Luke Dashjr has unveiled a bold reform concept for the Bitcoin network, advocating for a zero block subsidy policy to be implemented over a 30-day period. The initiative aims to curtail profit-driven miners by eliminating short-term revenue sources, thereby reshaping the network's incentive structure.
On September 10, 2026, Luke Dashjr formally disclosed two temporary measures, emphasizing that these do not represent a final consensus mechanism change. The first option involves extending the initial reward maturity period from the current 100 blocks to a substantially larger 4,375 blocks; given that Bitcoin generates one block every 10 minutes, this timeframe equates to roughly 30 days, effectively delaying the point at which miners can access their subsidies. The second option is to outright cancel block subsidies, compelling miners to rely solely on transaction fees to sustain operations.
Data compiled from WoofunAI indicates that both pathways are designed to stress-test the existing mining economic model, either by increasing capital lock-up costs or by eliminating immediate returns. Since the halving event in April 2024, the subsidy per Bitcoin block has been reduced to 3.125 BTC. If the 30-day zero-subsidy plan were executed, it would directly impact approximately 4,320 blocks, temporarily postponing the issuance of about 13,500 Bitcoin.
It is worth noting that this move only adjusts the timing of issuance and does not alter Bitcoin's hard cap of 21 million coins; the next halving remains scheduled for block 1,050,000. As the halving mechanism progressively trims subsidies, transaction fees are playing an increasingly vital role in safeguarding network security, and this transitional design is intended to accelerate that structural shift.
The core logic of this proposal lies in leveraging economic pressure to drive decentralization. During a month without subsidies, miners facing high electricity costs or heavy debt burdens would encounter severe survival challenges, while low-cost miners equipped with efficient infrastructure would gain a relative advantage. Although the alternative extended maturity approach does not interfere with the total issuance, it significantly raises miners' working capital requirements and helps prevent recent rewards from being invalidated by network structural reorganizations.
However, Luke Dashjr has yet to specify the relevant BIP number, activation threshold, software version, or precise duration measurement method. Any consensus layer change would require broad consensus among miners, node operators, developers, and related enterprises, making the path to implementation exceptionally challenging.
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