Moore Threads Intelligent Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd., commonly known as Moore Threads, is scheduled to have its IPO application reviewed this week. The company is sponsored by Citic Securities Company Limited, with Zhou Zheli and Wu Xiajuan serving as sponsor representatives.
This company has garnered significant attention, earning the title "China's NVIDIA" even before going public. The designation stems from several factors: Moore Threads' founder and CEO Zhang Jianzhong previously served as NVIDIA's Global Vice President and General Manager for China. Additionally, employee director Zhou Yuan and director Zhang Yubo both have extensive backgrounds at NVIDIA.
More importantly, Moore Threads launched AI computing and professional graphics acceleration products in 2024 with high performance levels, becoming a crucial alternative for customers unable to acquire NVIDIA GPUs. This drove substantial revenue growth, with 2024 revenue surging approximately 254% year-over-year. The first half of this year saw revenue approaching nearly twice that of the entire previous year, demonstrating remarkable growth.
Crucially, alongside the increased volume of high-end GPU products, Moore Threads experienced a qualitative change in core profitability. The company's gross margin jumped from just 25.87% in 2023 - typical of mid-tier manufacturing - to 70.71% in 2024, maintaining 69.14% in the first half of this year. This represents the financial performance expected from a company that has overcome technological bottlenecks.
Based on these factors, Moore Threads has attracted significant capital market expectations, even boosting the performance of several "China NVIDIA" related stocks. Shenzhen H&T Intelligent Control Co.,Ltd., which directly holds stakes in Moore Threads, has shown impressive stock performance. Other companies like Xiamen Intretech Inc., Zhejiang Century Huatong Group Co.,Ltd., and Yangtze Optical Fibre And Cable Joint Stock Limited Company have also demonstrated strong market performance.
However, it's important to acknowledge the gap between Moore Threads and NVIDIA. According to available information, Moore Threads' desktop graphics cards (such as MTT S80) perform comparably to NVIDIA's RTX 3060 (2021 technology level), while their AI computing cards (such as S5000) exceed the A100 (2020) but fall short of NVIDIA's H100 (2022) performance levels.
The path to catch up remains long, and Moore Threads continues its pursuit of advancement, which is understandable.
However, there's one detail in Moore Threads' disclosed operational and financial information that raises questions. While not definitively identifying problems, this warrants discussion and expert analysis.
This concerns a major Moore Threads customer, referred to only as "Customer M" without specific identification. According to the "Reply to Audit Inquiry Letter," the company recorded total sales returns of 53.86 million RMB in 2024, with Customer M accounting for 44.00 million RMB of these returns.
Moore Threads explained in public disclosures that after signing the contract and completing delivery of cluster products to Customer M, the customer's downstream computing cluster project bidding process was lengthy and ultimately unsuccessful. After prolonged non-payment and unsuccessful collection efforts, the company chose to have Customer M return the cluster products.
This explanation raises several questions. First, according to Moore Threads' account, Customer M had not completed the bidding process when Moore Threads had already "signed the contract and completed cluster product delivery." This appears to constitute false bidding or "show" bidding. What purpose does such bidding serve, and is it even legal?
Second, standard accounting practice requires that when customers return products, sales revenue should be reversed while simultaneously recognizing the returned products as inventory at their original cost. This means Moore Threads should have increased inventory corresponding to Customer M's 44.00 million RMB return in 2024.
However, the "Reply to Audit Inquiry Letter" reveals that inventory balance confirmation for Customer M's returned sales was actually conducted in two separate instances during 2024 and the first half of 2025.
This creates confusion: if Customer M's return was confirmed in 2024, why was 50% of the returned sales inventory balance not reflected in 2024 but instead appeared in the first half of 2025? This accounting treatment raises questions that warrant expert clarification from accounting and auditing professionals.
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