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iQiyi Inc. was once one of the most dazzling stars among US-listed Chinese stocks, with its share price reaching a peak of $46 and its market capitalization exceeding $30 billion, earning it high investor hopes as the "Netflix of China." However, it now hovers near the $1 delisting threshold, having lost over 90% of its market value.
The 2025 annual report reveals that this long-form video platform, which once came close to profitability, has once again fallen into a loss-making quagmire. Full-year revenue was RMB 27.29 billion, marking a second consecutive year of decline. Net profit attributable to shareholders plummeted from a peak profit of RMB 1.925 billion in 2023 to a loss of RMB 206 million in 2025. All four of its core business segments—membership, advertising, content distribution, and other revenue—experienced declines. Operating cash flow plunged from over RMB 2 billion to just over RMB 100 million, while content costs remained high.
Simultaneously, the impact from short-form video and short dramas continues to intensify. In 2025, the average daily usage time of short drama users surpassed that of long-form video for the first time. The share of long-form video in total user online time shrank from 17.8% to 11.3%. Faced with internal and external challenges, is AI iQiyi's "last card to play"?
From "Netflix of China" to a Value Trap: iQiyi's Market Cap Drops 97%
From its glorious IPO in 2018 to its peak of $46 in early 2021, and now struggling near $1, iQiyi's share price trajectory resembles a classic case study of a US-listed Chinese stock bubble bursting. Over seven years, its market capitalization evaporated from over $30 billion to just around $1.1 billion, a drop exceeding 90%. Its current share price of approximately $1.16 and the stock chart repeatedly testing the $1 delisting line not only signal its marginalization in the secondary market but also reflect the harsh reality that the entire long-form video industry has become a "value trap" in the eyes of capital.
Revenue Declines, Profit Turns to Loss, All Four Core Business Segments Fall
From a revenue perspective, iQiyi's revenue was RMB 29.0 billion in 2022, down 5% year-over-year. It surged to RMB 31.873 billion in 2023, a 10% increase, largely driven by the hit drama "The Knockout." However, revenue declined for two consecutive years thereafter, dropping to RMB 29.23 billion in 2024 (down 8%) and further to RMB 27.29 billion in 2025 (down 7%). Under US GAAP, the company reported a loss of RMB 136 million in 2022, achieved its first true GAAP profit of RMB 1.925 billion in 2023, saw net profit plunge about 60% to RMB 764.1 million in 2024, and swung to a net loss of RMB 206 million in 2025, a decline exceeding 126%.
Breaking down by business segment, all four core segments—membership services, online advertising, content distribution, and other revenue—declined year-over-year in 2025, with drops of 5%, 9%, 12%, and 4% respectively. Membership service revenue, the "ballast" accounting for 61.6% of total revenue, was RMB 16.81 billion in 2025, down approximately 5%. The company attributed this to a "slower pace of content releases and a relatively lighter content lineup." While 2025 did see productions like "All Things Grow," which achieved high platform popularity second only to "The Knockout," and "Strange Tales of Tang Dynasty: Chang'an," which received some acclaim, the fundamental issue is that none could replicate the phenomenal new user acquisition effect of "The Knockout."
Furthermore, online advertising revenue in 2025 was RMB 5.19 billion, down 9% year-over-year. The financial report cited "advertisers adjusting strategies in response to macroeconomic pressures," but this is only superficial. The deeper crisis lies in the irreversible shift of advertisers' budgets towards short-form video platforms. Content distribution revenue was RMB 2.5 billion in 2025, down 12%, attributed by the company to a "decrease in barter transactions." As content resource swaps between platforms become more rational, the continued contraction of this segment signifies a narrowing secondary monetization channel for iQiyi's content assets. When self-produced content neither efficiently drives membership growth nor generates substantial returns through distribution, the ROI of content investment deteriorates comprehensively.
In 2025, iQiyi's operating cash flow plummeted from over RMB 2 billion to just over RMB 100 million. As of the end of 2025, cash and equivalents stood at only about RMB 5 billion. Considering the company's annual content cost payment of approximately RMB 15.45 billion, the current cash flow level indicates an extremely fragile ability to withstand risks. If the pace of content investment is forced to contract, it would further drag down membership and advertising revenue.
iQiyi's Secret Filing for Hong Kong Listing: A Long-Form Video Giant's Capital Self-Rescue and AI Narrative
In 2026, iQiyi confidentially submitted an application form to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange for the listing and trading permission of its Class A ordinary shares on the Main Board. On the same day, the company's board approved a share repurchase plan authorizing the buyback of up to $100 million worth of shares (including in the form of American Depositary Shares) over the next 18 months.
iQiyi stated in its announcement that the proposed listing aims to enhance its financing channels in the Hong Kong capital market, broaden its investor base by increasing exposure to Asian institutional and retail investors, and elevate its international profile. However, many market investors believe iQiyi's Hong Kong IPO push may stem from the company being "short on cash"—with its market value severely shrunken, average daily trading volume persistently low, secondary market financing function weakening, and significant funding needs for betting on AI.
The rapid rise of short-form video and short dramas is no longer just a "supplementary option" in the content landscape but represents a structural disruption to the business logic of long-form video platforms. For iQiyi, this impact is affecting its fundamentals across multiple dimensions: user time, advertising revenue, member value, and content investment returns.
Meanwhile, the impact of short dramas is formidable. According to QuestMobile's "2025 China Mobile Internet Annual Report," the average daily usage time of short drama users reached 118 minutes in 2025, surpassing the 109 minutes of the long-form video industry for the first time. The share of long-form video in total user online time plummeted from 17.8% in 2023 to 11.3% in 2025, while short dramas rose from 2.7% to 10.8%, bringing the two nearly on par.
Amid these internal and external challenges, AI has become iQiyi's core narrative. At the iQiyi World Conference 2026 held in Beijing on April 20, founder and CEO Gong Yu took the stage to outline a grand vision of AI transforming the film and television industry. His statements quickly ignited public discussion, including claims that "live-action filming may become intangible cultural heritage in the future," "AI can enable actors to star in 14 dramas a year instead of 4," and that "over a hundred artists have already joined the AI artist library." Following his speech, numerous related topics trended online.
iQiyi is attempting to shift from its past model as a centralized long-form video platform characterized by "heavy investment and full-chain involvement" towards a decentralized social media platform driven by AI technology and centered on creators, combining a "creator and user community with premium content production." Whether the AI narrative can translate into tangible financial results and whether the impact of short dramas can be mitigated by ecosystems like "Nadou Pro" are questions iQiyi must answer for market investors. The secret filing is just the first step. The real test lies ahead: as the urgency of being "short on cash" collides with the long-term nature of "transformation," whether iQiyi still has sufficient chips and time to navigate the risks remains to be seen.
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