catalysts such as Labubu 4.0's added interactive features and World Cup collaborations performed poorly after launching in the third quarter of 2026, instead consuming more energy and investment costs. JPMorgan attributed this to the combined effect of limited content resources and consumer aesthetic fatigue. At the same time, first-round sales of new IPs Supertutu, Merodi, and KeyA were mediocre, with very limited second-hand market premiums. Although Zsiga recently sold out in some channels, the hot sales of individual products are not enough to prove it can succeed Labubu. Mature products such as the Labubu x Sanrio collaboration and the Twinkle Twinkle series still contribute sales.

Data shows that in the first half of 2026, Molly revenue fell 33.6% year on year. The former ace, under Labubu's shadow, grew far slower than the latter. Meanwhile, THE MONSTERS' share fell from 34.7% to 26%. No single IP is large enough to pull overall growth back to triple digits on its own the way Labubu did in 2025.

Strictly speaking, the randomness of hits is not itself the problem. The question is whether the company has only one growth path — betting on a hit. Currently, POP MART's top six IPs contributed more than 60% of performance in the Asia-Pacific market in the third quarter of 2026, and the sales structure is somewhat more diversified than during Labubu's dominance. This seems like a positive signal, but it is more a passive diversification after the hit wave receded than the result of actively passing the baton. Although POP MART has chosen a multi-IP signing strategy to hedge against the randomness of hits, a multi-IP strategy cannot replicate the magnitude released when a single super IP breaks out. The capital market often expects the former, while the company worries about the latter.

More critically, there is a deeper contradiction in IP operations — the breakout paradox. For IP influence to grow explosively, it needs a hit product to break out. But once it becomes a mass product, original core fans leave because scarcity has diminished, repurchases fall, and sales of the breakout IP eventually stall at a certain stage. From Molly to SKULLPANDA to Labubu, every main IP has failed to escape this trajectory.

Is the theme park the second curve?

Perhaps POP MART itself has realized this. The company began building city theme parks, trying to transform itself from a trendy toy company into IP infrastructure. The direction is understandable, but the financial picture does not seem very clear.

It is understood that POP LAND in Beijing Chaoyang Park opened in September 2023, achieved profitability in 2024, and saw foot traffic grow about 70% year on year in 2025, with non-local visitors and non-parent-child visitors each accounting for more than half. For a scene-recreation park of only about 40,000 square meters with no large ride equipment, this operating result is not bad. It proves one thing: under space constraints, the gravitational pull of the IP itself can replace equipment scale as the logic for a park's viability.

But the small-scale, strong-IP, high-iteration operating approach POP MART demonstrated in the Beijing project is still far from that of traditional large parks. The park has a weak presence within the overall POP MART brand, and for a company with annual revenue in the tens of billions of yuan, the park's direct revenue contribution is quite limited. It is more like a high-cost non-standard investment: asset-heavy and operation-heavy, with its value mainly reflected in auxiliary IP empowerment and brand asset accumulation.

Although Wang Ning has clearly stated that the company will not blindly expand with quantity as the goal and that accumulating park operating capability is more important at this stage, the problem is that the park's return cycle is on the scale of ten to twenty years, while the popularity cycle of a hit IP is often only two to three years. When the core IP supporting park traffic enters a fading period and a new super IP has not yet taken over, the park's IP empowerment logic will face pressure on the demand side. The park can become part of IP infrastructure, but it cannot alone shoulder the task of hedging against the hit cycle. Does POP MART have the advantage to navigate this ten-year time scale?

Beyond the park, POP MART's diversification attempts in IP derivatives are not few: films, games, figures, small home appliances, and more. In direction, they cover almost all the main paths of Disney-style IP monetization, but most of these attempts have failed to form a second growth curve of scale.

In May 2026, Wang Ning himself admitted that the film and game businesses were both not successful enough. The self-developed mobile game Dream Home ceased operations, with cumulative losses of nearly RMB 120 million over two years. Small home appliances enter a highly competitive manufacturing track, and whether IP premiums can support the pricing of functional products is itself an unresolved question.

The fundamental reason the second curve is hard to form is not execution, but the nature of the underlying asset. Disney's derivative monetization works because its IP is repeatedly thickened in film and television narratives — every movie, series, or stage play injects new emotional layers into the characters, and derivatives and parks are merely the downstream monetization ports of this content engine.

POP MART's IP is more like a precisely designed emotional container. Its value comes from users' momentary projection, not from a story world that can be continuously expanded. When the container's own appeal fades, downstream derivative categories cannot reverse the decline and renew the container's life. In other words, the second curve is not something that grows just by adding a few more categories or signing a few more licenses. It requires the IP roots themselves to have the ability to extend into content, narrative, and worldview.

POP MART has already proven itself in the creation and commercialization of image IPs, but evolving from an image company into a content company requires a completely different set of organizational capabilities, talent structure, and time investment — and this is precisely the shortcoming that a hit-driven growth model most easily conceals and finds hardest to fill in the short term.

The valuation logic is changing

Duan Yongping's investment in POP MART has drawn heavy market attention, especially his recent paper loss — a cost of about HK$150 and a book loss of roughly HK$1.8 billion to HK$2 billion, glaring by any short-term trading standard. He had said in August 2025 that he could not understand the business and would not touch it, yet after reading POP MART's financial report in March 2026, he decided to retract his earlier refusal to invest. The core change was not that he suddenly believed in Labubu's durability, but that he saw a set of numbers that made him willing to bet: a market value of HK$200 billion against annual profit of RMB 13 billion, a business model that has already proven itself, and a corporate culture he approves of.

Regarding Duan Yongping's investment in POP MART, Bai Wenxi, vice chairman of the China Enterprise Capital Alliance, analyzed that Duan's cost is about HK$150, his stake is 8.01%, and his paper loss is about HK$1.8 billion to HK$2 billion, but he used a combination of selling puts and building the position in batches, and explicitly kept his stake below 10% to maintain the boundary of a passive shareholder. He is looking at the probability of IP platformization over a ten-year horizon, not the third-quarter year-on-year figure. The current loss is not a falsification of the logic, but the cost of going from not understanding to understanding to being willing to wait for the cycle.

Three quarters of stock price volatility may carry too little information within a decision framework measured in decades to prove anything. But one thing seems certain: this loss will become an opportunity for the capital market to reassess POP MART. What framework should the market use to price it?

Over the past two years, the capital market's answer was: first push it to a height that does not belong to a random asset using the hit-product narrative, then, when randomness reappears, complete the settlement through a valuation collapse. Now, that seems to have changed.

Previously, POP MART was priced as a high-growth platform. In 2025, revenue grew 184.7% year on year and net profit grew 284.5%, and investors were willing to pay a huge option premium for the possibility of the next Labubu. But when growth falls from triple digits to single digits or even negative numbers, it must be placed back under the yardstick of a mature consumer goods company. The market will no longer pay a platform-level premium for the randomness of hit products, but will price it based on steady growth, cash flow quality, and predictability.

On this point, angel investor Guo Tao said that indeed, POP MART's hit-driven growth model naturally conflicts with the capital market's valuation assumption of stable perpetual operation. The market needs to reassess POP MART's valuation framework, move away from the past valuation logic for high-growth targets, switch to an emotional consumer goods cycle valuation system, and no longer simply grant a perpetual high-growth premium. It should treat IP iteration success rates, user retention, and overseas localization capabilities as core pricing indicators, and rationally view the natural cyclical volatility of the trendy toy track.

And that seems to be exactly the direction POP MART is moving in, trying to transform itself from a hit-making machine into an IP platform. Along with promoting multiple matrices, it is also following up with refined overseas operations and a partial tightening of its licensing strategy. If it succeeds, the impact of randomness on the revenue curve will be absorbed by the breadth of the portfolio and the depth of operations, and the capital market will have reason to re-examine it under a stable-value framework. But if it does not succeed, or does not fully succeed, then its hit-driven nature will persist for a long time, and the market will need a more reasonable framework that allows for volatility while still seeing through bubbles to price it.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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