The United States boasts the world's deepest and most liquid financial markets, with the US dollar long reigning as the undisputed "king of currencies," and US Treasuries widely regarded as the premier safe-haven asset. However, as policy uncertainty from the Trump administration escalates, a "Sell America" narrative is quietly gaining traction among global investors. This concept can be traced back to April 2025, when President Trump, under the banner of "Liberation Day" tariffs, imposed massive trade barriers on dozens of countries, disrupting the global trade system. By early 2026, Trump's push for "controlling Greenland" further angered allies, particularly sparking a strong backlash in Europe, which has rekindled the "Sell America" debate. Foreign capital has long played a crucial role in supporting the high valuations of US equities and financing the nation's fiscal and trade deficits. While there is currently no evidence of a full-scale global capital "boycott of America," even a more modest shift in sentiment could have profound implications for the US dollar, Treasury bonds, and the broader American economy. Market observers note that the US's ability to sustain massive fiscal and trade deficits relies on the so-called "exorbitant privilege"—the near-unshakable global trust in the dollar and US debt, which ensures a continuous inflow of overseas capital into American assets. Should this "spell" be broken, and US assets no longer be perceived as the safest option, the consequences could be severe. A sell-off of US assets by foreign investors could weaken the dollar and shrink the pool of financing available to the US government and corporations. Should import costs rise and borrowing rates climb, the US economy could fall into a vicious cycle, making fiscal deficits harder to sustain and potentially triggering a recession. Markets experienced a brief taste of this scenario following the shock of the "Liberation Day" tariffs, when stocks, bonds, and the dollar were sold off in unison, forcing Trump to retract some of his trade threats. The turbulence was short-lived, and the economy escaped significant damage, but since Trump's return to the White House, the dollar has depreciated by approximately 10%, nearing its weakest level since 2022, indicating investors are gradually reducing their dollar exposure. At the heart of the "Sell America" narrative is growing concern over the rising risks associated with dollar-denominated assets. For decades, foreign investors have consistently flocked to the US, drawn by its deep capital markets, rule of law, commitment to free trade, stable currency system, independent monetary policy, and high sovereign credit rating. Yet, these advantages are showing signs of erosion. In May 2025, Moody's stripped the United States of its last remaining top-tier credit rating, citing long-term fiscal deficit prospects that no longer met AAA standards; at the time, the yield on the 30-year US Treasury note briefly surpassed 5%. Concurrently, Trump's tariff policies have increased costs and heightened uncertainty for multinational corporations, diminishing the US's investment appeal. Adding to market anxieties, Trump's frequent pressure on the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates has sparked concerns about the central bank's independence. Investors worry that unnecessary rate cuts could reignite inflation, further eroding the dollar's purchasing power. In terms of concrete action, the Danish pension fund AkademikerPension has become a poster child for the "Sell America" movement. Following Trump's threats regarding Greenland, the fund announced it would sell approximately $100 million in US Treasury holdings, explicitly stating that the US is now viewed as a credit risk. While this amount is a "drop in the ocean" compared to the $30 trillion US Treasury market, its symbolic significance is considerable. Furthermore, the Dutch pension fund PME has also decided to reduce its allocation to US assets, citing similar concerns about the policy direction of the Trump administration. Meanwhile, the dollar's persistent decline and the strong rally in metal prices since 2025 are partly interpreted as investors seeking alternatives to US stocks and bonds. Japan, with its rising interest rates, is frequently mentioned as a potential alternative market, while PME has indicated a future focus on the European tech sector. However, some analysts argue that a more realistic scenario is not "Selling America," but "Hedging America." This strategy involves investors maintaining holdings of US stocks and bonds while hedging against further dollar depreciation risk using foreign exchange forwards or derivative instruments. Such operations would also exert downward pressure on the dollar, even if capital does not physically exit US securities markets. Data from the US Treasury Department shows that as of June 2024, foreign investors held approximately 21% of the total market value of US securities, including about one-third of Treasury bonds, 27% of corporate bonds, and 18% of US equities. Regarding Treasury holdings, Japan remains the largest foreign holder, with a stake of around $1.2 trillion, followed by the United Kingdom and China. During the height of the Greenland dispute, Deutsche Bank suggested Europe could potentially "weaponize capital" as a countermeasure, causing market jitters that prompted US Treasury Secretary Bessent to subsequently issue clarifications. Experts widely believe it is unlikely European governments would actually use these holdings as tools in an economic conflict, as the majority of US stock and bond assets are held by private institutions, not national governments. Despite the rising risks, "Selling America" remains a difficult proposition. Over the past decade, US corporate profit growth has far outpaced that of other regions. High-tech giants face almost no genuine global competitors, and their digital ecosystems have become unavoidable platforms for global economic activity. The AI wave is likely to attract even more economic value to Silicon Valley, reinforcing US tech dominance. In bond markets, while Australia, New Zealand, and the UK can offer comparable yields, their market sizes are far smaller than that of the US. The euro, a potential alternative to the dollar, is also constrained by structural issues and is unlikely to challenge the dollar's status in the short term. As PME Chairman Alae Laghrich stated, the US "remains an economic powerhouse that cannot be ignored, and it is still possible to achieve positive returns there."
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