B&K CORP-B (hereinafter referred to as B&K) recently passed the Hong Kong Stock Exchange hearing. The company has no marketed products and has not generated product revenue, reporting losses exceeding CNY 300 million over the past two years. Its two core products are in Phase II clinical trials, while competitors reached Phase III trials 11 years ago.
B&K shares office contact details with several closely related companies, and its prospectus contains inconsistent disclosures on related-party transactions. It also omitted information on multiple directors and executives. Even the post-hearing documents failed to fully supplement these details.
**Two Core Products in Phase II Trials, Losses Exceed CNY 300 Million in Two Years** On December 10, 2025, B&K passed the Hong Kong Stock Exchange hearing. The company had previously submitted listing applications in April and November 2024, followed by a third attempt in August 2025.
B&K focuses on discovering, developing, and commercializing wound-healing therapies. As of the latest practicable date, its pipeline includes ten candidate products, seven of which are PDGF-based drugs. The two core products—Pro-101-1 for burn treatment and Pro-101-2 for diabetic foot ulcers—are both rhPDGF-BB drugs.
Currently, Pro-101-1 and Pro-101-2 are in Phase II trials, while the remaining eight candidates are in preclinical stages.
Notably, the August 15 prospectus stated that Pro-101-1 was expected to enter Phase III trials in China in Q4 2025. However, the December 10 post-hearing documents revised this timeline, indicating Phase IIIa trials for deep second-degree burns would begin in Q1 2026, with Phase IIb trial reports for superficial burns completed in Q2 2026.
For Pro-101-2, B&K expects to complete Phase II trials in China by Q2 2027 and initiate Phase III trials in Q3 2027.
In contrast, competitor Tianjin Tasly (600535.SH) advanced its rhPDGF-BB candidate to Phase III trials in 2014, though no further updates have been disclosed. B&K attributes Tasly’s delay to its reliance on technology transferred from Beijing Jinshaishi Biopharma, which went bankrupt in 2018 after losing its business license.
However, B&K’s PDGF development also intersects with the Military Medical Science Academy (MMSA), raising questions about independence.
CEO Zhai Junhui, who joined in October 2019, leads PDGF R&D alongside CRO Zhao Xinghui and advisor Sun Shihui—all MMSA PhD holders and former researchers. B&K co-filed Pro-101-2’s IND application with MMSA and agreed to pay annual royalties based on sales. Despite this, the company claims full control over clinical development and future commercialization.
With no marketed products, B&K reported revenues of just CNY 472,000 and CNY 261,000 in 2023 and 2024, alongside net losses of CNY 105 million and CNY 212 million. Administrative expenses (CNY 42 million and CNY 117 million) exceeded R&D spending (CNY 40 million and CNY 91 million). Operating cash flow remained negative, and the current ratio dropped from 20.9x at end-2023 to 4.1x by September 2025.
**Valuation and Governance Concerns** In October 2023, B&K raised CNY 300 million in Series B funding at CNY 33/share, valuing the company at CNY 3.3 billion—a CNY 1.3 billion increase from its 2021 Series A. Notably, August 2021 saw related-party transactions at prices differing by nearly 30% on the same day.
Red flags include shared office contacts with Beijing Green Gas Tech (linked to executive Wang Kelong) and Jingliuli Winery (linked to procurement VP Jia Qiuli). Both firms share phone numbers and email domains with B&K, while financial officer Zhang Liting’s name appears in multiple registrations.
Discrepancies persist across prospectus versions: Wang Kelong’s 2023 expenses were initially reported as CNY 2,000 but later revised to CNY 365,000. Similarly, executive compensation disclosures jumped from CNY 7 million to nearly CNY 20 million.
Director Zhai Junhui’s concurrent role at Raycan Optronics was omitted until post-hearing filings, while CFO He Hongtian’s positions at Zhejiang LiJi Storage and Shenzhen Huada北斗 were partially disclosed. Non-executive director Lin Ying’s directorship at Huada北斗 was also initially omitted.
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