A recent incident involving Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd.'s gold accumulation product has sparked significant market discussion. This investment business, closely tied to gold prices, saw some clients acquiring positions at extremely low prices during a period of high market valuations. Subsequently, Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd. proactively rectified the error by reversing and canceling the transactions. The journey from perceived windfall gains to complete reversal was illusory, like a bubble bursting. This event tested the bank's emergency response capabilities in handling risk incidents.
Arbitrage under "BUG" conditions and Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd.'s decisive reversal The incident began on March 2nd with a system anomaly in Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd.'s gold accumulation business. After the market opened at 9:00 AM, the bank's buy price for accumulated gold was displayed at 1.60 yuan per gram, far below the normal price, while the sell price remained at the standard level of 1,173.40 yuan per gram. This substantial price gap prompted numerous investors to execute buy and sell orders, with some reportedly boasting about purchasing over 1,000 grams at 1.6 yuan per gram and profiting more than 1 million yuan.
However, around 12:00 PM the same day, Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd. suspended new account registrations for personal precious metal agency services and halted all gold accumulation transactions by evening. Later, some users reported that the balances from their sales, which had been transferred to their savings accounts, were deducted by the bank's capital operations center. Furthermore, the funds used to purchase the accumulated gold were returned to their savings accounts by the bank under the label of "reversal."
Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd.'s stance on this matter was unequivocal: reversal. According to the bank's customer service response, "Based on relevant laws and regulations, we cannot assume compensation liability for losses claimed by clients." Some investors shared SMS messages from the bank stating: "Due to today's severe deviation of the gold accumulation subscription quote from the normal price, the bank has reversed the subscription, fixed investment, and redemption transactions executed at the deviated price. We apologize for any inconvenience caused."
What is accumulated gold? It is a gold investment product offered by commercial banks, essentially a liability business similar to "gold installment savings." Clients open a gold accumulation account by signing an agreement with the bank, periodically or actively purchasing gold shares in batches, which can be redeemed for cash or exchanged for physical gold after accumulating a certain amount. Against the backdrop of strong gold price appreciation, this product has likely generated substantial profits for many investors.
Certainly, the buy price of 1.60 yuan per gram represented a significant deviation from the normal price of over a thousand yuan per gram that day, constituting a grossly unfair and major misunderstanding. From a legal perspective, this qualifies as a voidable contract between the user and the bank. However, the bank's resolution procedure raised market concerns – unilaterally reversing settled transactions using backend authority and directly deducting funds from investors' current accounts. This incident, which the bank attributed to a technical fault in the data source causing erroneous pricing, questions the boundaries of banks' backend operational powers and the security of investor assets.
SDIC Essence Silver LOF: A "dilemma" leading to partial compensation In contrast, another financial institution demonstrated a different approach to public sentiment management. Just half a month prior, as international silver prices rose to high levels, volatility intensified. Although SDIC Essence Fund had frequently issued risk warnings for its Silver LOF, market enthusiasm remained high. Between January 30th and February 2nd, COMEX silver futures fell sharply, dropping approximately 30.7%. To fully reflect the sharp decline in international markets, SDIC Essence Fund, in accordance with the "Guiding Opinions on the Valuation Business of Securities Investment Funds" from the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the fund contract, adjusted the net asset value (NAV) of the Silver LOF on the evening of February 2nd. The NAV decline was revised from -17% to -31.5%.
The timing of this adjustment, however, was not perfect. In fact, before the market closed that day, some investors had already placed redemption orders at the "daily limit down" price (-17%, reflecting domestic trading restrictions). This subsequent adjustment meant these investors had to bear an additional 14.5 percentage points of loss after their transactions were processed. In this contest between "absolute fairness" and "relative fairness," SDIC Essence Fund faced significant public criticism. On February 15th, the company released an "Announcement Regarding the Silver Fund Compensation Plan," proposing a tiered compensation scheme for individual investors who had confirmed redemptions based on the NAV on February 2nd, 2026 – using its own funds and risk reserves for a settlement-style compensation, thereby drawing a line under the incident.
The specific compensation rules were as follows: losses below 1,000 yuan were fully compensated (covering over 90% of the investors who redeemed that day), representing the difference between the expected loss of -17% and the actual loss of -31.5%. For amounts exceeding 1,000 yuan, a progressively decreasing tiered compensation was applied (e.g., 35% for the portion between 1,000 yuan and 2,000 yuan; 25% for the portion between 2,000 yuan and 3,000 yuan, etc.). This compensation was targeted solely at individual investors who confirmed redemptions on February 2nd based on the adjusted NAV; institutional investors and those who did not redeem were not included.
As a key aspect of their public response, Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd. and SDIC Essence Fund demonstrated截然不同的应对模式: the former reversed the relevant transactions citing technical reasons, but its methods sparked market concerns about overreach of power and asset security, seemingly lacking a "human touch." SDIC Essence Fund, meanwhile, displayed a "backstop" sense of responsibility to the market: under conditions of extreme volatility, striving to ensure both "absolute" and "relative" fairness for investors, though introducing human factors also complicated the situation. In the face of controversy, SDIC Essence Fund adopted a more empathetic approach – compensatory measures. However, the replicability of such an approach reflects the balancing act required of financial institution management when weighing various considerations.
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