A decades-long global migration within the television industry is reaching a pivotal conclusion. Following Sharp's acquisition by Foxconn, Toshiba's sale to Hisense, and Sony's alliance with TCL, Panasonic recently announced it is handing over its European television operations to Skyworth for complete management. This move means that all four formerly dominant Japanese TV giants have now been integrated into the industrial ecosystems of Chinese manufacturers. This marks a significant shift: the era of Japanese television supremacy is collectively giving way to Chinese leadership.
The path to this zenith has been a grueling saga for the entire sector. From reckless capacity expansion triggering price collapses to industry-wide severe financial losses, Chinese panel makers ultimately outlasted Japanese and Korean competitors who could no longer bear the pressure. However, challenges persist. The seemingly impregnable moat of LCD capacity now faces threats from next-generation display technologies. The massive investments, totaling hundreds of billions, used to build this LCD capacity could potentially become a heavy burden. As technology evolves, the newly crowned Chinese giants must now gamble correctly on the next wave.
**Final Twilight**
The recent deal involves Panasonic transferring its European TV business to Skyworth. Under the agreement, Skyworth will fully manage the production, sales, marketing, and channel development for Panasonic-branded TVs in Europe. Panasonic will refocus its efforts on its domestic market and the development and production of its own high-end models. An insider close to Skyworth explained that Panasonic possesses a strong market foundation and consumer recognition in European and American markets, and the Panasonic TV brand will be retained post-collaboration. This may only be a prelude. An investment analyst in Beijing who monitors the panel industry suggested that Skyworth might eventually take over Panasonic's global TV business entirely.
This is not an isolated case. Earlier this year, Sony formed a joint venture with TCL, in which TCL holds a controlling 51% stake. This new entity will handle the global operations of Sony's TV and home audio businesses. Extending the timeline, the successive exits of Panasonic and Sony represent a milestone in a prolonged industry restructuring.
Rewinding to 2015 marks the beginning of the "Big Four" Japanese TV makers slowly divesting their TV operations and shedding heavy assets. This historic wave of global retreat and consolidation in the TV industry has now spanned a full decade. Sharp was the first to undergo an ownership change. In 2015, Hisense acquired Sharp's Americas business and a five-year brand license for $23.7 million, initiating the withdrawal of the Japanese giants from the TV competition. The following year, facing continuous financial losses, Sharp accepted a roughly $3.5 billion investment from Foxconn, ceding control and integrating its LCD technology and global channels into a Chinese corporate structure.
This trend of asset reorganization accelerated in subsequent years. In 2017, Hisense invested approximately 12.9 billion yen to acquire a 95% stake in Toshiba Visual Solutions, along with a 40-year global brand license. Considering Toshiba TV under Hisense, Sharp under Foxconn, and now the transferred operations of Panasonic and Sony, all four once-powerful Japanese TV giants have been incorporated into Chinese manufacturers' industrial frameworks, officially heralding the Chinese era for Japanese television brands.
**Tempered by Cycles**
Chinese companies' successive acquisitions of Japanese brands were not merely about lavish spending but were underpinned by gaining control over the supply chain. While brand premium can support higher prices, in the highly standardized, volume-driven TV business, the fundamental determinant of survival is the cost of display panels. According to TrendForce data, display panels account for about 40%-50% of a TV's total cost. However, mastering panel manufacturing requires not only improving production efficiency but also enduring the brutal backlash of strong industry cycles. Investment in a single high-generation panel production line can start at tens of billions, with long construction periods.
Generations like G8.5, G8.6, and G10.5 refer to different levels of panel production lines; as the generation increases, so does the glass substrate size, alongside correspondingly higher investment costs. For instance, TCL CSOT's single 8.5-generation LCD line required a total investment of 24.5 billion yuan. HKC, with relatively limited capital, has not ventured into G10.5 or G11 lines but utilizes efficient glass substrate mask套切 technology to produce ultra-large-size panels over 85 inches. This highlights the immense financial pressure high-generation lines place on manufacturers.
A major pain point for players is the frequent misalignment between supply and demand. When end-market demand surges and panel prices soar, profit temptation drives frenzied capacity expansion. However, by the time new capacity, built over years, is finally released, demand in the consumer electronics market often has already peaked and begun to decline. This industrial curse has cyclically plagued players for years. Chinese manufacturers have endured repeated, painful cycles during this process.
Taking the last decade as an example, global end-market demand showed signs of weakness starting in 2017. Although a brief, stimulus-driven boom occurred in 2021, this透支性 demand was quickly followed by a severe downturn. From Q2 2022, the panel market turned downward, entering a prolonged winter. DISCIEN data shows global LCD TV panel shipments in 2023 were only 234.6 million units, a significant 10% year-on-year decrease. No one was spared in this harsh downturn, with the entire industry suffering massive financial losses: industry leader BOE saw profits plunge for two consecutive years, with net profit attributable to shareholders dropping 70.91% in 2022 and 66.22% in 2023. HKC, known as a major panel player, reported losses exceeding 2 billion yuan in 2022.
This painful cycle game accelerated the reshaping of the global landscape. In the decades-long industrial migration pattern—Japan's development, Korea's超越, Taiwan's rise, and finally the shift to mainland China—Japanese and Korean giants, unable to withstand endless losses, ultimately chose to cut their losses. With TCL CSOT's acquisition of LG's 8.5-generation line in Guangzhou for 10.8 billion yuan last year—the last major large-size LCD capacity held by a Korean company—and the shutdown of Sharp's Sakai plant, the last Japanese holdout, the era of tripartite competition between China, Japan, and Korea effectively ended. Chinese companies endured the寒冬 with sheer resilience, completing a massive capacity consolidation.
This decades-long capacity transfer has reached a decisive outcome, as recent data shows: the global share of LCD panel capacity held by mainland Chinese manufacturers surged from 57% in 2020 to 74% in 2024. Concentrating over 70% of panel capacity in mainland China brings not only unrivaled economies of scale but also pricing power over the supply chain. The past model of disorderly expansion and "produce-then-sell" that led to cyclical industry-wide losses has become history. Now, major panel manufacturers are adopting rational, dynamic adjustments, essentially "producing to demand."
After significant fluctuations, the utilization rate of global high-generation production lines is expected to stabilize around 85%. Regarding new capacity, only three new LCD panel lines have commenced operation globally since 2023: TCL's G6 LCD line, Tianma's G8.6 LCD line, and BOE's G6 LCD line. This new normal in supply strategy has not only mitigated the long-standing violent cyclical swings but also provided downstream TV brands with a stable cost foundation.
This positive trend is reflected in the recent financial results of TCL CSOT and HKC. In 2025, TCL CSOT's operating revenue surpassed the 100 billion yuan mark, with net profit exceeding 8 billion yuan. In the same year, HKC's net profit attributable to shareholders reached 3.808 billion yuan, a growth of over 10%. Looking at price trends, BOE anticipates TV panel prices will continue to rise in March. The painful cycle洗礼 finally shows signs of dawn.
**Challenges Remain**
Despite the rosy financial results, Chinese panel giants, while seemingly at the industry's pinnacle, face ongoing battles. The most immediate challenge comes from "small screens" encroaching on "large screens." Although Chinese companies have won the global living room, the dilemma is that people are spending less time there. With the rapid development of mobile internet, short-video platforms, and smart hardware, smartphones, tablets, and even VR/AR devices are consuming consumers' fragmented time. Once the indispensable center of home entertainment, the TV is increasingly becoming a low-frequency "background noise" device, forcing the industry into a battle over a stagnant market.
Beyond shifting consumer habits, a more critical threat lies in the generational shift of underlying technology. A key premise enabling Chinese manufacturers to dominate the LCD field through "scale + cost control" is that LCD technology has reached extreme maturity. However, in the history of tech, no technology remains dominant forever. For instance, OLED offers advantages like self-emission, thinner/ lighter form factors, flexibility, and high contrast, but its adoption in large-size TV panels has been relatively slow compared to smartphones. According to Sigmaintell data, OLED's share of TV display panel shipments was only 3% in 2024.
TCL Chairman Li Dongsheng argues that while new display technologies are widely expected to potentially replace traditional LCD in the future, currently no other technology surpasses LCD for large-screen displays, especially in terms of cost-performance and competitiveness. Nonetheless, significant investments continue to flow into next-gen display tech. Notably, Korean giants who exited the LCD battlefield did not fully retreat but redirected substantial funds towards下一代 technologies. Currently, Samsung and LG dominate the global large-size OLED TV panel market.
Samsung began OLED production in 2001, initially by retrofitting older low-gen LCD lines, and started commissioning new G5.5 lines from 2011 onward, subsequently building G6 and G8.5 lines. In January, Samsung Display CEO Choi Joo-sun stated, "In the IT business area, our product lineup continues to expand. The company added 8.6th-gen OLED products this year, and sales are expected to grow 20% to 30% compared to last year." LG achieved production at its first G8.5 line as early as 2014.
This represents the most significant concern for China's panel industry: if the massive LCD capacity moat, built with hundreds of billions over years of struggle, faces a "降维打击" from next-generation display technology, Chinese manufacturers holding vast LCD assets could be burdened with heavy包袱 and a technological generation gap. Consequently, Chinese companies are compelled to heavily invest in OLED and Mini-LED production lines.
BOE's 8.6-generation AMOLED production line has been established in Chengdu with a total investment of 63 billion yuan. To support this project, the China Development Bank, as the lead arranger and agent bank, completed the formation of a 25 billion yuan syndicated loan. In February and May 2025, HKC successively launched projects in Luoyang and Nanchong: a Mini-LED backlight/direct-display module and整机 project, and a full-color M-LED new display chip base project, with combined investments totaling 19 billion yuan.
On this track representing the foundation of major power manufacturing, there is no final finish line, only constantly reset starting points. The old Japanese era has indeed concluded, but a new technological rivalry between China and Korea is gradually unfolding. For the newly crowned Chinese panel manufacturers, winning yesterday does not guarantee holding onto tomorrow. To avoid being left behind by generational technological shifts, they must relentlessly charge into the next, potentially even more intense, cycle of technological competition.
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