A private energy giant that held Shanxi's richest family title for seven consecutive years is now mired in an unprecedented crisis of confidence.
Recently, numerous employees of Meijin Steel have spoken out on social platforms such as Douyin and Weibo, claiming the company has withheld wages for as long as seven months.
Meanwhile, information from Tianyancha shows that the total enforcement amount against Yao Junhua, one of the actual controllers of the listed company Meijin Energy, is approaching 2 billion yuan, and Qingxu County Jinhuitong Microfinance Co., Ltd., where she serves as legal representative, has also been placed under consumption restrictions by a court.
More tellingly, when investors directly asked on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's Hudongyi platform whether wages had been unpaid for half a year, the company's response only mentioned "normal operations" and "cash flow of 679 million yuan," sidestepping the core question entirely.
From Two Old Trucks to a Multi-Billion Empire
The origins of the Meijin Group can be traced back to 1981, when 49-year-old Yao Juhuo borrowed 16,000 yuan to purchase two old trucks for a transport business, launching the family's journey to wealth.
In 1983, he founded a coal processing plant; in 1985, he established Shanxi's first private coke railway transport station; and in 1989, he invested 50 million yuan to build mechanized coke ovens—several times the entire fiscal revenue of Qingxu County at the time.
After the turn of the millennium, Yao Juhuo gathered his six children to jointly establish Meijin Group, with shares allocated as "25% for the eldest son and 12.5% for each of the other five children," laying the basic framework for family governance.
In 2007, Meijin Energy listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange through a reverse merger with Tianyu Electric, stock code 000723, officially bringing the Yao family into the capital market spotlight.
Over the following decade, Meijin Group gradually built an integrated industrial chain of "coal—coke—gas—chemicals—hydrogen," owning four operating coal mines (Fenxi Taiyue, Dongyu Coal, Jinfu Coal, and Jinhui Coal) with approved capacity totaling 6.3 million tons per year, coke production capacity of 10.95 million tons per year, and supplying over 40% of Taiyuan's city gas.
From 2017 to 2023, the Yao Junliang family was named Shanxi's richest for seven consecutive years, peaking at 32.9 billion yuan in 2022.
In August 2025, Meijin Energy announced that Gao Fane, widow of the founder, had passed away, and her shares in Meijin Group were inherited by the six children.
After the change, Meijin Group's equity structure became: eldest son Yao Junliang holding 27%, eldest daughter Yao Junhua holding 15%, and Yao Junjie, Yao Sanjun, Yao Sijun, and Yao Junqing each holding 14.5%.
Meijin Group directly holds 37.35% of the listed company Meijin Energy, making it the controlling shareholder.
The third-generation successor Yao Jinlong (son of Yao Junliang) serves as chairman of the listed company but does not hold equity in Meijin Group.
Notably, the pledge ratio of Meijin Group's shares in the listed company has reached approximately 99.99%—almost entirely pledged, with 73.30% of the pledged equity maturing within the next year, showing a concentrated maturity schedule.
This means that if the stock price continues to fall and hits the liquidation line, it could trigger passive reduction of holdings or even a change of control risk.
Beyond the listed company, the Yao family also controls a series of non-listed entities, forming a vast "Meijin system" empire.
The group's Shanxi Meijin Steel Co., Ltd., covering 2,400 mu with annual production of 2 million tons of construction steel, is a major supplier for Taiyuan's urban infrastructure, accounting for 85% of government procurement.
This company is precisely the core entity in the current wage arrears controversy.
As the controlling platform at the apex of the entire Meijin pyramid, Meijin Group's own financial condition is even more severe than that of the listed company.
According to the group's consolidated financial data, from 2021 to 2025, group revenue declined from 30.109 billion yuan to 23.569 billion yuan, a cumulative shrinkage of over 6.5 billion yuan in five years.
Net profit fell off a cliff—from 3.523 billion yuan in 2021 and 2.662 billion yuan in 2022, plummeting to 46 million yuan in 2023, turning to a loss of -1.362 billion yuan in 2024, continuing to lose 744 million yuan in 2025, and losing another 687 million yuan in the first half of 2026.
In just four years, the group level has accumulated losses of nearly 2.8 billion yuan.
The debt-to-asset ratio rose from 54.00% in 2021 to 60.42% by the end of 2025, and though it slightly retreated to 59.61% by the end of June 2026, it remains at a historical high.
More concerning is the deterioration of liquidity indicators: the current ratio dropped from 1.23 in 2022 to 0.84 by the end of June 2026, and the quick ratio fell from 1.13 to 0.79, both breaking below the safety threshold of 1, meaning the group's short-term solvency is severely insufficient.
According to Meijin Energy's 2023 annual report inquiry letter response, Meijin Group defaulted on stock pledge financing with Great Wall Guorui, involving 848.44 million pledged shares and an overdue financing principal balance of 1.985 billion yuan.
At the time, the company stated that "a solution recognized by all parties has basically been formed, and the implementation work is being actively advanced." But to this day, Meijin Group's overdue debts are still being resolved by local government departments together with various parties, and if these overdue debts cannot be successfully resolved, the company could also face the risk of a change of control.
As of June 30, 2026, Meijin Group's total outstanding borrowings reached 22 billion yuan, of which 14.9 billion yuan must be repaid within the next year.
Continuous Losses, Core Business Bleeding, Transformation Stalled
A review of Meijin Energy's financial data over the past five years reveals a clear and alarming downward curve.
In 2021, the company's net profit attributable to shareholders was 2.541 billion yuan—the Yao family's last moment of glory.
In 2022, revenue hit a record high of 24.6 billion yuan, but net profit had already declined to 2.209 billion yuan.
In 2023, profit plummeted to 289 million yuan, a year-on-year drop of 86.92%.
In 2024, the company experienced its first annual loss since listing, with a full-year loss of 1.143 billion yuan.
In 2025, the loss was 1.123 billion yuan—slightly narrower in scale, but the core business's non-GAAP net profit actually worsened by 9.90%.
Entering 2026, the decline accelerated—the first three quarters already showed a loss of 1.018 billion yuan, approaching last year's full-year loss in just three quarters, with third-quarter net profit attributable to shareholders plunging 564.59% year-on-year.
The company attributed the third-quarter deterioration to "coal and coke industry market fluctuations" combined with production declines caused by the "May 22特别major gas explosion accident." But the deeper problem lies in the systematic collapse of profitability: the company's comprehensive gross margin fell from 20.99% in 2022 to approximately 0.77% in the first three quarters of 2026, with core business profitability almost entirely consumed by price declines and safety incidents.
Nearly 98% of Meijin Energy's revenue comes from coal and coke operations, showing extremely high dependence on this traditional core business.
However, since 2024, the coke industry has been trapped in a "three highs and three lows" dilemma—high output, high costs, high inventory, low demand, low prices, and low efficiency.
In 2024, Shanxi coking coal prices fell from 2,560 yuan per ton at the beginning of the year to 1,420 yuan per ton by year-end, a decline of 44.53%.
The decline in coke selling prices far exceeded the decline in raw coal costs, significantly narrowing product gross margins.
In 2024, Meijin Energy's coking industry inventory surged 497.62% year-on-year, which the company explained was due to downstream steel enterprises reducing purchases amid the real estate downturn, pessimistic expectations, and just-in-time procurement.
Although conditions eased somewhat in 2025, with coke sales volume increasing 18.97% year-on-year to 8.108 million tons, revenue actually fell 5.58%, presenting a classic "price-for-volume" pattern.
On the liquidity front, alarms have already sounded.
As of the end of the third quarter of 2026, monetary funds stood at 3.288 billion yuan, but cash and cash equivalents were only 509 million yuan, down approximately 67% from 1.540 billion yuan in the same period last year.
Meanwhile, short-term borrowings were 1.299 billion yuan, non-current liabilities due within one year were 1.916 billion yuan, notes payable were 5.317 billion yuan, and accounts payable were 8.136 billion yuan—creating enormous short-term rigid repayment pressure.
The current ratio dropped from 0.38 in 2024 to 0.35 in the third quarter of 2026, far below the safety line of 1.
The debt-to-asset ratio climbed to 66.86%, and net assets attributable to shareholders continued to shrink from 14.980 billion yuan in 2023 to 12.023 billion yuan.
The interest coverage ratio is negative, and the company relies entirely on refinancing and operating cash collection to maintain operations.
As of October 27, 2026, the guarantee balance of Meijin Energy and its controlled subsidiaries to subsidiaries and associate companies reached 6.776 billion yuan, accounting for 51.77% of the company's latest audited net assets attributable to shareholders.
The density of the guarantee chain reflects the extent of funding strain across the entire listed company system.
In 2017, Meijin Energy announced a high-profile 20 billion yuan investment in the hydrogen energy industry, once seen as a benchmark for traditional energy companies' transformation.
Eight years later, the results are far from ideal.
In 2024, hydrogen energy revenue was 792 million yuan, accounting for only 4.16% of total revenue; in 2025, it further shrank to 409 million yuan, down 48.42% year-on-year, with its share dropping to 2.27%.
More critically, the hydrogen business gross margin was -6.18% in 2024 and worsened to -31.44% in 2025, not only failing to contribute profit but becoming a significant drag.
R&D expenses were drastically cut from 90 million yuan to 60 million yuan, a reduction of 33.47%; R&D personnel decreased from 215 to 185, with R&D staff under 30 years old plummeting from 71 to 19, a drop of 73.24%.
Some hydrogen projects, such as hydrogen fuel cell power systems, have been terminated.
The 2,000 mu of land for the Qingdao Hydrogen Town has still not been approved, and the hydrogen headquarters base has been delayed from June 2024 to June 2026.
The strategic narrative of the hydrogen business has failed to translate into financial returns, instead exacerbating the risk of resource dispersion when the core business is under pressure.
Against this backdrop, in August 2025, Meijin Energy announced plans to issue H-shares overseas and list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, stating the purpose was to "advance global strategic layout and enhance overseas financing capacity," and in September 2025 hired an audit firm to advance related work.
However, there has been no further development since—no announcement of submitting a prospectus to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, nor any further disclosure about the listing progress.
This overseas financing attempt, which the market had high hopes for, has essentially stalled.
With two consecutive years of massive losses and A-share market value shrinking over 80% from its peak, this move seemed more like a desperate attempt to seek external funding, and its current lack of progress further exposes the company's financing difficulties in the capital market: given its current profitability and financial performance, even pivoting to Hong Kong, it would likely struggle to gain recognition from international investors.
Wage Arrears Controversy Continues to Simmer—Silence May Be the Answer
Since the second half of 2026, numerous videos of employees from Meijin-affiliated companies demanding unpaid wages have appeared on Douyin.
"Meijin Steel Co., Ltd., pay your wages, it's been 7 months, where is your conscience"—1,099 likes.
"Meijin Steel Factory doesn't pay wages"—1,155 likes.
"#QingdaoMeijin #LaborBureau #WageArrears Is it so hard for such a big company to pay wages on time"—194 likes.
"Wage arrears, drawing pies every day. #MeijinHuasheng #WageArrears"—412 likes.
According to rough statistics, the entities involved include at least Meijin Steel, Meijin Huasheng (Shanxi Meijin Huasheng Chemical New Materials Co., Ltd.), Qingdao Meijin (Qingdao Meijin Hydrogen Energy Technology Co., Ltd.), and other Meijin subsidiaries, covering locations including Qingxu in Shanxi, Liuzhi in Guizhou, and Qingdao in Shandong, with wage arrears ranging from 6 to 7 months.
Some employees reported being asked to "withdraw" their complaints after filing them.
Business registration information shows that Meijin Steel was established in 2003 with registered capital of 589 million yuan, held 98% by Shanxi Meijin Enterprise Development Co., Ltd. and 2% by Shanxi Meijin Building Materials Co., Ltd.
It is a core subsidiary of Meijin Group's steel industry segment and is not a directly controlled entity of the listed company Meijin Energy.
In other words, the direct responsible party for Meijin Steel's wage arrears is at the group level, but its spillover effects are difficult for the listed company to isolate: first, Meijin Steel and the listed company are in the same "coal—coke—steel" industrial chain, and the steel downturn means continued weak downstream demand for coke; second, after the wage arrears controversy was amplified through social platforms, it has disrupted the overall credit of the "Meijin" brand, and the possibility of affecting the listed company's financing environment and commercial credit cannot be ignored.
Meijin Huasheng and Qingdao Meijin, however, directly belong to the listed company system.
Meijin Huasheng is wholly owned by Meijin Energy, and Qingdao Meijin is indirectly 100% held by Meijin Energy through equity penetration.
On August 24, 2026, an investor asked Meijin Energy on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's Hudongyi platform: "I noticed that the company (000723) has owed employee wages for half a year. Does this mean the company's operating cash flow has suffered a severe rupture? Has it triggered the major risk disclosure circumstances required under the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's Stock Listing Rules? Please have the board secretary respond truthfully within the statutory deadline."
On September 1, 2026, the company replied: "The company's current production and operations are normal. In the first half of 2026, the company's net cash flow from operating activities was 679 million yuan. The company strictly fulfills its information disclosure obligations in accordance with relevant laws and regulations."
This response deserves careful examination word by word.
The investor asked three questions: Have wages been unpaid for half a year? Has cash flow been ruptured? Has the major risk disclosure obligation been triggered?
The company only answered the "safe versions" of the latter two questions.
Regarding "whether wages have been unpaid for half a year," the core factual question, the company neither denied it as "untrue" nor confirmed "no wage arrears exist"—it completely avoided the question.
According to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's Stock Listing Rules, listed companies should disclose information truthfully, accurately, completely, and timely, without false records, misleading statements, or major omissions.
When investors explicitly raise wage arrears concerns, the listed company's silence itself is a signal.
If the wage arrears were untrue, a simple statement that "the relevant rumors are untrue" would clarify matters; choosing to avoid the question often means the problem does exist but is inconvenient to publicly acknowledge.
In fact, Meijin Energy's shortcomings in information disclosure and corporate governance have long been flagged by regulators.
On June 12, 2026, the company and five senior executives—including Chairman Yao Jinlong, President Yao Junqing, CFO Zheng Caixia, Board Secretary Zhao Jia, and former Board Secretary Zhu Qinghua—received the "Decision on Taking Warning Letter Measures Against Shanxi Meijin Energy Co., Ltd. and Related Responsible Persons" ([2026] No. 32) issued by the Shanxi Securities Regulatory Bureau.
Investigation revealed three major violations: first, failure to timely review and disclose the use of certain raised funds for cash management; second, non-standard management of dedicated raised fund accounts; third, non-standard registration and management of insider information recipients.
The Shanxi Securities Regulatory Bureau uniformly adopted warning letter supervisory measures against the company and the five responsible persons, recording them in the securities and futures market integrity database, and requiring written rectification reports within 30 working days.
More notably, Meijin Energy's 2026 third-quarter report shows that "cash paid to and on behalf of employees" in the first three quarters was 644 million yuan, down 16.88% year-on-year.
By quarter, Q1 through Q3 expenditures were 230 million yuan, 216 million yuan, and 198 million yuan respectively, declining each quarter, with year-on-year drops of 15.47%, 9.28%, and 25.18%—the Q3 decline was significantly larger.
As of the end of the third quarter of 2026, employee compensation payable was 232 million yuan, a surge of 118.29% compared to the same period last year.
For a heavy-asset enterprise with thousands of employees, whether this increase corroborates the wage arrears controversy deserves further investigation.
Meanwhile, Yao Junhua, one of the actual controllers of Meijin Energy, is facing severe judicial risks.
Tianyancha information shows that Yao Junhua is involved in two enforcement cases as the person subject to enforcement: (2026) Jin 01 Zhi Hui No. 328, with an enforcement amount of 736 million yuan; and (2026) Jin 01 Zhi Hui No. 327, with an enforcement amount of 1.259 billion yuan.
Both cases were filed by the Taiyuan Intermediate People's Court of Shanxi Province on August 18, 2026, with total enforcement amounts of approximately 1.995 billion yuan.
The filing date was just before the investor's Hudongyi question on August 24.
Additionally, Qingxu County Jinhuitong Microfinance Co., Ltd., where Yao Junhua serves as legal representative, has been placed under consumption restrictions twice by a court.
The company is also involved as a person subject to enforcement in case (2026) Jin 0121 Zhi Hui No. 16, with an enforcement amount of 5.1142 million yuan, filed by Qingxu County People's Court on February 4, 2026, and has 9 historical enforcement records.
One of the listed company's actual controllers having personal enforcement amounts approaching 2 billion yuan, with her private financial platform also mired in judicial disputes, is not an isolated personal debt problem but a microcosm of the entire Meijin system's funding chain strain.
Microfinance companies are typically tools for internal fund allocation within corporate groups and channels for external lending to generate returns.
When a microfinance company itself becomes a subject of enforcement and consumption restriction, it indicates that its fund recovery has encountered serious difficulties, or the group behind it can no longer provide liquidity support.
The Real Predicament of a Shanxi Merchant Legend
From starting with two old trucks in 1981 to becoming Shanxi's richest with 32.9 billion yuan in 2022, the Yao family spent over forty years writing a legendary tale of grassroots success.
However, as the coal cycle recedes, as the hydrogen transformation story remains unfulfilled, and as cries of unpaid wages travel from factory floors to social networks, this family stands at a dangerous crossroads.
Meijin Energy's case is not isolated—it is a microcosm of Shanxi's entire coking industry under the triple pressures of cyclical downturn, tightening environmental regulations, and weak demand.
Peer Antai Group lost 300 million yuan in the first three quarters, with revenue plunging 34%.
Coking expert Xu Deping pinpointed the key issue: "Coke profits are being squeezed from both ends by weak steel demand and environmental costs."
But for a listed company, operational difficulties can be understood—information opacity cannot be accepted.
When investors explicitly ask "are wages being withheld," silence is not golden—it is a risk amplifier.
For market participants, what needs attention is not just Meijin Energy's next quarterly financial figures, but whether this family enterprise can rebuild transparency and credibility amid the crisis.
After all, the bottom line of the capital market is not profit—it is trust.
Comments