This wave of Hong Kong listings essentially represents a long-term competition where domestic beauty brands are shifting from chasing traffic to focusing on brand value and product strength.
A local beauty enterprise positioning itself as "high-end skincare" knocked on the door of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at the end of 2025.
On December 30, FOREST CABIN officially listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, with an issue price of HK$77.77 per share. The total offering size was approximately HK$1.086 billion, with an additional 15% over-allotment option. As of 12:00 on the 30th, FOREST CABIN's stock price was HK$88.8, a gain of 14.18%, with its market capitalization exceeding HK$12.4 billion.
During the subscription phase, the international placement portion of FOREST CABIN's offering was oversubscribed by 19.79 times, while the Hong Kong public offering portion was oversubscribed by a staggering 1236 times. A year earlier, the Hangzhou-based beauty company Maogeping listed in Hong Kong, with its offering attracting subscription funds amounting to HK$173.814 billion and its Hong Kong public offering oversubscribed by 919.18 times. The performance of these two companies reflects the high recognition Hong Kong stocks have for domestic beauty brands.
Founded in 2003, FOREST CABIN focuses on the anti-wrinkle and firming skincare segment, with products promoting natural ingredients, camellia flower components, and the concept of "nourishing skin with oil." For the first decade and more, the company relied primarily on offline channels. In its 17th year, it was hit by the pandemic, which caused its offline channels to collapse and its performance to plummet by 90%. A self-rescue letter from its founder initiated a company-wide shift online. Within just a few years, it staged a remarkable comeback via e-commerce and livestreaming channels, driven by its signature camellia repair oil. Its revenue surpassed 1 billion yuan in the first half of 2025, with half-year net profit nearly reaching the level of the entire previous year. Coupled with an average product price exceeding 300 yuan and a gross profit margin above 82%, FOREST CABIN presents a strong attraction for the capital market.
The story of FOREST CABIN is not an isolated case; it is a microcosm of the collective rise of domestic beauty brands. According to data jointly released by Euromonitor International and CITIC Securities, in 2024, the market share of domestic skincare brands surpassed that of international giants for the first time, becoming the market leader. Proya Cosmetics Co.,Ltd. broke through the 10-billion-yuan revenue mark, while Baimaite dominated the sensitive skin segment. They capitalized on the dividends of channel transformation and precisely targeted the consumption psychology of the younger generation.
In the Chinese cosmetics market, the industry landscape is undergoing a profound transformation. International brands are experiencing sluggish growth, while domestic brands are gaining strong momentum.
Accompanying this shift in market position is a change in capital strategy. Initially, the A-share market was the main battleground. Companies like Proya and Baimaite listed there successively. Nowadays, the Hong Kong stock market has become the new hotspot. After Maogeping landed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at the end of 2024, its market capitalization once exceeded HK$60 billion, demonstrating its powerful appeal. In 2025, FOREST CABIN, Chando, Proya, and Marubi rushed to list in Hong Kong.
Behind this fervor lies the urgent needs of domestic brands for valuation, internationalization, and financing channels. However, the path to listing is not smooth; very few succeeded in 2025. The capital market is scrutinizing these brands with a more critical eye: having traffic alone is far from sufficient; solid performance and broad prospects are the real tickets to success.
The next battle for domestic beauty brands will shift from the marketing arena to competing on core technological R&D and brand value.
Who is "FOREST CABIN"?
Among domestic skincare brands, FOREST CABIN is not a new player; it launched its first camellia repair oil as early as 2014, but its development remained lukewarm for a long time.
In recent years, it became known to many consumers due to the popularity of the "nourishing skin with oil" concept. On social platforms like Xiaohongshu, many KOLs and KOCs share how good essential oils can repair and strengthen the skin's natural barrier, thereby achieving moisturizing and anti-aging effects.
FOREST CABIN's camellia repair oil frequently appears on KOLs' recommendation lists. Relying solely on this product, it has cumulatively sold over 50 million bottles to date.
According to the company's prospectus, from 2022 to 2024, FOREST CABIN's revenue climbed from 691 million yuan to 1.21 billion yuan, achieving a three-year compound annual growth rate of 32.3%. In the first half of 2025, the company achieved revenue of 1.052 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 98.3%, breaking through the 1-billion-yuan mark in a half-year period for the first time.
In terms of profitability, FOREST CABIN was still in a loss-making state in 2022, with a net loss of 5.93 million yuan that year. It turned a profit in 2023, achieving a modest net profit of 85 million yuan. By 2024, net profit further increased to 187 million yuan. In the first half of 2025, net profit reached 182 million yuan, almost matching the full-year 2024 level.
In terms of channels, as of June 30, 2025, although FOREST CABIN had 554 offline stores, its primary sales channel remained online. In the first half of 2025, its online revenue reached 688 million yuan, accounting for 65.4% of total revenue. Notably, the Douyin platform performed exceptionally well, with revenue of 345 million yuan in H1 2025, a surge of 327% year-on-year, accounting for 50.2% of online revenue.
The core of FOREST CABIN's performance reversal lies in the combination of digital channel transformation, a hero product strategy, and a high-end positioning.
During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, 157 FOREST CABIN stores closed, and performance plummeted by 90%. In February 2020, founder Sun Laichun wrote "A Letter in the Darkest Hour," initiating a company-wide online self-rescue effort. He wrote in the letter, "I call on everyone to get out of bed immediately, determined to fight a counterattack. We cannot just wait for death. We will try to completely move our business online," and proposed measures such as "all in online," establishing a content factory, and having all staff create short videos, livestreams, images, and articles.
This crisis became the catalyst for FOREST CABIN's digital transformation. The company rapidly formed a company-wide livestreaming team, with the founder personally participating. Using tools like DingTalk + Taobao's smart shopping guide and WeChat mini-program stores, they redirected offline customers online.
Within just two months, FOREST CABIN not only survived but also achieved counter-trend growth in online sales.
After 2020, FOREST CABIN made digitalization its core strategy, fully deploying on the Douyin platform. It continuously promoted the "nourishing skin with oil" skincare concept on platforms like Douyin and Xiaohongshu, and the camellia repair oil quickly became a blockbuster product. In 2024, this single product contributed 448 million yuan in revenue, accounting for 37% of total income.
Simultaneously, FOREST CABIN adhered to its high-end positioning, maintaining an average product price above 300 yuan, with gross profit margins exceeding 82% in both 2024 and the first half of 2025. This "hero product + premiumization" strategy allowed FOREST CABIN to find a differentiated advantage in the fierce market competition.
The Rise of Domestic Brands
FOREST CABIN's "counterattack" is not an isolated incident but a microcosm of the collective rise of domestic beauty brands.
According to a CITIC Securities research report based on Euromonitor data, assuming the long-tail market is primarily composed of local brands, the overall market share of domestic brands in the skincare and color cosmetics markets is estimated to have increased to approximately 51% and 46% respectively in 2024.
Domestic beauty brands achieved a significant increase in market share, with their share in the skincare sector surpassing that of foreign brands for the first time in 2024, becoming the market leader. This group includes representative companies.
In 2024, Proya's revenue broke through the 10-billion-yuan mark, becoming the first enterprise in the domestic cosmetics industry to achieve this milestone. Through blockbuster product strategies like "Vitamin C in the morning, Retinol at night" and deep penetration of e-commerce channels, the company completed a thorough e-commerce transformation, increasing its online revenue share from 36% in 2017 to over 95% in 2024.
Baimaite, founded in 2010, has its main brand, Winona, focused on sensitive skin care. According to data from Euromonitor International and Baimaite's official disclosures, between 2023 and 2024, Winona's market share in the sensitive skin care sub-segment remained relatively stable at around 20%, maintaining its position as the leader in China's dermocosmetics market for many consecutive years.
The collective rise of domestic beauty brands is attributed to the combined effect of multiple factors.
The ability to skillfully navigate local social media and connect with young people is a key factor.
Taking Proya as an example, its performance surge is underpinned by capturing the dividends of online marketing and channel development, as well as its understanding of contemporary consumer psychology. Following the rise of content e-commerce platforms like Douyin and Xiaohongshu, domestic brands quickly adapted to the new channels with their flexible operational models. Proya, Baimaite, and Shanghai Jahwa are representative companies in this regard.
Furthermore, domestic brands have found their niche through differentiated positioning. FOREST CABIN chose a "premium" positioning, pioneering the "nourishing skin with oil" sub-category; Ganye focuses on whitening based on glabridin; Perfect Diary rose rapidly through seeding on Xiaohongshu. These brands all avoided direct competition with international giants, finding their own space in specific segments.
In contrast, international brands, constrained by traditional agency systems, often face longer cycles for channel transformation and relatively slower response times to market changes.
With the popularization of cosmetics science content on content platforms and the further segmentation of consumer demand, coupled with breakthroughs in quality and design by domestic brands, consumers are gradually becoming disenchanted with international brands. The rise of content e-commerce has further broken the mindshare monopoly that international brands built relying on traditional advertising.
L'Oréal Group's North Asia region (with China as the core) fell into negative growth in 2024, declining by 3.2% year-on-year, making it the only market among L'Oréal's five global regions to experience negative growth. Estée Lauder's Asia-Pacific region saw net sales decrease by 6% and operating profit plummet by 73% in fiscal year 2024 (ending June 2024). Estée Lauder attributed this primarily to a decline in net sales in mainland China, mainly due to continued softness in the premium beauty products segment. Additionally, companies like Shiseido and Procter & Gamble also showed declining sales trends in the Chinese market.
However, international brands are not sitting idly by. Taking L'Oréal as an example, in recent years, it has successively invested in local brands. In 2025, through its Shanghai Meicifang Investment Co., Ltd., BOLD venture capital fund, and other capital platforms, it completed strategic investments in four domestic beauty brands: FIRST COVER Yoyi, Chando, LAN, and FOREST CABIN. Adopting the "if you can't beat them, join them" approach, it transformed from opponent to shareholder through investment.
These adjustments have provided domestic brands with a better environment for growth. The underlying industry trend changes also signal a shift in the Chinese cosmetics market from a pattern of "international brand dominance" to one of "competitive coexistence between domestic and international brands."
Why Has Hong Kong Become the Main Battleground?
The path to capitalization for domestic beauty brands is also changing.
Initially, the A-share market was their main arena. In November 2017, Proya listed on the main board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Its market capitalization once exceeded 60.8 billion yuan, but since 2022, Proya's stock price began to fluctuate downwards. As of December 29, 2025, Proya's total market capitalization was 26.641 billion yuan, with a P/E ratio of 16.88.
In the following years, companies like Marubi Biological and Baimaite also completed their A-share listings. Among them, Baimaite, as the "first stock of functional skincare," saw its market capitalization surge to 120 billion yuan at one point, setting a record high for the domestic skincare industry. However, the high valuation trend did not continue. By December 29, 2025, Baimaite's market capitalization had shrunk to approximately 16.9 billion yuan, just a fraction of its peak value.
In the past two years, the performance of the domestically brand Maogeping, which listed in Hong Kong, has been particularly outstanding.
In December 2024, Maogeping officially listed on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, becoming the "first domestic color cosmetics stock on the Hong Kong market." This company's path to listing was fraught with twists and turns over eight years. It first submitted an A-share listing application in 2016, passed the initial review in October 2021, but ultimately withdrew its A-share application in January 2024, switching to Hong Kong. After listing, Maogeping's total market capitalization once exceeded HK$60 billion, and although it later retreated, it remained above HK$40 billion.
In 2025, the domestic beauty industry witnessed a wave of Hong Kong listing applications. In May, FOREST CABIN submitted its prospectus to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; in September, Chando submitted its prospectus; in October, Proya, which had been listed on the A-share market for eight years, formally submitted its application for a Hong Kong listing, aiming to become the first domestic beauty company with an "A+H" listing; in November, Marubi Biological also announced its plan to issue H-shares and apply for a listing on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
The core reasons for domestic beauty companies turning to Hong Kong are, on one hand, valuation advantages. The average P/E ratio in 2025 for Shanghai Jahwa and Maogeping, listed in Hong Kong, exceeded 30 times, while Proya's P/E ratio on the A-share market during the same period was about 21 times.
On the other hand, it is the need for international strategic layout. As an international financial center, Hong Kong is an ideal base for companies expanding overseas. Proya explicitly stated that listing in Hong Kong would "accelerate the company's international strategy and the development of its overseas business." Chando also listed "establishing international brand awareness" as a core objective in its prospectus.
A Hong Kong listing also opens up a new offshore financing channel for companies. The foreign exchange funds raised can be more conveniently used for overseas investments and acquiring overseas brands with historical heritage or core technologies. Proya has already explicitly stated its plan to acquire European brands in the skincare and perfume sectors.
Finally, listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange itself is a major branding event targeting consumers and retailers across Asia-Pacific and even globally. It helps quickly build brand trust, optimize capital structure, and attract long-term international institutional investors.
However, listing is not a smooth path. In the past year, although over 30 beauty-related companies initiated IPO processes, only 6 ultimately succeeded in listing. These included 2 in the US, 3 in Hong Kong, and 1 on the A-share market, encompassing beauty product companies, operators, and e-commerce enterprises. Many other companies failed due to unmet performance benchmarks, compliance issues, etc.
For instance, Plant Scription's IPO process was delayed for a full 19 months; Jiakai Biological saw its listing application lapse due to an expired audit report, requiring re-preparation of materials. Companies like Inoherb相继传来终止IPO的消息 in 2024.
These cases reflect the capital market's increasingly stringent selection criteria for beauty companies. Enterprises must possess solid market foundations, clear brand positioning, and core technological barriers to win capital favor.
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