Since February 1st, the 10 billion yuan promotional red packet campaign for Tencent's Yuanbao has rapidly proliferated across various WeChat groups, allowing users to participate in the sharing simply by clicking the red packet and entering the Yuanbao App. Waking up in the morning, one would find WeChat groups, Moments, and public account comments flooded with strings of "Yuanbao passwords" and "shareable links," transforming networks of acquaintances into temporary, fission-like red packet venues. In some cases, group administrators even had to step in to maintain order, requesting members to stop sharing. Placing this phenomenon of red packets raining from the sky back into the context of Tencent's product logic makes it appear particularly突兀.
This is because product experience has always been the most cherished foundation of WeChat and, by extension, Tencent. A decade ago, when WeChat had just secured its position as a national-level application, figures like Allen Zhang were not contemplating what flashy features could be added; instead, they were concerned that "we are occupying too much of the user's time." In terms of product logic, Tencent and WeChat have consistently aimed to do less but do it accurately, striving to avoid disturbance, thereby earning users' long-term trust and attention. Even the introduction of WeChat advertisements was approached with extreme caution, and any minor modification or innovation underwent lengthy experimentation, internal testing, and gray release. It is the compound accumulation of this product methodology that allowed WeChat to gradually fortify its moat over time, evolving from a mere function into an ecosystem and achieving an irreplaceable level of user stickiness.
However, it must be acknowledged that the current user acquisition tactics for Yuanbao seem to be increasingly diverging from the original product philosophy of "not disturbing users." This time, the red packets were distributed first, while the Yuanbao app itself is reportedly still in gray release. This "traffic first, product later" approach indeed seems unlike Tencent's traditional DNA, but it may also be a无可奈何 choice in the face of intense AI competition. This is not so much a betrayal of product values as it is a strategic急转 in response to the high-speed competitive environment of the AI era.
As a new interaction layer, AI is fundamentally competing for user mindshare and primary entry points. If a company fails to pull users into its own ecosystem during the limited window of opportunity, it might never get them back. One can imagine that compared to the delayed start of Video Channels against rivals like Douyin and Kuaishou—even if they later achieved scale—the ceding of massive amounts of user time and opportunity windows likely caused profound anxiety and reflection within Tencent. For this strategic shift, Tencent has paid an unprecedented cost at the product level, arguably greater than the 10 billion yuan in real money spent.
The first cost is the compromise made on the restraint of "not轻易 disturbing users." The red packet war 12 years ago did not require link redirects; all interactions occurred within the WeChat tool itself. The integration with social attributes made that product a Pareto improvement. In contrast, the current Yuanbao campaign, with its red packets, passwords, and group-fission propagation, creates more noise, eroding the清净感 of the WeChat environment. The red packets can be seen as a form of compensation to users for this disturbance.
The second cost is the reorganization of originally relatively independent social chains. In its product design, the Yuanbao app has, for the first time, interconnected the two major social matrices of WeChat and QQ. This level of cross-chain integration is rarely seen and not only brings stronger traffic diversion pressure but also essentially leverages Tencent's core, reserve user ecosystem resources, demonstrating the immense importance Tencent places on this initiative. But why is Tencent in such a hurry?
The reason is that AI is not merely a single feature; it is destined to reshape the interaction logic between people, products, and applications in the future. Once a particular assistant establishes actions like searching for information or generating content as the default option, the switching cost due to entrenched user habits becomes enormous. Therefore, waiting until the product experience is perfected before promoting it is far less effective than pulling users in first, allowing habits and mindshare to develop early. The primary competitor for this entry point is undoubtedly Doubao, whose product strength is formidable. However, it's important to note that Douyin, with its 1 billion monthly active users, has been seamlessly diverting traffic to Doubao for some time.
Doubao's current monthly active users are estimated to be just over 200 million. Based on China's total internet user base of approximately 1.1 billion, there remains a gap of at least 700 to 900 million potential AI entry point users. This is the remaining space where Yuanbao can accelerate its sprint. Therefore, the root cause of this sudden shift in "user posture" is Tencent's strategic expression of the urgency and necessity of securing the AI入口. Precisely because Tencent built a sufficiently high moat through network effects in social networking in the past, it had the confidence to practice long-term主义 restraint on the user side. But now, it likely feels the AI window is short and the competitive landscape is残酷, leading it to choose to exchange traffic for time and use short-term刺激 to compete for a long-term入口.
Ultimately, the decisive factor will be whether short-term user acquisition can be transformed into long-term stickiness. This depends entirely on whether Yuanbao can retain users through its own product value. If it fails, this campaign will merely become a pure traffic purchase. On a national-level application like WeChat, such phenomenal mobilization is difficult to initiate repeatedly. If it were, WeChat would inevitably deviate from its product image of "not轻易 disturbing users," which would, for Tencent, be a clear case of得不偿失.
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