On July 25, 2026, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) imposed an administrative penalty on Trip.com Group for abusing its market dominance, marking another significant monopoly case in China's platform economy. The case focuses on two monopolistic practices by Trip.com: exclusive cooperation agreements and "lowest price guarantee" clauses.
While previous platform economy monopoly cases in China, such as those involving Alibaba and Meituan's "choose one from two" practices and the CNKI case, have touched upon exclusive cooperation, this is the first time an antitrust enforcement agency has directly penalized a "lowest price guarantee" clause. Globally, monopoly issues in the online travel agency (OTA) market, particularly platform most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses like the "lowest price guarantee," have long been a focus for antitrust authorities. Major global OTAs like Booking.com, Expedia, and HRS have all faced investigations for imposing such clauses on merchants.
In this case, Trip.com's demand for a "lowest price guarantee" from hotel merchants has unique characteristics compared to standard platform MFN clauses, making it an "upgraded version." First, Trip.com not only requires "parity" from merchants but also imposes a "lower price" requirement on some. An MFN clause is often called a "parity obligation," meaning the platform requires the merchant's price on its platform to be no higher than on other platforms. If the price is lowered elsewhere, it must also be lowered on this platform, ensuring prices are roughly equivalent. However, Trip.com categorizes hotels into "Special," "Gold," and "Unrated" tiers. "Unrated" hotels must offer prices no higher than on other platforms (parity), while "Gold" hotels must offer prices at least 20 yuan or 5% lower than on other platforms (the "lower price" requirement).
Second, Trip.com uses technology to enforce the "lowest price guarantee." In cooperation agreements, it mandates that "Gold" and "Unrated" hotels operating across multiple platforms authorize Trip.com to directly adjust their prices. If a hotel's price is lower on another platform, Trip.com uses tools like the "Price Adjustment Assistant" and "Listing Pass" to automatically set the price as the lowest on the web, while implementing punitive measures such as limiting traffic, "delisting" the hotel, and deducting order reserves. Third, the "lowest price guarantee" clause is differentiated and deeply integrated with exclusive cooperation arrangements. Trip.com uses incentives like traffic boosts and rights support to induce high-turnover, high-quality, and attractive mid-to-high-end hotels to choose "Special" status. These "Special" hotels must list all their online room inventory exclusively on Trip.com and cannot cooperate with competing platforms. For the remaining "Gold" and "Unrated" hotels, Trip.com demands a "lowest price guarantee."
This strategy locks in "Special" hotels, maintaining the platform's premium image and retaining high-value business and official travelers. Simultaneously, it allows Trip.com to offset any temporary profit reduction from enforcing the "lowest price guarantee" on "Gold" and "Unrated" hotels through the exclusive "Special" hotels. The enforcement of the Trip.com monopoly case helps clarify the competitive harm mechanism and antitrust nature of "lowest price guarantee" clauses, promoting compliance among industry players with similar practices. It is also significant for regulating competitive order in the platform economy, curbing "involutionary" competition, and ultimately fostering high-quality development of the platform economy.
First, this case establishes that MFN clauses like "lowest price guarantee" can themselves constitute an independent act of abusing market dominance, specifically an imposition of unfair trading conditions. While MFN clauses have been addressed in China's antitrust enforcement practice, they have not been treated as independent monopolistic acts. For instance, in the 2019 "Eastman Chemical Company Abuse of Market Dominance Case" announced by the Shanghai Municipal Market Regulation Bureau, the MFN clause was seen as an incentive for the party to implement exclusive transactions. In the 2021 "Tencent Holdings Limited Acquisition of China Music Group Equity Illegal Concentration of Operators Case," SAMR ordered Tencent and its affiliates to take measures to restore market competition, including not requiring or implying upstream copyright owners to give Tencent conditions superior to those of its competitors. This contained elements of an MFN clause but was treated as a remedy to restore competition, not an independent violation.
Second, this case clarifies the competitive harm principle of MFN clauses like "lowest price guarantee," particularly their damage to consumer interests. The most direct harm of a platform MFN clause is restricting competition between platforms, leading to price convergence and weakening the ability of competing platforms to compete on price. However, there can be misconceptions about how it affects consumers. The penalty decision clearly points out that "lowest price guarantee" clauses harm consumer interests in at least two ways. While ensuring a relatively low price on the current platform, it prevents merchants from offering lower prices on other platforms or even from reducing prices, causing a real loss for consumers on those platforms. Price reductions on the current platform can also lead merchants to raise prices elsewhere to offset profit loss, potentially triggering continuous price increases on other platforms and eventually causing a severe mismatch between price and service. Furthermore, the "lowest price guarantee" erodes merchant profit margins, forcing some to cut services or reduce service quality, so consumers may receive "low price, low quality" or even "low price, inferior quality" services. In the long run, by weakening competitive pressure between platforms and increasing the cost and reducing the willingness for merchants to lower prices, "lowest price guarantee" can ultimately lead to higher overall prices. SAMR's assessment of the relationship between the clause and consumer interests is based on the consumer group as a whole and overall consumer interests, aligning with the antitrust law's method of protecting consumer interests.
Third, the enforcement of the Trip.com case has a prominent demonstration effect for applying antitrust rules in China's platform economy. The 2022 amendment to China's Anti-Monopoly Law explicitly included a provision stating that operators shall not use data, algorithms, technology, capital advantages, and platform rules to engage in monopolistic conduct, such as abusing market dominance. However, these provisions are generally abstract and lack targeted cases, making it difficult for operators to grasp their specific meaning during antitrust compliance work. The Trip.com case has largely activated the data, algorithm, technology, and platform rules provisions of the law. Trip.com's exclusive cooperation and "lowest price guarantee" clauses were not only embedded in its platform rules but also enforced through data, algorithms, and technology. By meticulously analyzing how data, algorithms, technology, and platform rules serve as tools for implementing monopolistic conduct and coordinate with each other in platform economy monopoly cases, the penalty decision establishes the basic understanding that while technology is neutral, its users may not be, and clarifies the baseline for platform operators' use of these tools.
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