Electronic warfare in the Persian Gulf is severely impacting one of the world's most critical economic choke points, not only disrupting shipping but also increasing the risk of maritime collisions.
Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has been paralyzed due to the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran. This strait is a bottleneck connecting the United Arab Emirates and Iran, through which a large portion of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade flows. Missile and drone attacks are the primary reasons for the sharp decline in shipping volume. There have already been eight attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf, resulting in multiple fatalities.
Furthermore, widespread signal jamming—where attackers use electronic interference technology to disrupt Global Positioning Systems (GPS)—is making safe navigation in this conflict zone even more difficult.
According to maritime intelligence company Windward, electronic jamming began at the onset of the conflict and has recently affected over 1,100 vessels in the Persian Gulf. In addition to GPS technology, the interference also impacts the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which is crucial for navigation. Several ships in the region have already suffered physical attacks.
The direct impact of electronic jamming is immense in a narrow and confined environment like the Strait of Hormuz. Ship-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg shows that traffic has dropped by more than 95% as large crude tankers and LNG carriers avoid the area. The few vessels still departing the Persian Gulf have turned off their location transponders, a common strategy in extremely high-risk waters.
Windward data indicates that only five ships passed through the waterway on March 4, far fewer than the 120 recorded on February 26. Among the recently transiting vessels, only one was identified as a cargo ship. This week, former President Trump stated that the U.S. Navy would escort oil and LNG carriers through the strait if necessary.
Ami Daniel, CEO of Windward, noted that as positioning capabilities degrade, ships face a higher risk of grounding or collision.
"Everyone is jamming constantly," Daniel said. "It's not expensive, so everyone is using it."
Daniel, a former Israeli naval officer, pointed out that signal jamming can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes. This tactic can completely block signals or deceive navigation systems by manipulating false signals, making a vessel appear to be inland or in an incorrect and potentially dangerous location.
Major military powers rely on jamming to complicate missile operations, using it as a tool to reduce accuracy and attempt to force projectiles off their intended trajectories.
"Simple tasks become difficult," Daniel said. "All of this increases navigation risks, which in turn makes operators reluctant to enter or exit the Persian Gulf."
According to a Windward report, the company has identified 44 signal injection zones (where signals are artificially replaced or manipulated) and 92 denial zones (where signals cannot be received) in the Persian Gulf. Windward cannot pinpoint the responsible party for each jamming zone, but Daniel suspects all sides involved in the conflict share responsibility.
Lennart Koopmann, founder of cybersecurity firm Nzyme, stated that there are currently four major global navigation satellite systems in use worldwide. The public can partially gauge the operational status of these systems in different locations by monitoring the navigation system reliability reported by commercial flights passing through relevant areas.
Data from tracking website GPSjam.org shows that jamming around the Strait of Hormuz was relatively minimal in the days preceding the U.S.-Israel attack on Iran. The day after the attack, the site indicated jamming in areas near the waterway in the UAE and Oman, with the interference persisting and expanding in the following days.
In 2025, GPS jamming played a significant role during the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean aimed at capturing Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro.
Since 2022, the same tactics have frequently appeared in and around the Russia-Ukraine war, peaking last year when the plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen experienced GPS disruption over Bulgaria, an incident Europe quickly blamed on Russia. The Russian government denied involvement.
In 2024, a similar jamming incident caused GPS disruption for a plane carrying the UK Defence Secretary over Poland.
Daniel expressed his belief that the current jamming activities around Iran involve more parties than just the U.S. He noted that Israelis frequently jam signals domestically for defensive purposes, and Gulf states could also use the technology defensively.
"Electronic jamming creates a fog of war, it creates confusion," Daniel said. "If you have better intelligence, you can leverage that to launch strikes and win. It can also be used defensively against GPS-guided missiles or unmanned vehicles. It covers all of that."
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