The year 2025 marked the formal implementation of what is termed the "strictest ever" new loan facilitation regulations (Jin Gui [2025] No. 9). Key measures, including an interest rate cap locked at 24%, comprehensive adoption of a bank whitelist management system, and an explicit ban on third-party entities handling core risk control, have collectively triggered an unprecedented industry-wide reshuffle in the trillion-yuan loan facilitation sector.
An analysis of the full-year financial reports from seven leading listed loan facilitation platforms reveals that their combined revenue for 2025 reached approximately 69.378 billion yuan. Among the six companies that disclosed net profit figures, the aggregate profit was about 13.245 billion yuan. Five platforms that reported facilitated loan volumes accounted for a combined total of approximately 991.9 billion yuan. However, the dominant themes were "revenue growth without corresponding profit growth" and "significant performance divergence." For instance, Qifu Technology experienced revenue growth but a decline in net profit, whereas LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. saw its revenue decrease but its net profit surge against the trend by 52%. Yiren ZhiKe witnessed a drastic 97.4% plunge in net profit. Performance across the entire industry was generally under pressure in the fourth quarter. Caught between compliance requirements and profitability challenges, the loan facilitation industry is shifting its focus from a "race for scale" to a "contest of quality."
Overall performance divergence intensified significantly. The total loan facilitation volume reached the trillion-yuan mark. In 2025, the seven listed loan facilitation platforms delivered a mixed financial report. In terms of revenue, Qifu Technology led with 19.205 billion yuan, an increase of 11.9% year-on-year. FinVolution Group reported revenue of 13.570 billion yuan, up 3.8% year-on-year. LexinFintech Holdings Ltd.'s revenue was 13.152 billion yuan, marking a 7.4% decrease. X Financial's revenue grew substantially by 30.1% to 7.639 billion yuan. Jiayin Group Inc. achieved revenue of 6.222 billion yuan, a 7.3% increase. Yiren ZhiKe's revenue slightly declined by 1.0% to 5.719 billion yuan. WeShang Group's revenue decreased by 1.5% to 3.871 billion yuan. The combined revenue for all seven companies was approximately 69.378 billion yuan.
Qifu Technology's net profit was 5.976 billion yuan. While this was the highest absolute figure, it represented a 4% year-on-year decline. FinVolution Group's net profit rose 6.6% to 2.550 billion yuan. LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. saw a significant 52% jump in net profit to 1.677 billion yuan. Jiayin Group Inc.'s net profit increased by 45.3% to 1.536 billion yuan. X Financial's net profit fell by 4.9% to 1.465 billion yuan. Yiren ZhiKe's net profit plummeted 97.4% to just 41 million yuan. WeShang Group did not disclose its net profit. The combined net profit for the six disclosing companies was approximately 13.245 billion yuan.
Regarding facilitated loan volumes, Qifu Technology facilitated 327.07 billion yuan for the full year, with outstanding loan balances of 126.01 billion yuan. LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. facilitated 205 billion yuan, with outstanding balances of 96.6 billion yuan. FinVolution Group facilitated 200.3 billion yuan, with outstanding balances of 68.3 billion yuan. X Financial facilitated 130.55 billion yuan. Jiayin Group Inc. facilitated 129 billion yuan. The five platforms together facilitated approximately 991.9 billion yuan. Notably, the outstanding loan balances at several platforms retreated from previous highs, indicating an industry trend towards proactive "balance sheet contraction" for risk mitigation.
The top three players—Qifu Technology, FinVolution Group, and LexinFintech Holdings Ltd.—collectively accounted for over 70% of the total revenue, indicating a further increase in industry concentration. However, divergence was also evident among these leaders: Qifu Technology faced the dilemma of "revenue growth without profit growth," with its financial report indicating declining revenue under its capital-light model alongside a substantial increase in loan loss provisions that eroded profits. In contrast, LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. followed an opposite trajectory; despite a revenue decline, its net profit surged 52%, primarily benefiting from the hedging effect of non-credit businesses like installment e-commerce and improved asset quality. Yiren ZhiKe saw its net profit nearly vanish for the year due to sharply rising compliance costs and pains from business transformation, even reporting a temporary loss in the fourth quarter.
"Data shows that the model driven solely by traffic and interest rate spreads has reached its end," an industry insider commented. "Companies that managed to achieve positive net profit growth in 2025 either found new markets overseas, unlocked potential in non-credit businesses, or achieved excellence in risk control."
The impact of the new regulations was particularly evident, with fourth-quarter performance universally under pressure. The "Notice on Strengthening the Management of Cooperative Business Between Commercial Banks and Third-Party Institutions" (Jin Gui [2025] No. 9, known as the "New Loan Facilitation Rules"), which took effect on October 1, 2025, became a watershed moment for the year's performance. Three core clauses of the new rules directly reshaped the industry's operating environment.
First, all implicit costs, such as credit enhancement service fees and guarantee fees, must be included in the calculation of the comprehensive annualized interest rate, which is strictly capped at 24%. Practices where some platforms previously split fees to indirectly increase borrowing costs were explicitly prohibited. Second, commercial banks are required to implement a whitelist system for their cooperative loan facilitation partners; only institutions on the "whitelist" can continue collaborations. Third, it is clearly stated that banks cannot rely on the core risk control capabilities of third parties; facilitation platforms can no longer handle risk control entirely, and banks must perform substantive approval duties.
The impact of the new rules concentrated in the fourth quarter. Data showed that leading institutions like Qifu Technology, FinVolution Group, and LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. all experienced year-on-year declines exceeding 10% in both revenue and net profit. This was extremely rare in previous years—during periods of high growth, single-quarter growth rates for top platforms often remained above 20%.
"The fourth quarter was a painful period of compliance adjustment," a mid-level operations manager at a loan facilitation platform revealed. "The new rules require all products to clearly display an annualized rate not exceeding 24%. We urgently delisted a large number of high-interest products and adjusted our cooperation processes with banks. Customer acquisition costs rose significantly in Q4 because traffic channels also had to be re-audited for compliance."
Increased provisions for bad debts further squeezed profit margins. Qifu Technology, explaining its net profit decline in its annual report, specifically mentioned increased loan loss provisions based on macroeconomic uncertainties. FinVolution Group also set aside more risk reserves in the fourth quarter. Many platforms proactively scaled back their lending volumes, significantly reducing exposure to high-risk customer segments.
Following the implementation of the bank whitelist system, numerous less-qualified facilitators were forced to exit the market after failing to gain entry to cooperation "whitelists." Industry observations indicate that a large number of small and medium-sized facilitators ceased new business or transitioned to pure technology service providers in the second half of 2025. "Previously, banks had relatively lenient reviews for facilitation partners. Now, they assess dozens of indicators, including registered capital, shareholder background, system integration capabilities, historical non-performing loan ratios, and complaint rates. Many small platforms simply cannot meet these standards," the aforementioned insider stated.
Under the dual pressures of tightened fee structures and rising risks, the industry pivoted from pursuing "scale races" to engaging in "quality contests." Several platforms stated in their earnings releases that for 2026, loan volume growth would no longer be the primary target; instead, the focus would be on acquiring high-quality customers and reducing risk exposure.
Key industry trends for the year included expansion overseas, focus on small and micro enterprises (SMEs), and technology output. Faced with stricter domestic regulations and narrowing interest spreads, leading platforms actively sought new growth drivers. Overseas expansion, SME finance, and technology empowerment emerged as the three most prominent directions in 2025.
Overseas expansion represented the most certain source of incremental growth in 2025. FinVolution Group's international business revenue grew 38.6% year-on-year, increasing its contribution to total revenue to 31.4% and becoming the core engine for the company's growth. Its overseas operations are primarily focused on Southeast Asian markets like Indonesia and the Philippines, where digital inclusive finance is still in a rapid development phase, offering better pricing flexibility and growth potential compared to the domestic market. Other leading platforms have also made varying degrees of progress overseas, but FinVolution Group currently demonstrates the most advanced internationalization.
Against the backdrop of a saturated personal consumption loan market with rising risks, some platforms turned their attention to the business loan market. Qifu Technology leveraged its self-developed large model technology to tap into the value of the SME segment. In 2025, its SME loan approval rate was 19.8 percentage points higher than the overall average, with non-performing loan ratios controlled at relatively low levels compared to peers. This indicates that using technological means to accurately assess the operational status and credit risk of SMEs is a viable path to differentiation.
The shift from "loan facilitation" to "pure technology services"—where platforms only output systems, models, and operational capabilities, while licensed institutions like banks bear the risk—represents a capital-light, zero-risk-exposure model encouraged by regulators. Although revenue from technology output currently constitutes a relatively small proportion for most platforms (generally between 5% and 10%), the profit margins for this business are significantly higher than traditional facilitation, and it is not directly constrained by the interest rate cap. Several leading platforms have disclosed in their annual reports plans to increase investment in their technology empowerment businesses.
Additionally, some platforms are exploring the hedging value of non-credit businesses. LexinFintech Holdings Ltd.'s 52% surge in net profit against the trend in 2025 was closely linked to contributions from its non-credit businesses, such as installment e-commerce. These businesses are not directly subject to the new facilitation rules' interest rate restrictions and can foster user stickiness and create closed-loop scenarios.
Industry divergence is expected to intensify further in 2026. The 24% interest rate ceiling has become an irreversible regulatory norm. Survival will depend on the ability to control comprehensive costs within this 24% limit while maintaining reasonable profits. Under the whitelist management system, bank cooperation resources will increasingly concentrate towards leading platforms, further squeezing the survival space for small and medium-sized players. Meanwhile, the macroeconomic trajectory and household repayment capacity remain the most significant uncertainty variables.
A non-bank financial analyst at a securities firm summarized, "The 'Golden Decade' for loan facilitation has ended. 2026 will be a critical year testing the true mettle of each platform—those who can genuinely control risks, find growth points beyond the domestic market, and complete the transition from traffic resellers to technology enablers will be able to navigate the cycle. The rest will likely be淘汰 or marginalized."
It is noteworthy that several platforms did not provide specific loan volume guidance for 2026 in their annual reports, instead emphasizing keywords like "high-quality growth," "controllable risk," and "profit priority."
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