Lantu Auto, the premium new energy vehicle brand under Dongfeng Motor Group, has recently drawn market attention with its unconventional "introduction listing" approach in Hong Kong.
As Dongfeng's flagship premium brand, Lantu has strengthened core team cohesion and shareholder synergy through equity restructuring. However, its product portfolio reveals excessive reliance on a single model.
Despite seemingly positive revenue and profitability, structural imbalances in its business and customer complaints over delivery delays and quality issues pose challenges to sustainable growth.
01 Dongfeng's "New Darling" On October 2, 2025, Lantu Auto officially filed for a Hong Kong listing. Unlike traditional IPOs, Lantu opted for an introduction listing, which involves no new share issuance or capital raising. This allows early shareholders an exit path while bypassing fresh funding.
Dongfeng Group holds a 79.67% stake, maintaining absolute control. In July 2025, Dongfeng further consolidated its ownership to secure decision-making power over Lantu's technology roadmap (e.g., "Lanhai Intelligent Hybrid" R&D), production capacity (Wuhan plant expansion), and brand positioning (premium NEV market).
Wuhan Woya, a 7.35% shareholder, serves as Lantu's employee stock ownership platform. Key executives, including Chairman Lu Fang, hold stakes through this entity, with Lu's shares valued at over 40 million yuan based on a mid-range H-share valuation of HK$11.735 per share.
Lantu's equity structure has undergone multiple adjustments since its 2021 inception. External investors like ICBC Financial and ABC Financial joined in January 2023, while strategic shifts in July 2025 saw the exit of Ganfeng Lithium (supply chain investor) and Dongfeng Jiao Bank Fund (financial investor), replaced by Dongfeng Asset to sharpen strategic focus.
02 Severe "Over-Specialization" Positioned in the RMB 200,000–500,000 premium segment, Lantu reported impressive sales growth: 19,409 units in 2022, 50,285 in 2023, and 80,116 in 2024, with a 103.2% CAGR.
Yet sales are lopsided. In 2025's first seven months, the Dreamer MPV accounted for 60.15% of total sales (40,111 units), while the Zhui Guang sedan managed only 1,768 units and the Zhi Yin SUV 6,575 units.
This heavy MPV reliance raises concerns, as SUVs dominate China's NEV market (51% share in 2024 vs. MPV's 3.4%). Projections show SUVs growing to 56.3% by 2029, while MPVs remain niche at 4.1%.
Customer grievances compound the problem. Complaints on platforms like Che Zhi Net cite delayed Zhi Yin SUV deliveries ("promised October 2025 release still undelivered") and quality issues with the Zhui Guang ("water leakage, wiring short-circuits causing fires").
03 The Subsidy-Dependent "Profit" Lantu boasts soaring revenues: RMB 6.05 billion (2022), RMB 12.75 billion (2023), RMB 19.36 billion (2024), and RMB 15.78 billion (Jan–Jul 2025), with gross margins climbing from 8.3% to 21.3%.
However, Morgan Stanley analysis reveals a grim reality: while Lantu posted RMB 434 million net profit for Jan–Jul 2025, this relied on RMB 642 million government subsidies. Adjusting for capitalized costs and taxes, the bank estimates an underlying RMB 2 billion loss—far exceeding the reported profit.
Notably, Lantu's R&D costs are below industry averages, partly due to leveraging Dongfeng Group's existing research. This raises questions about whether Dongfeng Automobile Co.,Ltd. (600006.SH) shareholders indirectly subsidize Lantu's operations.
As Lantu steps into the spotlight, its product imbalance, subsidy-driven profitability, and eroding consumer trust loom large—issues demanding urgent resolution for long-term viability.
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