According to a research report released by CICC, the results of the US midterm elections are now clear, with the Democratic Party sweeping both the Senate and the House of Representatives to regain congressional control. Following the announcement of the election results, major markets in the United States and Europe initially rose before falling back, with US technology stocks coming under notable pressure. In the Asia-Pacific region, under the transmission of adjustment pressure across the global AI supply chain, stock indices in Japan, South Korea, and China's Taiwan region experienced relatively large declines. In contrast, A-shares and Hong Kong stocks demonstrated overall resilience. From a transmission mechanism perspective, the impact of the US midterm elections on related A-share industries is primarily channeled through four pathways: geopolitical policy, trade policy, AI regulation and other industrial policies, and the fiscal and monetary environment. The main views from CICC are as follows:
The Democratic Party achieved a comprehensive victory in the 2026 US midterm elections. The results of the US midterm elections are now clear, with the Democratic Party sweeping both the Senate and the House of Representatives and regaining congressional control. On November 3 local time, the United States held its midterm elections. At the federal level, according to the Associated Press, the Democratic Party secured control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives on the evening of November 3 and the early hours of November 4. As of the morning of November 7 Beijing time, the Democratic Party was projected to obtain at least 54 Senate seats (out of 100) and approximately 256 House seats (out of 435). At the state government level, the Democratic Party's governing map also showed relatively significant expansion. The latest statistics from Multistate indicate that in this election, the Democratic Party captured governor positions from the Republican Party in six states: Ohio, Georgia, Iowa, Nevada, Texas, and Alaska, including several traditional Republican strongholds and key hubs for US energy, manufacturing, and technology. Overall, in this midterm election, the Democratic Party's winning coverage and advantages at both the federal and state levels exceeded market expectations.
Following the election, global stock markets experienced wide-ranging volatility, with US technology stocks undergoing notable adjustments while A-shares showed relative resilience. After the election results were announced, major markets in the United States and Europe initially rose before falling back, with US technology stocks coming under clear pressure. After the Democratic Party won congressional control, the market held relatively positive expectations on the one hand regarding its ability to check the Trump administration's geopolitical policies and fiscal expansion, control the risk of further escalation in the US-Iran conflict, and alleviate upward pressure on US Treasury yields. On the other hand, concerns existed that the Democratic Party might strengthen AI regulation at both the federal and state levels, restrict data center construction, and thereby drag down industry progress and economic growth. Additionally, the current AI theme lacks new model breakthroughs and new demand-side catalysts, and the previous earnings season triggered concerns about the pace of revenue realization and return on capital under high-intensity capital expenditure by cloud providers. Amid the interplay of multiple factors, the market's digestion of related expectations was accompanied by relatively notable volatility. In the US market, major indices generally rose on November 4; on November 5, they turned sharply lower, with the S&P 500, Nasdaq, and Dow Jones falling by 4.4%, 5.5%, and 3.4% respectively, with the AI supply chain experiencing the largest declines, as the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index dropped over 12%; on November 6, a rebound in the AI chain drove the S&P 500 to close slightly higher. In Europe, on November 4, European markets rose in tandem with US stocks, with major European indices gaining approximately 1.8% to 2.2%; on November 5-6, there was some pullback but the declines were smaller than those in the US. In the Asia-Pacific region, under the transmission of adjustment pressure across the global AI supply chain, stock indices in Japan, South Korea, and China's Taiwan region experienced relatively large declines. On November 5-6, the Nikkei 225, the KOSPI, and the Taiwan Weighted Index, which have high exposure to the global AI supply chain, fell for consecutive days, with cumulative declines of 7.6%, 11.0%, and 7.6% respectively, with semiconductor leaders such as SK Hynix, Samsung Electronics, Tokyo Electron, and TSMC experiencing the largest declines. In contrast, A-shares and Hong Kong stocks demonstrated overall resilience. On November 4-5, reduced external uncertainty and strengthened "market stabilization" policies jointly supported a notable rebound in A-shares and Hong Kong stocks; on November 6, affected by the weak performance of overseas technology themes overnight, the hardware sector in A-shares and Hong Kong stocks saw some pullback, with the ChiNext Index and STAR 50 falling 4.0% and 2.6% respectively that day, but the CSI 300 Index and Hang Seng Index declined only 1.4% and 1.3%, significantly less than markets in Japan, South Korea, and China's Taiwan region.
How does the conclusion of the US midterm elections affect related A-share industries? From a timing perspective, the impact of the US midterm elections on A-shares in the short term is mainly reflected in valuation adjustments brought about by changes in US policy expectations and market sentiment disruptions, while in the medium to long term, it depends on the actual implementation of US policy adjustments and their impact on industry fundamentals. As the new US Congress and newly elected state governors take office progressively from late 2026 to early 2027, the related effects may gradually emerge. From a transmission mechanism perspective, the impact of the US midterm elections on related A-share industries is primarily channeled through four pathways: geopolitical policy, trade policy, AI regulation and other industrial policies, and the fiscal and monetary environment. Combining the views of CICC macro and industry analysts, the firm believes that: 1) Regarding geopolitical policy, the US-Iran conflict pushing up oil prices was one of the important factors dragging down the Republican Party in the midterm elections. Under the combined effect of public opinion pressure facing the Trump administration and institutional constraints formed by Democratic control of Congress, the risk of further escalation in the US-Iran conflict may decrease, which could exert some pressure on the valuation of A-share oil and gas and shipping sectors in the short term, but the subsequent performance of these sectors still depends on policy implementation, US-Iran negotiation progress, and the actual evolution of the situation. 2) Regarding trade policy, the Democratic Party tends to restrict the policy space for the Trump administration to unilaterally impose tariffs and promote more stable and predictable trade policies. Concerns about escalating global trade frictions with the US may ease, but uncertainties in the China-US trade environment remain, and further attention is needed on changes in the external environment for export chain companies in industries such as automobiles and machinery equipment. 3) Regarding the AI industry, both parties support the development of the US AI industry, with the main disagreement lying in the intensity of regulation and the path of policy implementation. The Democratic Party tends to strengthen safety regulation of frontier models and may constrain data center construction through state governments in areas such as electricity costs, tax incentives, and land use. However, at the federal level, related legislation is still subject to limitations such as Senate filibuster rules and presidential veto power, and state governments also need to balance the economic benefits brought by data center investment against residents' energy costs, so the actual intensity of policy implementation remains highly uncertain. For A-shares, short-term heightened regulatory expectations may disrupt US AI capital expenditure expectations, putting temporary pressure on demand expectations for the overseas chain of AI hardware. However, considering that the pace and extent of related policy implementation remain unclear, and that the long-term development of the AI industry still depends on new industrial breakthroughs and investment returns, if the market initially overprices the impact of US policy, then as the actual policy intensity gradually becomes clearer, capital expenditure expectations stabilize, or new technological and demand catalysts emerge, related targets in the overseas chain may still see valuation recovery. On the other hand, if overseas computing power investment slows temporarily, the domestic chain may gain a certain window to catch up, but supply chain constraints on the expansion of domestic computing power hardware production still exist, and the profitability realization capability of related companies and its match with valuations still need continuous verification. Regarding new energy, the Democratic Party generally tends to support clean energy development and may promote the restoration of domestic new energy tax credit policies in the US, which could benefit the export chain of A-share power equipment to some extent, though uncertainties remain regarding trade-related policies. 4) Regarding the fiscal and monetary environment, after the Democratic Party controls both chambers, the Trump administration's space for further expanding fiscal stimulus may be limited; if geopolitical tensions ease and inflationary pressure subsides while the AI industry's contribution to overall economic growth weakens, expectations for US monetary tightening may ease marginally, which could support a recovery in gold prices and the precious metals sector. Combining the views of CICC industry analysts, the firm further elaborates on the impact on various sectors. Specifically: Impact of geopolitical changes on related industries: The risk of conflict escalation may ease marginally, and the mid-term center for oil prices and freight rates may decline, but in the short term they may remain elevated.
Oil, gas, and chemicals: Under the baseline scenario of prolonged geopolitical friction, the recovery of oil production and supply still faces uncertainty and is expected to show a pulse-like recovery, with the center for oil prices unlikely to decline rapidly in the short term. The CICC commodities team forecasts that Brent oil prices may still struggle to fall below the high level of $90 per barrel over the next 3-6 months. For upstream oil and gas companies, profitability remains supported at current oil prices. For downstream petrochemical product segments, under the background of an improving competitive landscape, some leading enterprises with independent pricing power have shown relatively good profitability. Overall, if oil prices do not experience a sustained significant decline in the short to medium term, the sector's current profitability is expected to maintain some resilience, though next year's growth rate may be affected. Non-ferrous metals: From an overall environment perspective, traditional cyclical demand and supply constraints may still support the sector, but stricter US AI regulation could suppress demand expectations for related metals; in terms of allocation, gold is preferred, while also paying attention to incremental demand opportunities brought by US new energy industry support policies. Regarding gold, a marginal retreat in geopolitical risk could help ease inflationary pressure, and combined with stricter AI regulation potentially weakening US economic growth expectations, if this strengthens market expectations for a slower pace of Federal Reserve rate hikes and declining real interest rates, it could support gold prices; however, if the situation reverses, gold prices may still fluctuate. At the same time, A-share gold stocks are currently reasonably valued overall, and domestic risk-averse sentiment may provide further room for valuation improvement. Regarding copper and minor metals, AI-related demand currently accounts for a relatively low proportion, and stricter regulation has limited direct impact on actual demand, mainly affecting long-term demand expectations; some minor metals carry technology valuation attributes and may be more significantly disrupted. Transportation and infrastructure: Expectations of easing in the US-Iran conflict exert pressure on the valuation of the shipping sector in the short term, but the actual impact on industry fundamentals depends on whether the conflict can be sustained and effectively resolved. If only a ceasefire agreement lacking enforcement constraints is reached, geopolitical conflicts may still recur intermittently, and the center for freight rates will remain above pre-conflict levels for some time, with industry prosperity expected to remain at relatively high levels.
AI regulatory policy: Data center regulation expectations disrupt the overseas AI chain. Technology hardware: After the US midterm elections, expectations for stricter AI regulation have risen, and combined with uncertainties in technological development and commercialization progress, this may drive further downward revisions to overseas AI capital expenditure expectations, putting short-term pressure on the AI hardware supply chain. Some core semiconductor manufacturing assets in A-shares have already undergone deep adjustments previously. Short-term changes in North American data center construction expectations may alter the slope of hardware demand expectations, but there are currently no signs indicating this is sufficient to change the long-term prosperity trend. If positive catalysts emerge in the overseas AI industry trend going forward, or if domestic computing power supply constraints ease, industrial support policies land, and related corporate earnings gradually materialize, the AI hardware supply chain may still welcome new investment opportunities. Regarding the overseas chain, AI infrastructure construction faces short-term headwinds, but the medium-to-long-term prosperity trend remains. Currently, the overall balance sheets of large overseas cloud providers remain relatively healthy, and the risk of severe overcapacity and significant price declines is relatively limited. Looking ahead, overseas cloud providers are still expected to maintain active investment in 2027, supporting demand for the A-share overseas chain, with subsequent focus on industry catalysts brought by AI technology breakthroughs and application deployment. Regarding the domestic chain, if overseas AI investment slows temporarily, it may provide a certain window for domestic computing power to catch up technologically. Currently, domestic data center construction is driving strong demand for computing power chips and server systems, with the short-term bottleneck still on the supply side. Looking ahead, on the supply side, attention should be paid to the progress of production capacity expansion under policy support; on the demand side, attention should be paid to the sustainability of government computing center construction. Software, telecommunications, and education: Facing rising uncertainty in US AI regulation, the model and application layers may show stronger resilience relative to AI hardware and computing infrastructure. Overall, the development logic of domestic models and applications has not changed significantly, but attention is still needed on computing power supply constraints and AI application commercialization progress. At the model level, if overseas regulatory constraints are substantially strengthened, it may bring relative benefits to domestic models. On the one hand, domestic models mainly rely on domestic computing infrastructure, and the slowdown in US data center construction has relatively limited direct impact on domestic model training and inference; on the other hand, if US AI regulation substantially restricts US model R&D and computing infrastructure expansion, it may slow the pace of US AI industry development, creating space for Chinese model manufacturers to narrow the technology gap. However, considering that US model manufacturers may still deploy computing power in other regions, and that domestic model manufacturers still face constraints such as difficulty in obtaining high-end computing power cards, high rental costs, and insufficient domestic chip supply, the extent to which the above relative benefits materialize remains uncertain. In addition, it is noted that after entering 3Q26, price competition among domestic models intensified, and overall sector revenue slowed. Looking ahead, the pace of next-generation model iteration remains key for domestic model manufacturers to maintain competitiveness and compete for market share. At the application level, the direction of AI's continued penetration in B-end and C-end has not changed significantly, and commercialization progress and demand growth speed remain decisive factors for related industries globally. At the same time, given that downstream IT spending is highly correlated with the economic cycle, the performance of the A-share software sector has been relatively lackluster in recent quarters. Media: In the media sector, after the US midterm elections, regulatory compliance requirements for game going overseas and AI film and television may be further raised; in the long term, the cultural game between China and the US will continue, and cultural barriers facing domestic content going overseas may be difficult to quickly dissolve in the short term. Regarding game going overseas, the regulatory focus may shift from "access barriers" to "refined operational compliance." Under the background of full-process compliance in game development and operations, leading manufacturers with mature overseas data compliance architectures, localized content operations, and legal teams may adapt to the rules more quickly and use compliance advantages to increase market share. Regarding AI film and television, increased compliance requirements are mainly reflected in strengthened external regulatory constraints and accelerated domestic substitution. The acceleration of AI regulatory legislation at the US federal level, on the one hand, compresses the compliance space for domestic manufacturers to directly use overseas AI tools for large-scale content production, and on the other hand, opens up market space for domestic independent AI content tools and full-process AI production pipelines as local alternatives.
New energy and trade policy: Expectations for marginal improvement in clean energy support and trade policy, but export chain benefits still await fundamental verification. Power equipment and new energy: The market expects marginal improvement in US new energy and trade policies after the midterm elections. The marginal easing of clean energy subsidy phase-outs and import restriction policies is expected to improve overseas demand for China's power equipment and new energy industry chain, but actual progress and pace still face significant uncertainty. Regarding grid equipment, demand for US power infrastructure investment exists for the long term, and the domestic equipment supply gap is prominent. If import restriction policies are marginally relaxed, exports by Chinese power equipment enterprises are expected to benefit. Regarding photovoltaics, on the overseas demand side, US power supply and demand are relatively tight, and the intensity of clean energy subsidy phase-outs may ease, which is expected to drive demand growth for photovoltaic power stations, residential energy storage, and inverters. The execution method of import restrictions may be adjusted, and conditions for Chinese related products to enter the US market are expected to improve marginally; on the domestic supply side, policies are promoting the exit of some backward production capacity, and industry supply may begin to contract from 2027, while the efficiency advantages of leading enterprises may become more prominent, potentially leading the way in reducing or eliminating losses. Regarding energy storage, US policies guiding the accelerated localization of the clean energy industry chain are expected to continue. Under the goals of reducing energy costs and controlling inflation, trade barriers may be marginally lowered, opening more market space for China's energy storage and related equipment. Regarding lithium batteries, the direction of localizing the US lithium battery supply chain remains unchanged, but considering insufficient local industrial supporting facilities, subsequent FCC (US Federal Communications Commission) policy intensity may be adjusted; the sector experienced significant adjustments previously, and combined with the recent marginal recovery in domestic energy storage policies, it may welcome rebound opportunities. Automobiles and mobility equipment: The US election results are expected to ease market concerns about further escalation of US unilateral trade policies, which may be generally positive for China's auto sector, but restrictions on China's auto and intelligent driving sectors enjoy strong bipartisan consensus in the US, and the possibility of short-term substantive relaxation is low. The following three investment themes are suggested for attention: First, parts going overseas: marginal decline in trade policy uncertainty is conducive to restoring stability in the global auto supply chain, with attention on high-quality parts enterprises that have overseas production capacity layouts and global customer supporting capabilities. Second, the new energy industry chain: the Democratic Party is relatively active on new energy transition, and market expectations for US new energy policies are expected to improve marginally, with attention on battery and electrification component suppliers with global competitiveness. Third, independent brand going overseas: the US market remains difficult to break through in the short term, but the expected improvement in the global trade environment is conducive to Chinese automakers advancing overseas layouts, and independent brands leading in overseas channels, products, and localized production capacity construction remain favored. Machinery and defense: The impact of the US midterm elections on various sub-sectors of machinery equipment is somewhat divergent. First, stricter AI regulation may suppress expectations for US AI infrastructure capital expenditure, exerting certain pressure on related industry chain segments such as PCB equipment and gas turbines; second, the Democratic Party relatively supports clean energy development, and new energy equipment segments such as photovoltaics and wind power are expected to benefit; third, if US tariff policies become more stable or even gradually return to normal, the machinery equipment export chain is expected to benefit, with enterprises having greater exposure to US business showing higher growth elasticity. Pharmaceuticals: The Democratic Party is relatively positive on the pharmaceutical industry's development. After the midterm elections, the enforcement intensity of US innovative drug price control policies may ease marginally, and improved industry R&D and commercialization expectations may form certain benefits for China's innovative drug going overseas and the CXO industry chain. Regarding innovative drugs, China's innovative drug R&D capabilities continue to improve, and opportunities to cooperate with large US pharmaceutical companies through License-out (overseas rights authorization) are expected to increase, driving growth in related authorization revenue. Regarding CXO, if US innovative drug R&D and production activities improve, demand for drug R&D and production outsourcing is expected to increase, bringing incremental orders to Chinese CXO enterprises. In terms of risks, the recently announced proposed rules related to the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act (COINS Act) may restrict some China-US biomedical cross-border transactions, but the direct impact on the pure License-out model is currently relatively limited, and further attention is needed on whether the regulatory scope expands. Risks: Repeated or escalated geopolitical conflicts; AI industry progress falling short of expectations; changes in US AI regulation, new energy industry policies, and trade policies exceeding expectations; changes in Federal Reserve monetary policy and global liquidity exceeding expectations.
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