After 36 years in the automotive industry, Wei Jianjun, Chairman of GWMOTOR, has never personally endorsed a specific vehicle model until now. On the evening of May 18th, the V9X was launched with a starting price of ¥349,800. This model is also the first mass-produced vehicle from the Guiyuan S platform. More significantly, Wei Jianjun has added a new role for himself: the "end-to-end, lifelong spokesperson." From R&D and quality control to after-sales service, the founder is tying his reputation to the entire lifecycle of this vehicle. The weight of this move must be understood within the context of the Wey brand's current situation. The narrative of Chinese brands breaking into the ¥300,000 price bracket has been told for nearly a decade, with Li Auto and AITO having proven this path is viable. In 2025, the Lanshan and Gaoshan models helped the Wey brand return to an annual sales volume of 100,000 units, with an average transaction price reaching ¥300,000, making it the fastest-growing brand within the GWMOTOR system. The story finally has a beginning that can be continued. However, 100,000 units merely proves survival. The V9X must answer a more fundamental question: what does this brand truly represent, and who is accountable for its direction? Wei Jianjun, a veteran automaker, is placing a heavy bet. In 2016, he lent his surname to the brand, marking the opening move. Nine years later, by tying himself to a specific vehicle, he is showing his hand. A full lineup of models is queued up behind the Guiyuan S platform, all waiting for the V9X to deliver the first report card.
**The Stakes** Priced between ¥349,800 and ¥389,800, the V9X avoids the ¥500,000 battlefield occupied by the AITO M9 and Li L9. Instead, it positions itself in a nuanced segment: a large six-seat SUV in the ¥350,000 to ¥400,000 range, initially launched as a plug-in hybrid. This segment addresses genuine family needs. This market has also attracted the attention of numerous automakers. Gong Min, Head of China Automotive Research at UBS, stated on May 19th that many car companies are currently aggressively launching large '9-series' vehicles. The launch of more large SUVs and increased homogenization pose an ongoing challenge for the industry. If ¥500,000 vehicles sell status and technological benchmarks, and ¥200,000 vehicles sell cost-effectiveness, the ¥350,000 segment sits in the middle. Consumers demand robust product capabilities while being extremely sensitive to brand premiums. This is a difficult position to hold, as it cannot rely solely on piling on features for value, nor does it have sufficient brand halo to make consumers buy without hesitation. The V9X chooses to tackle this market with a platform logic. Underpinning it is the Guiyuan S platform, on which GWMOTOR spent six years developing. Its core is a structural choice: a single chassis architecture compatible with five powertrain forms, with over 90% parts commonality. This choice is controversial. In recent years, "dedicated pure electric platforms" have almost become an industry consensus, with mainstream automakers developing independent architectures for their pure electric models. Wei Jianjun holds a different judgment. "We have been misled by the concept of dedicated electric vehicle platforms for nearly a decade," he said at the launch event. In his view, the problem with dedicated pure electric platforms lies in volume. Over half of the world's countries lack adequate charging infrastructure, meaning focusing solely on pure electric vehicles would forfeit most of the overseas market. Without sufficient volume, R&D costs cannot be amortized effectively, parts supply chains cannot be scaled, and resale value becomes problematic. He provided a specific calculation: "Products with high resale value are typically those with large existing fleets. A large fleet means more repair outlets, cheaper parts, and mature maintenance skills." The Guiyuan S approach is based on this logic: first, use multi-powertrain compatibility to build global volume, then use economies of scale to drive down costs. The logic sounds self-consistent but has one prerequisite: no powertrain variant can have significant weaknesses. Can a platform compatible with five powertrains match the pure electric experience of a dedicated platform? Can its plug-in hybrid efficiency compete with other automakers? The V9X provides answers on the parameter sheet: an 800V architecture, a WLTC fuel consumption of 6.3 liters per 100 km in charge-sustaining mode, and a CLTC comprehensive range of 1,700 km. Brands like Li Auto and AITO represent more direct competitive pressure. These companies have already established complete user recognition and a virtuous cycle of word-of-mouth in this price segment, with stable monthly deliveries. Their approach is almost the polar opposite of Guiyuan's: focusing on a single category, extremely fast product iteration, and thoroughly dominating a specific scenario in the Chinese market. The advantage of this strategy is an extremely sharp brand identity; when consumers think of "family six-seat SUVs," brands like Li Auto still come to mind first. The disadvantage is that the rapid iteration itself also consumes the residual value of older models, but Li Auto is betting that the pace of consumption upgrading in the Chinese market is fast enough for growth to offset the residual value issue. Guiyuan is taking a different path—slower, heavier, not betting on any single market or single powertrain form, attempting to capture global volume with a universal platform. This path is not uncommon in the automotive industry; Volkswagen's MQB and Toyota's TNGA are essentially based on this logic. However, those platforms are backed by companies with annual sales in the tens of millions. Whether the Wey brand's volume of 100,000 units last year can support this ambition remains a question for time to answer. In 2025, GWMOTOR's sales expenses surged by 44%, with the additional ¥2.8 billion primarily spent on building Wey's direct sales channels and brand promotion. Wey's new energy direct sales outlets now cover 110 cities with over 430 stores. GWMOTOR has set a target for 2026 of sales not less than 1.8 million vehicles and net profit not less than ¥10 billion. If the V9X can achieve rapid volume, the scale effects of the Guiyuan S platform can begin to materialize, helping to amortize the前期投入.
**The Chips** The Guiyuan S is the bet, but the Wey brand needs to solve a deeper-seated problem. Over the past nine years, Wey's biggest issue has not been an inability to make good products, but rather the lack of a stable identity. When the Tank brand was spun off in 2021, it took away not just a product line, but the only differentiated consumer perception that had been firmly established within the Wey brand system. The remaining Wey brand tried many directions, changing naming systems, brand tags, and helmsmen. Each change brought a new strategy, with the previous one being overturned before yielding results. Wei Jianjun also admitted frankly: "Wey has indeed faced many difficulties in recent years, with declining sales and a wavering定位." The sales of the Lanshan and Gaoshan in 2025 answered the question, "Can Wey survive?" The V9X must answer the next question: Why should someone spending ¥350,000 on a car feel that choosing Wey is the right decision. The direct sales channels GWMOTOR built for this brand, the marketing resources invested, and the profit decline endured all need the V9X to证明没有白花. This is also the real reason for Wei Jianjun's personal involvement this time. When a brand's标签 have changed too many times and consumers can no longer remember what it stands for, the founder stepping forward to say "I back it with my surname" is essentially substituting personal credit for brand credit. But merely saying "backing" is not enough; it depends on how it's done. Wei Jianjun said, "I have no way to retreat," then shifted his tone: "Personally stepping in is absolutely not for performance, nor to show diligence. It is to promote the solidification of management responsibility, the打通 of information chains, result orientation, and the rapid闭环 of problems." He subsequently announced that he would personally lead teams to experience car purchasing, delivery, and maintenance processes, form高管 teams to participate in live broadcasts, and directly address user issues online for闭环. Zhao Yongpo, CEO of the Wey brand, is under significant pressure. He半开玩笑地说: "Chairman Wei can't run away. If I can't satisfy users, I can be dismissed at any time." However, making the right姿态 does not guarantee victory. The reality the V9X faces is concrete. Brands like Li Auto and AITO already have a complete口碑循环 in this price segment. For the V9X to carve out a share from this market, it ultimately comes down to the product's own persuasive power. Beyond姿态, Wei Jianjun has also put real money on the table. The V9X's权益清单 carries symbolic significance: a 6-year/150,000-km warranty covering high-cost components like air suspension and rear-wheel steering, where the industry standard is typically 3-4 years;终身免费的 intelligent driving software, which according to industry惯例 is worth approximately over ¥30,000. Securing after-sales risk is the most direct way to说服 consumers. Of course, such strong权益 also意味着 GWMOTOR must reserve a significant amount for after-sales provisions over each vehicle's lifecycle. Interestingly, the timing of Wei Jianjun amplifying his role as founder-spokesperson coincides with the industry moving in the opposite direction. Since 2025, Chinese new energy brands have密集签约 celebrity endorsers. Founder IP marketing has undergone a round of泡沫化, with Li Xiang retreating from the spotlight and Lei Jun also experiencing diminishing marginal returns from personal exposure. The industry consensus is shifting from "the founder is the best spokesperson" to "the brand must learn to run without relying on the founder." Wei Jianjun is moving against this trend, choosing to tie himself to the V9X as its "终身代言人." His logic operates on a different level than hiring celebrities. Celebrities can bring exposure and话题, but they cannot provide a trust endorsement for product quality. A founder who has built cars for 36 years personally stating, "I will manage this car for its entire life," conveys a message that celebrity endorsements cannot: if there are problems, someone is accountable. This might be the most efficient way for Wey to build credit at this stage. However, founder credit is not like an advertising budget that can be increased annually; it is closer to a底牌. Play it right, and the brand becomes established; play it wrong, and there is no second chance. When asked what would happen if things go wrong, Wei Jianjun said the possibility exists, but "values will never翻车." The V9X is just a beginning. It is understood that the Guiyuan platform will also be applied to models under other brands like ORA. The first batch of V9X vehicles has begun delivery. In the coming months, the真实口碑 from the first owners will be more persuasive than all the promises made at the launch event. The Chinese automotive industry spent forty years learning how to build cars well and another ten years learning how to sell them at a premium. The next hurdle to cross is how to make consumers willing to pay a trust premium for a Chinese brand without anyone personally endorsing it. Wei Jianjun has put his surname on the line. He is betting not just on the success or failure of one car. If the V9X can succeed, the Wey brand has the opportunity to become one that no longer needs its founder to personally back it. That may be what he truly aims to win in this showdown.
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