China Vanke Co., Ltd. has announced an anticipated loss of 82 billion yuan for 2025, positioning it to surpass HNA as the year's biggest loss-maker on the A-share market. Combined with the 49.5 billion yuan loss in 2024, the company's total losses over two years exceed 130 billion yuan.
Prior to 2024, Vanke was widely regarded as a top performer in the real estate sector. Since its listing in 1991 with the stock code 000002, the company had generated cumulative profits of over 350 billion yuan across 34 years and distributed more than 100 billion yuan in cash dividends. These figures represent net profits attributable to the parent company; when including minority shareholders' interests, Vanke created total profits exceeding 500 billion yuan for all shareholders.
This impressive track record explains the intense corporate battle that once unfolded for control of Vanke, involving major players like China Resources, Shenzhen Metro, Anbang, Baoneng, and Evergrande. Ultimately, Shenzhen Metro spent over 60 billion yuan to acquire stakes from Evergrande and China Resources, while Baoneng exited with substantial profits of 30 billion yuan. The Shenzhen municipal government and SASAC appeared highly satisfied with the outcome at the time.
Eight years later, however, Vanke faces debt crises, massive financial losses, and near-bankruptcy. Shenzhen Metro injected over 30 billion yuan in support, but the financial hole continued to widen. By late last year, the company nearly defaulted on a 2 billion yuan corporate bond. To date, Shenzhen Metro's exposure to Vanke's troubles has reached approximately 100 billion yuan.
With consecutive annual losses totaling 130 billion yuan, the financial gap now appears irreparable.
Earlier this year, an announcement confirmed Yu Liang's retirement upon reaching retirement age. Despite 36 years of service, rising from entry-level positions to chairman, the notice contained no words of appreciation.
As previously discussed in two articles, the primary responsibility lies not with Wang Shi but with Yu Liang. While Zhu Jiusheng may have accelerated the final decline, the original architect was the lesser-known "Chief" Richard Yu—Yu Liang himself.
As a former employee of Vanke Group, including time spent in the group headquarters, I wrote about Wang Shi last year with mixed emotions—part criticism, part sarcasm, but also with some respect and considerable regret.
Wang Shi was a straightforward individual, a genuine official's child whose achievements benefited from era-specific advantages and family background. Though not a true business guru, he was uncomplicated and principled. His upbringing meant he never needed to obsess over minor financial gains, allowing him to focus on broader ambitions.
His life could have followed a glorious script: building an unparalleled enterprise, achieving fame and fortune, and retiring at his peak—leaving behind a legacy of success and humility.
Had he followed this path, even Duan Yongping would have addressed him respectfully as "Chairman Wang."
Unfortunately, Wang Shi was highly narcissistic, a peacock-like personality who cherished his reputation and public admiration. His goal wasn't wealth but idol status—a fatal weakness.
This vulnerability became Yu Liang's stepping stone. Before Yu Liang, potential successors like Yao Youmin, Ding Changfeng, Mo Jun, and Liu Aiming all had strong credentials. However, they were either too assertive, too outstanding, or too professional to flatter Wang Shi. Unlike them, Yu Liang—with a background only in finance and investments, and limited real estate expertise—posed no threat to Wang Shi's prominence while remaining unquestioningly loyal.
Today, Yu Liang appears as a lean, handsome, and authoritative leader. Few recall that before 2011, he was an unassuming, heavier-set figure. Compared to the slender and charismatic Wang Shi, Yu Liang deliberately remained in the background—a strategy of patience befitting an heir apparent.
After gradually sidelining competitors and gaining Wang Shi's trust—especially after Wang relinquished full control—Yu Liang rapidly transformed his image. He lost weight, appeared on the cover of Harper's Bazaar, climbed Mount Everest, engaged with fashion circles, and became a sports enthusiast—running marathons and cycling—shedding his former persona completely.
Wang Shi's weakness also allowed another figure to rise from obscurity to national attention: Tian Pujie.
While Tian primarily tarnished Wang Shi's later years, Yu Liang effectively dismantled Vanke—once a shining example of corporate excellence.
My tenure at Vanke coincided with Yu Liang's consolidation of power and physical transformation. Observing his rapid metamorphosis and eagerness to compensate for years of submission, I grew deeply concerned.
Despite being considered for inner-circle roles, I declined several overtures and chose to leave Vanke to start my own business.
Four years later, I returned to Vanke but opted for a position in the Shanghai branch, distanced from headquarters. Even there, I noticed cultural shifts: prioritizing superiors over substance, and pleasing leadership over genuine business execution. This was no longer the Vanke of Wang Shi's era, prompting my final departure.
Through connections, I've followed the trajectories of former colleagues. Some, recognizing the changing tides early, left Vanke for smaller developers like Excellence or Galaxy, or moved to state-owned enterprises like China Communications Construction or Cinda, securing stability during the industry's downturn.
Others relocated abroad to the U.S., Canada, or Australia.
Most lamentably, my predecessor in the headquarters office—formerly general manager of Vanke Kunming—faced legal issues abroad, was persuaded to return by Yu Liang, and ended up imprisoned.
Some aligned with Zhu Jiusheng ("Ninth Brother") and soon fell from grace.
Liu Xiao, a core member of Yu Liang's investment faction who implemented off-balance-sheet strategies and proposed the "Manhattan Plan," was arrested but released on bail due to extensive implications. It remains uncertain whether he will face further legal consequences.
He Zhuo, now detained, was once a peripheral member of the investment team but later chaired Boson Asset Management—a key off-balance-sheet entity.
Zhu Jiusheng, as an external hire and Vanke president, operated Pengjin Suo, a funding vehicle linked to Vanke that lent to employees and suppliers. Its arbitrage practices were soon exposed, leading to criminal investigations.
In contrast, He Zhuo's Boson Asset Management was structured as an independent entity, pooling investments from employees, suppliers, and public funds—all directed to Vanke projects. It extracted profits classified as minority interests, exceeding those attributable to the parent company in financial reports.
Such entities controlled by former insiders were numerous, often originating from Yu Liang's closer affiliates in the group finance center—subordinates of Wang Wenjin.
One former colleague, who once spent leisure time with me in Dameisha headquarters, rapidly built a purported 10-billion-yuan investment group after my departure. Sensing impending trouble before 2024, he vanished—even erasing previously widespread online publicity.
Corporate records, however, remain. Scrutiny of minority shareholders in Vanke projects would reveal many familiar names.
For instance, a once-top-20 private developer's centralized invoice entity—backed by IDG and holding a mutual fund license—participated deeply in multiple Vanke projects, diverting substantial profits. Its actual controller was Wang Wenjin's subordinate, Yu Liang's neighbor in Shenzhen's Xiangmi Lake, and former chief tax officer of Vanke—now untraceable.
Behind these schemes was Yu Liang's deliberate planning. After the corporate battles and Shenzhen Metro's intervention, realizing he couldn't achieve both fame and fortune, Yu Liang leveraged his financial expertise to systematically hollow out Vanke.
Previously, I hesitated to detail these observations due to uncertainties. Now, facts increasingly validate the intuition and judgments I formed 14 years ago.
Interestingly, after moving to Japan for entrepreneurship, I encountered another individual named Richard—also a major fraudster. Since then, I've harbored apprehension toward people bearing that name.
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