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Wang Jianlin spent three years selling plazas, and Xu Jiayin's liquidators spent a year and a half selling property management assets, yet the final buyer turned out to be the same institution: PAG. After the market close on October 28, the sale and purchase agreement for Evergrande Property Services Group Ltd (HKEX: 6666) was signed. Before the open on October 30, the company and the buyer jointly announced that PAG would pay HK$4.026 billion in cash to acquire 5.515 billion shares, or 51.016% of the issued share capital, from the liquidating China Evergrande and its offshore holding platform, equivalent to HK$0.8359 per share. On the resumption of trading that day, the stock fell 17.7% to close at HK$0.97, 16% above the offer price.
Headquartered in Hong Kong, PAG is an alternative investment firm with more than US$55 billion in assets under management. It is accustomed to taking control of distressed companies and then overhauling their operations, earning it the market nickname "Asia's Blackstone." Its predecessor was Pacific Alliance founded in 2002. In 2010, Chris Gradel, Jon-Paul Toppino and Weijian Shan consolidated their respective businesses under one brand, with Shan bringing the private equity arm. In March 2022, PAG filed a listing application with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to raise US$2 billion, but postponed it in August of that year due to market conditions and remains unlisted to this day. Since 2021, PAG has successively acquired control of Wanda Commercial Management, the property rights to 48 Wanda Plazas and a controlling stake in Evergrande Property Services. The three assets are of different types, but the sellers are all disposing of assets.
PAG Buys 51% of Evergrande Property Services for HK$4 Billion. The buyer entity is Everest Holdings I Limited, wholly owned by PAG Fund IV under PAG, a special purpose vehicle set up for this transaction. There are two sellers: China Evergrande directly held 1.361% of Evergrande Property Services, while its offshore platform CEG Holdings held 49.655%. Both have entered liquidation proceedings, with liquidators signing the agreement as agents. The transaction is priced in two tiers. The 1.361% held by China Evergrande is priced at HK$0.8359 per share, while the 49.655% held by CEG Holdings is priced at HK$0.7271 per share, with PAG simultaneously assuming about RMB 500 million of taxes and other liabilities at the CEG level. The two prices differ by HK$0.1088, and multiplied by the corresponding share scale, the amount is equivalent to that RMB 500 million. The sellers receive roughly equal amounts per share, with the difference being that part of the money does not go through share payment but is used directly to offset CEG's debts. The cash consideration is HK$4.026 billion, and together with the assumed liabilities, the comprehensive cost is about HK$4.5 billion. Under Hong Kong's Takeovers Code, having acquired more than half of the shares, PAG must make an unconditional mandatory cash offer to the remaining 48.98% of shareholders at HK$0.8359, a price not lower than the highest price it paid for shares during the offer period and the preceding six months. The announcement explicitly states no right to raise the price is reserved. If all shareholders accept, the maximum total consideration would be about HK$9.037 billion. The transaction has not yet become effective. It must first pass antitrust review by the State Administration for Market Regulation, with the deadline as late as February 12, 2027. On the day of the announcement, that approval had not yet been obtained. On the last trading day before suspension, Evergrande Property Services closed at HK$1.185, meaning HK$0.8359 represents a 29.5% discount. Net asset value per share at the end of June 2026 was HK$0.2267, meaning the same price represents a 268.7% premium. The simultaneous discount and premium arise because net assets have been written down. The RMB 13.4 billion deposit pledge case was fully provisioned in 2021, leaving Evergrande Property Services with book equity of only just over RMB 2 billion, so the price-to-book ratio no longer reflects asset quality. A more effective reference is the price-to-earnings ratio: the overall consideration of HK$9.04 billion corresponds to about 8.4 times the 2025 net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 986 million. The average 2026 forecast P/E of mainstream property management companies is in the low teens, with Poly Property at 8.6 times and China Resources Mixc Lifestyle at 18.8 times. PAG's purchase price is below the industry average, sitting at the upper end of the 6 to 8 times range common in M&A deals.
The deal itself is dramatic. In October 2021, Hopson Development offered HK$20.04 billion to buy 50.1% of Evergrande Property Services, equivalent to HK$3.7 per share, but the deal collapsed within 20 days. Five years later, the same controlling stake is valued at one-fifth of that. Back then Evergrande had not yet formally entered liquidation and could still negotiate over the price; now the auction is led by liquidators who contacted more than 160 potential institutions, and PAG ultimately became the one to strike the hammer. In the first half of 2026, Evergrande Property Services reported revenue of RMB 6.943 billion, up 4.5% year on year; net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 517 million, up 9.5%; and a gross margin of 19.2%, up 1.2 percentage points year on year. Its managed area of 603 million square meters ranks among the top three in the industry. Its revenue sources have already changed. Evergrande Property Services collects property fees from homeowners, of which 99.8% come from projects outside Evergrande, most of them taken over outside the system after the parent company ran into trouble. This stable cash flow base is precisely an important reason PAG is willing to act. After years of divestiture, this property management company has broken free from the business ties of its property developer parent, relying on property fees from existing communities and community services for continuous income. It still has RMB 4.244 billion of available funds on its books and no interest-bearing debt, making it suitable for a private equity fund skilled in existing-asset operational transformation to hold long term, compressing costs and realizing returns through refined management. But the historical baggage will not automatically disappear with the share transfer. The heaviest burden remains the RMB 13.4 billion deposit pledge case. Although full impairment was already recognized and a favorable judgment was obtained in the related litigation, actual recovery is only about RMB 9.5 million, and the long recovery cycle will continue to consume management's energy. As of the end of June, the company's trade receivables were RMB 2.923 billion, of which RMB 2.089 billion of related-party accounts had been fully impaired, compounded by legacy issues such as project warranty obligations in some communities and homeowner disputes, which continue to drag on valuation. At the same time, its growth ceiling is clear: China Evergrande Property will no longer add new delivery projects, so future managed scale can only rely on external expansion and M&A, and there is limited room to raise property fees. On the day trading resumed, the stock closed at HK$0.97, above the offer price, which also shows clear market divergence: everyone recognizes its ability to operate independently, but is unwilling to pay a higher premium for unresolved old accounts. By taking control, PAG is betting on operational improvement, not on surprise recoveries from historical bad debts.
Wanda Commercial Management's RMB 60 Billion Investment and the Transfer of 48 Plazas. PAG's largest domestic investment is in Wanda, starting with an agreement that included a repurchase clause. In August 2021, Zhuhai Wanda Commercial Management pushed for a Hong Kong listing, with PAG leading 22 institutions to invest RMB 38 billion, of which PAG contributed US$2.8 billion. The agreement stipulated that Zhuhai Wanda Commercial Management had to complete its listing by the end of 2023, otherwise Dalian Wanda would repurchase the shares at an agreed return. Zhuhai Wanda Commercial Management submitted its prospectus four times, all unsuccessful. As the bet deadline approached, repurchase pressure concentrated on Dalian Wanda. On December 12, 2023, PAG and Dalian Wanda Commercial Management signed an investment framework agreement; on March 30, 2024, the RMB 60 billion investment agreement was formally signed, led by PAG with participation from CITIC Capital, funds under Ares Management, Platinum Peony under the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Mubadala Investment Company. The new holding platform was Dalian Xindameng Commercial Management Co., Ltd. ("Xindameng"), with investors holding a combined 60% and Dalian Wanda Commercial Management holding 40%, and investors taking six of the ten board seats. In September 2024, Xindameng's registered capital increased from RMB 16.21 billion to RMB 40.52 billion, the legal representative and chairman changed from Xiao Guangrui to PAG partner and co-head of private equity David Wong, and the RMB 60 billion investment was received. After the platform was established, Wanda Plaza project companies began to be transferred in batches. In May 2025, the State Administration for Market Regulation disclosed that PAG, Gaoho Capital, Tencent, JD.com and Sunshine Life directly or through affiliates jointly established a joint venture to acquire 100% equity in 48 project companies directly or indirectly held by Dalian Wanda Commercial Management. These 48 companies are project companies of Wanda Plazas, distributed across 39 cities, with a market-estimated transaction amount of about RMB 50 billion. In 2026, the deal entered the delivery stage. Two plazas in Shanghai Songjiang and Quanzhou Puxi were acquired by Suzhou Anyi Fund under PAG for RMB 2.198 billion, obtaining 99.9995% of the platform's equity, while project companies in Xiamen Jimei, Putian, Yibin and Zhanjiang completed industrial and commercial registration changes one after another. According to incomplete statistics from market institutions, Wanda has transferred more than 80 plazas since 2023, and of the more than 500 currently operating, only about 60 still have property rights held by Wanda itself. Leasing, operations and branding remain under Wanda Commercial Management. Personnel adjustments at the operating level are proceeding in parallel. In 2025, Zhuhai Wanda Commercial Management reported revenue of RMB 28.49 billion and net profit of RMB 7.97 billion, with occupancy maintained above 97%. Xiao Guangrui stepped down as chief executive in July 2025, and Xu Fen, who came from the Wanda system, took over in January 2026. In April 2026, the company adjusted its registered capital, and some former Wanda management exited. There is a clear difference in the entry logic of the two deals: the Wanda deal was additional investment after an existing investment triggered a bet crisis, making it a passive entry, while Evergrande Property Services was a public bid under a liquidation framework.
Yingde Gases: A Controlling Buyout That Took Eight Years. Yingde Gases is the only domestic project where PAG completed a controlling acquisition, business integration and operational transformation and has already exited most of its stake. Wanda Commercial Management is still in the holding stage, and Evergrande Property Services has just signed the acquisition agreement and has not yet delivered. Although Tencent Music achieved a full exit, it was an early financial minority investment rather than a controlling buyout and transformation. In March 2017, PAG launched a general offer for Hong Kong-listed Yingde Gases at HK$6 per share, with the offer valued at about HK$11.27 billion in total. Considering the 23.61% stake already held before the offer and irrevocable commitments of 41.86% from shareholders including Zhao Xiangti and Sun Zhongguo, the actual cost was about HK$10 billion. The offer became unconditional in April that year, with PAG and concert parties holding a combined 53.87% and becoming the largest shareholder, ending a shareholder dispute that had lasted more than three months. In June 2018, 51% of Baosteel Gas was listed on the Shanghai United Assets and Equity Exchange with a reserve price of RMB 1.956 billion. The deal closed in August, with PAG winning the bid for RMB 4.166 billion while Baosteel Metal retained 49%. Two years later, PAG increased its stake to 63.82%. In July 2021, PAG pushed for the integration of Yingde Gases and Baosteel Gas, establishing Gas Power Technology Co., Ltd. as a unified operating platform. After the merger, the company's 2020 revenue was RMB 19.4 billion, accounting for 22.3% of domestic independent industrial gas producers' revenue. Operating data during the holding period changed markedly. EBITDA rose from about RMB 2.6 billion in 2016 to nearly RMB 7 billion in 2023, with annual profit exceeding RMB 3 billion. The revenue share of clean energy products increased from 7.3% in 2018 to 19.7% in 2020. The exit came in two steps. In November 2024, PAG signed agreements with Hangzhou Capital, Ping An Life, Sunshine Life and others to establish Hangzhou Yingde Gases Co., Ltd. as the acquisition vehicle to buy Gas Power's core industrial gas business at a valuation of about RMB 50 billion. Ping An Life contributed RMB 3.75 billion for 20%, and Sunshine Life contributed RMB 1.5 billion for 8%, while Hangzhou Yingde's registered capital increased from RMB 100 million to RMB 18.75 billion. The transaction completed in January 2025 with consideration of about US$6.8 billion. PAG sold its controlling stake and retained a 25% stake and the clean energy business, making it one of the largest controlling exits in China's private equity market. The second step was completed in January 2026. On January 29, PAG announced the completion of the delivery of the transfer of Anyang Yingde to chemical group Indorama Corporation. Anyang Yingde is located in Anyang, Henan, and produces urea, ammonia and syngas as part of Gas Power's clean energy business segment; the transfer amount was not disclosed. Returns across different projects vary enormously. In 2013, PAG invested about US$137 million in China Music Corporation, pushed for its merger with Tencent Music, and exited in 2020 with cumulative gains of US$2.607 billion, about 18 times the initial investment—figures from PAG's prospectus. In December 2020, PAG invested US$100 million to subscribe for Nayuki shares at a cost of about HK$8.5 per share and held 5.28% after listing through its PAGAC Nebula Holdings Limited. In September 2024, PAG reduced its holding by 24.321 million shares, cutting its stake to 3.88%, and has not disclosed further changes since. Nayuki has posted losses for years after listing, with cumulative losses exceeding RMB 6 billion from 2021 to 2025 and another RMB 97 million loss in the first half of 2026; based on the November 2 closing price of HK$0.7, the stock has fallen about 92% from PAG's cost of about HK$8.5 per share.
PAG's M&A Logic. Wanda Commercial Management and Evergrande Property Services share the same type of target: both are service platforms under distressed companies, with revenue from management fees and property fees, and neither holds land or property. After gaining control, PAG does not take them private but keeps their listing status and improves operations by changing directors and adjusting assessment metrics. The entry methods of the two deals differ. Wanda was additional investment after a bet matured, while Evergrande Property Services was a public bid in liquidation proceedings. The common point lies in timing: the sellers are disposing of assets, and the room for negotiation is determined by the seller's circumstances. PAG used its fourth US dollar fund to buy Evergrande Property Services. Funds have terms, and before maturity they must convert assets into cash and return it to the underlying investors—institutions such as pension funds and sovereign funds. So this investment must eventually find an exit: either reduce holdings in the secondary market after the share price rises, or bring in new shareholders, or sell the company to a peer. At the same time, PAG is preparing for the long term. In June 2026, PAG's first RMB fund landed in Suzhou with a first close of RMB 3.1 billion, dedicated to M&A. Previously, all of its domestic investments used US dollars. A foreign institution starting to raise RMB funds shows it does not intend to make this business a one-off deal. The significance of this transaction also lies here. In recent years, distressed developers disposing of assets have mostly been dragged along with the parent company's debt restructuring; Evergrande Property Services took a different route—control was sold directly to a financial institution, the company continued operating as usual, and creditors received cash. The 8.4 times P/E ratio also shows another thing: during the industry peak in 2021, property stocks generally traded at more than 30 times earnings, and buyers were betting that new projects delivered by the parent company each year could be continuously injected; now that the parent company has collapsed, the automatic growth story no longer holds, and buyers are only paying for the profit it can currently determine. The pricing of property management companies has shifted from a growth-stock calculation to a rent-collecting asset calculation. For PAG, there are still three hurdles between putting in money and getting cash back. The first is antitrust approval; if not approved, the deal terminates. The second is how to use that RMB 4.244 billion in cash. A large dividend could allow PAG to quickly recover part of its cost, but a considerable portion of that money corresponds to prepaid property fees, and taking it out would affect the company's working capital. The third is the RMB 13.4 billion recovery effort, of which about RMB 9.5 million has been recovered; if this money cannot be collected, the company's valuation will remain under pressure. Wang Jianlin's Wanda Commercial Management has still not reached listing, and Xu Jiayin's debts have still not been fully divided, yet the most valuable platforms of both companies have already changed hands. What was bought for HK$4 billion—is it a property management company that has escaped its dependence on Evergrande and continues to generate cash, or an asset long dragged down by historical bad debts? The answer will only be revealed after antitrust approval lands, the board restructuring is completed, and several years of operational testing have passed.
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