Recent data from Wood Mackenzie shows that in the first half of 2026, among newly signed offshore wind orders in China, Electric Wind Power alone captured more than half, becoming the new "offshore overlord."
The company that was pulled down from the top is Mingyang Smart Energy Group Ltd (ASX: MYE), which had held the number one spot in China's new offshore wind installations for many consecutive years and was long known as the "offshore wind king."
Its stock price has fallen alongside. On October 15, it closed at 8.64 yuan with a market value of 19.539 billion yuan. That figure was unimaginable just months ago — in early January 2026, the positive news of acquiring Dehua Chip pushed its share price above 19 yuan, with a market value of approximately 44.5 billion yuan; even earlier, its 52-week high exceeded 26 yuan.
On platforms like Xueqiu and East Money, "What is the offshore wind leader busy doing?" became a question repeatedly raised by retail investors. China Entrepreneur sent a related interview request to Mingyang, but as of press time, no reply had been received. Management also did not respond directly.
At a recent interim results briefing, Mingyang founder and Chairman Zhang Chuanwei personally presided. One investor asked bluntly: why did the power station transfer business come to a standstill in the first half of the year? The company's answer: "Power station transfers are affected by industry demand, project grid-connection cycles, and other factors, so the transfer pace has a certain degree of volatility... Power station transfers are expected to accelerate in the second half, and the company's current production and operations are normal." Another investor asked about market competition and the gap with competitors. The reply did not engage directly, landing instead on the "wind-solar-storage-hydrogen-gas-intelligence integrated strategy" and the "two seas strategy." Throughout the briefing, one phrase management repeated was: the industry has "bid farewell to irrational price wars and entered a new stage of value competition."
Fluctuations in market sentiment are not hard to understand against the broader backdrop of the wind power industry. In recent years, price wars have intensified. By 2024, onshore turbine prices had fallen 62% compared with 2019; offshore turbine prices dropped from 6,659 yuan per kilowatt to below 3,000 yuan. Although that year 12 complete-machine enterprises including Mingyang signed a self-discipline convention and industry prices stabilized and rebounded, the shakeout is still not complete — in the first half of 2026, newly signed wind turbine orders nationwide fell 25% year-on-year.
Mingyang is not the only anxious company, but for the former industry leader, the change is more conspicuous. At the end of September, Mingyang made consecutive moves: a board reshuffle and share buyback cancellation. In the board reshuffle, Chief Technology Officer Zhang Qiying, the technical soul who led anti-typhoon turbine research and development, exited, and Zhang Jinyuan, with a background in the Guangdong provincial state-owned platform Hengjian system, filled the position. On the same day, there was also a cancellation announcement — 70.0235 million shares in the buyback account (estimated at about 1 billion yuan based on the average buyback price) would be fully cancelled instead of being "used for equity incentives."
Changing generals on one side and "burning money" on the other — the two announcements together exude a certain ruthlessness, which has also long been the underlying tone of Zhang Chuanwei's decisions. This year marks the 33rd anniversary of the founding of Mingyang Group. In the past, Zhang Chuanwei often appeared in media coverage, talking about wind power trends, overseas markets, and the Henan merchant spirit of his hometown. His story is not hard to tell: at 31 he resigned from public office and went into business, starting with 12,000 yuan in an iron-sheet house; in 2005 he abandoned the trade he had worked in for twelve years and bet on wind power when few were optimistic; he staked his entire fortune to install turbines in typhoon restricted zones that European experts asserted "could not stand," and ascended to the throne of "offshore wind king."
But today, the narrative surrounding this company is more about confusion. After the interim report was disclosed, Zhang Chuanwei did not step forward to explain. He has maintained a high-frequency meeting pace — banks, provincial local investment groups, power generation companies... Over the past year, he flew 320,000 kilometers and made 143 international trips — this is the "flight ledger" he presents to the outside world, which works out to an average of one overseas visit every 2.5 days. At 64, when many of his peers have retreated behind the scenes, he still stands at the center of Mingyang.
This "storm" is far more violent than a typhoon and may involve matters of life and death. He must seize the moment while the market still has confidence to make Mingyang's accounts clear.
Daring to Think and Act
Unlike those star entrepreneurs in manufacturing, Zhang Chuanwei does not carry an obvious "technological gambler" label. He is closer to an "adventurer." Those who know him describe him as "restless and never settling down." Before age 31, he had no intersection with wind power. In 1993, with no technology, no money, and no people, he founded Mingyang Electric Co., Ltd. in Zhongshan with just over 10,000 yuan. He and six partners started from an iron-sheet house, doing contract processing of household distribution boxes. By 1995, this business had an annual profit of 500,000 yuan. Contract manufacturing is a business with no technology and no barriers. Even then, he was already consciously standardizing factories and upgrading products.
His "dare to think and dare to act" style became even more evident after he entered the wind power industry. In 2005, Zhang Chuanwei, then undertaking development of wind power control systems, smelled an opportunity. That year, the Kyoto Protocol took effect, and the National Development and Reform Commission issued new rules: the domestic content rate of wind power equipment must reach above 70%. He realized this might be the only window to squeeze into the power industry — at the time, thermal power was inaccessible, nuclear power had thresholds, and hydropower was already saturated. He decided to throw away entirely the transmission and distribution main business he had run for 12 years and which was steadily profitable, and enter the wind power track. But at that time, China lacked core technology, investment was large, and payback cycles were long. Zhang Chuanwei recalled that almost all old employees opposed it; one employee even knelt down directly, hoping he would give up this "unrealistic" idea. He was resolute, even if it meant starting from zero. Later, he did not take a single person from the old company, nor a single cent from it. What he calculated in his heart was not return but "odds" — the distribution box industry offered certain returns, while the wind power industry had the possibility of exponential growth. His goals were ambitious — ten billion yuan in output value, a top-three domestic listed company, and entry into the global top ten. At the time the company had only 300 people and had not even secured factory land.
In fact, he was not empty-handed. As early as 2000, when switchgear enterprises nationwide were mired in price wars, Zhang Chuanwei quickly pivoted to high-voltage variable-frequency speed control devices. In hindsight, this was a key decision. This product became an important technological foundation for Mingyang's entry into wind power control systems, and he "stumbled" into securing core components. Five years later, all his "crazy" goals were realized. Several important decisions during this period fully demonstrated his sensitivity to opportunity, especially in capital and technology. According to media reports, the most important card in Zhang Chuanwei's hand was a piece of land in Zhongshan. Through mortgage, allocation, and re-mortgage, he actually leveraged the land value from 7.5 million yuan to 50 million yuan and borrowed 30 million yuan. He used 10 million yuan to buy intellectual property from a famous European wind turbine design company, not taking the old path of independent research and development but using joint development to seize the time window for product launch; 10 million yuan was used as project startup investment; the remaining 10 million yuan bought another piece of land, and a few years later when land prices rose, he mortgaged it and borrowed another 30 million yuan. In this way, one piece of land became two, and it also paid for the new company's cash flow and core technology. In the years that followed, he met more than a hundred international investment banks. In October 2010, Mingyang listed on the New York Stock Exchange, becoming China's first wind turbine complete-machine manufacturer listed in the United States. He once summarized it himself: "The achievement in wind power is a matter of one move. One step earlier or later, one step faster or slower, could mean a completely different chess game... In Cantonese, I drank the 'first bowl of soup.'"
Having won several key fast battles, Zhang Chuanwei's style seems increasingly clear — he is accustomed to betting on "survivorship bias," wanting to sit at the table before the window closes. As for which cards to play, as long as the accounts work out, he resolutely pushes forward. Mingyang was among the earliest batch of enterprises to plunge into offshore wind power. Nearshore was deemed by European experts a "world-class problem" for wind turbine units, and no one believed a Chinese company could survive in this field. While onshore turbines were still in fierce combat, Zhang Chuanwei led his team "out to sea." In 2007, Mingyang's world-first anti-typhoon turbine was put into operation. His "adventurousness" was a gift in the incremental era. In the rush-installation window before wind power achieved grid parity, in the policy gaps of domestic content rates, and in the blank zones of offshore wind power, speed and ruthlessness were competitiveness. Mingyang seized them and remained first in China's new offshore installations for many consecutive years.
But the industry's underlying color has now changed. Turbine prices have pierced cost lines in recent years. Industry involution is severe, and what companies compete on is no longer "whether they dare," but cost, expense control, supply chain payment cycles, and overseas channels... The cost of this switch is clearly visible in financial reports. In the same first half of 2026, Goldwind Science & Technology Co Ltd (ASX: GWK) had net profit attributable to shareholders of 1.855 billion yuan, up 24.67% year-on-year, while Mingyang's was 111 million yuan, down 81.8%. In industry institutional analysis: Goldwind relied on product structure upgrading and high-priced overseas orders, with both volume and price rising, while Mingyang was more like "trading price for volume" — wind turbine gross margin was 10.34%, lower than Goldwind's 11.62%, while the three expenses ratio was 11.19%, more than two percentage points higher than the other. The gap in overseas business revenue is even more obvious: Goldwind's international business revenue was 10.887 billion yuan, covering 49 countries, while Mingyang's was only 354 million yuan. When industry practitioners mention Mingyang, the consensus is that the company's intelligent technology foundation is not bad, but the times have "changed the question." This is not Zhang Chuanwei's problem alone, but when it falls on Mingyang, it is especially glaring.
Crunching the Numbers
If "daring to charge" is the underlying color of Zhang Chuanwei's character, then "crunching the numbers" is his business logic. It is also in recent years that everyone gradually realized Mingyang was never a purely manufacturing enterprise. Its 2025 annual report showed: although wind turbine and parts revenue was 31.01 billion yuan, accounting for 81.4% of revenue, gross margin was only 6.38%, while power station product sales gross margin was 28.99%, and wind farm power generation gross margin reached 45.99%. Some media summarized accordingly: Mingyang's profit pillar is not in manufacturing.
Simply put, this model is that Mingyang measures wind itself, obtains approvals, advances funds to build wind farms, and sells the power station as a whole after grid connection, with recovered funds invested in the next batch of projects. The annual report states: "To control financial risks that may arise from an excessively high asset-liability ratio during rapid business scale growth... continuously sell mature power station projects at opportune times." Equipment sales, resource development premiums, engineering general contracting value — selling one power station earns three kinds of money. According to a rating report by China Chengxin International, this model has produced considerable results since 2022: by the first three quarters of 2025, it had cumulatively transferred 4,470 megawatts of power stations, while as of the end of June 2026, it had 2.20 gigawatts of power stations in operation and 4.44 gigawatts under construction.
This model was once efficient. As early as 2021, Mingyang sold equity in the Yangjiang Shapa offshore project to China Three Gorges Renewables for 1.757 billion yuan, and the announcement stated an expected profit increase of 438 million yuan, with all profit coming from "reversal of wind turbine sales profit." In effect, the power station was only the "shell" of the project, while the profit had long been installed in the turbines sold to its own wind farm. The following year's performance was also beautiful: 3.455 billion yuan in net profit attributable to shareholders was a historical peak, and the stock price had reached 35.68 yuan the previous year. The valuation the market gave Mingyang and the operating efficiency of "rolling development" were completely in sync at that time.
But the other side of the model is that the company tied its fate to the pace of asset transfers. Power station transfers are affected by multiple factors such as project construction cycles, grid access, compliance approvals, and buyer funding arrangements. A bottleneck in any link will be reflected in the income statement. This is especially obvious under industry "involution." In 2023, Mingyang transferred 1,471 megawatts, but power station sales revenue fell to 2.08 billion yuan — grid parity and price wars lowered the unit price of power stations, and approvals were also an uncontrollable factor. Zhang Chuanwei did the math at a shareholders' meeting: offshore projects were delayed due to channel and sea use approvals, affecting about 12 billion yuan in revenue, and power station sales were about 1.7 billion yuan less. By 2024, the returns from this model further degraded: within one year, Mingyang sold the Kailu and Naiman Banner wind farms to CGN Wind Power at book net asset parity, with a total price of 1.5 billion yuan (later lowered to about 1.3 billion yuan), and power stations became more of a "blood-recovery" tool.
Afterward, Zhang Chuanwei once again found an answer using capital tools. In December 2025, Mingyang issued the "CITIC Securities-Mingyang Smart New Energy Holding Real Estate Asset-Backed Special Plan," packaging power stations into ABS (asset-backed securities) and selling them to the capital market, adding an outlet for power stations that "could not be sold." That year, power station sales revenue recovered to 4.506 billion yuan, and net profit attributable to shareholders also rose 90.65% year-on-year. But the real test came in the first half of 2026: the same period last year still had 3.140 billion yuan in power station sales revenue, while this period it fell to zero. The reason is that policy changed — the "Document No. 136" issued in 2025 fully marketized incremental power station electricity prices. A credit rating agency stated directly in a rating report that this may increase the difficulty of power station transfers to a certain extent. This is precisely the "fatal weakness" of this playbook.
The manufacturing account is essentially a cost curve — whoever has lower per-kilowatt-hour cost, higher yield, and faster turnover can survive to the end; the "rolling development" account is asset circulation — what is earned is resource premium, capital efficiency, and transaction timing. Some brokerage research reports and analyses point out that facing the same involution, the path of companies like Goldwind is "manufacturing as the main body + high-priced overseas orders," where the wind turbine main business can generate its own blood and report fluctuations are much smaller; Mingyang's path is asset-centered, with greater elasticity and greater volatility. To a certain extent, this is not a strategic mistake. Zhang Chuanwei's playbook, close to policy, capital, and resources, produced results in past eras, but this path dependence comes with a cost.
Secondary market sentiment also stems partly from this. Some investors have dug up old accounts: in August 2023, he promised to increase holdings by 20 million to 30 million yuan, but five months later had completed only about 10 million yuan; at almost the same time, Vice Chairman Shen Zhongmin cashed out more than 90 million yuan.
"Showing the Cards"
Zhang Chuanwei's strategic priority ranking at this moment has returned to surviving first, then talking about ideals. What Mingyang wants to do is already on the table: with the main business under pressure, use strategic expansion and capital actions to buy the company breathing room to endure the involution period. Strategically, its tentacles reach far and fast. Beyond offshore wind power, Mingyang has placed early bets on green hydrogen, green methanol, and floating offshore wind power; at the end of September, it joined multiple industrial parties in taking a stake in Guangdong Lufeng Nuclear Power, becoming another case of "private capital entering nuclear"; at this year's Davos Forum, Zhang Chuanwei talked about global green hydrogen energy and energy governance... The largest span is space photovoltaics — the proposed acquisition of Dehua Chip, which makes gallium arsenide space solar cell chips, with an average market share of its main products exceeding 30% over the past three years.
Capital actions are equally intensive. Including the entry into the board of directors of an investor from the Guangdong provincial state-owned platform Hengjian system, nominated as a non-independent director, expectations in the secondary market for state-owned credit, mixed-ownership reform, and asset integration have all opened up; 70.0235 million buyback shares changed from incentive use to cancellation, sending a signal to the secondary market to "first clean up the capital structure"; a private placement plan is also already being planned, which has a major impact on cash flow.
This is also the rhythm Zhang Chuanwei knows best — heavy positioning before the market forms a consensus, using a grander business model to lock in resources. The only problem is that acquiring Dehua Chip is a "backward account." This asset was divested by Mingyang in 2016 for 17.2652 million yuan on the grounds of low business relevance, and the buyer was Nengtou Group, the controlling shareholder of Mingyang's listed company, whose legal representative is Zhang Chuanwei; in the years since, control of Dehua Chip gradually shifted to a company wholly owned by Zhang Chuanwei's daughter, Zhang Chao. In January 2026, Mingyang announced it would buy Dehua Chip back through issuing shares and paying cash, at an issue price of 14.46 yuan per share — the trading day before suspension it hit the daily limit, and on the resumption day it hit the daily limit again. That evening, the Shanghai Stock Exchange's inquiry letter arrived, directly pointing to the target's continued losses, transaction fairness, abnormal stock price movement, and insider information management. On Xueqiu, many investors used phrases such as "tunneling benefits"; some media calculated that "the Zhang Chuanwei family may cash out billions." Some brokerages gave the opposite interpretation: gallium arsenide space cells have extremely high barriers, and this is a long-slope, thick-snow hard-tech layout. This debate has no result yet. But looking at Mingyang's current situation, Zhang Chuanwei indeed needs a sufficiently large new battlefield to draw capital's attention back.
Mingyang must quickly jump out of this "inefficient cycle" — power station development requires advance funding, and only after transfer can it recover blood; once transfers stop, cash flow fluctuates, and then capital instruments are needed. After repeating this cycle, its dependence on capital will inevitably increase. But under the basic backdrop of main business involution, this may also be the only choice. Over the past decades, the problem Zhang Chuanwei has solved has always been "surviving," and the principles he believes in seem never to have changed — seize time, seize expectations, seize position. Only this time, the whistle for "transition" has already blown, and how much capital will stand behind him is no longer up to him.
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