On January 29, Bluefocus Intelligent Communications Group Co.,Ltd. (300058) announced its forecast, projecting a net profit attributable to shareholders of 180 million to 220 million yuan for 2025, with a non-GAAP net profit of 220 million to 260 million yuan. This stands in stark contrast to its 2024 performance, which saw a net loss attributable to shareholders of 291 million yuan and a non-GAAP net loss of 331 million yuan.
Just as investors were beginning to celebrate the turnaround from loss to profit, on January 30, the company's Chairman, Zhao Wenquan, announced his plan to reduce his holdings by up to 20 million shares, representing 0.5571% of the company's total share capital. Director and Deputy General Manager Xiong Jian also planned to sell up to 354,500 shares, or 0.0099% of the total. Based on the closing price of 23.33 yuan per share on January 30, Zhao Wenquan could cash out approximately 467 million yuan, while Xiong Jian could realize around 8.27 million yuan, bringing their combined potential proceeds to a staggering 475 million yuan!
While it is the fundamental right of major shareholders to reduce their holdings in accordance with regulations, the timing and manner of such plans reflect the attitude of a company's management and major shareholders towards ordinary retail investors. Announcing a sell-off immediately after reporting a return to profitability—could this be an attempt to drive down the share price and lure in new retail investors? Major shareholders of listed companies often enjoy significant perks with costs borne by the company; for them to start "collecting money" from the secondary market the moment performance improves seems particularly ungracious.
Bluefocus is an advertising company, and by acting in this manner, it has effectively created a foolish advertisement for itself. Viewed from the broader perspective of the stock market, the eagerness of a major shareholder to cash out immediately after a company turns a profit means Bluefocus has also delivered a negative advertisement for the entire Chinese stock market.
Looking at Bluefocus's stock price trajectory, it surged rapidly from just over 6 yuan per share in late October 2025 to around 24 yuan per share. From the perspective of a major shareholder, a price above 24 yuan indeed presents an excellent opportunity to sell and realize gains. However, from the "rearview mirror" of market trends, retail investors might argue it would have been better for the major shareholder to sell when the price was between 8 and 9 yuan per share in late 2025 because: 1) Selling at that lower level might have prevented the price from rising to its current high, potentially trapping fewer investors; 2) At that time, no profit-turnaround news had been announced, avoiding speculation about cashing out on positive news; and 3) Selling at a relatively low price would not have reinforced the image of "competing with retail investors for profits."
This principle applies not only to Bluefocus but to any listed company: major shareholders should ideally choose to reduce their holdings when the stock price is at a relative low, avoiding the perception of competing with retail investors for gains. They should particularly avoid selling on the back of positive news and must never engineer positive news to facilitate their sell-off. Only by selling at relatively lower price levels can major shareholders improve the perception of the share reduction mechanism and help rebuild a more harmonious relationship between large and small shareholders.
As for whether Bluefocus colluded with specific institutions to stage this sequence of events, or whether there was any conspiracy to manipulate the stock price, this is a matter for the relevant authorities to investigate and determine.
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