Jiayin Group Inc.'s (JFIN.US) Q3 2025 financial report is nothing short of spectacular. Revenue reached $1.47 billion, a slight increase of 1.8% year-over-year; net profit surged to $376.5 million, a sharp 39.7% rise; and loan facilitation volume hit 32.2 billion yuan, growing 20.6% compared to the same period in 2024. All core indicators demonstrated robust growth. Calculated, this translates to Jiayin Tech earning over $4 million in net profit per day. However, starkly contrasting the impressive financial data, the core loan facilitation products under Jiayin Tech widely face issues of "advertised interest rates severely mismatching actual rates," artificially inflating borrowing costs through various hidden fees, with actual annualized rates far exceeding legal limits,涉嫌变相高利贷.
The 66% ultra-high annualized rate financial report data indicates Jiayin Tech's profitability is近乎完美, with both operating profit and net profit increasing synchronously by 39.7% year-over-year, a growth rate substantially领先于 the 1.8% revenue increase. The core driver behind this high profit growth stems from the continuous rise in loan facilitation service income, with Q3 2025's 32.2 billion yuan in loan facilitation volume increasing by 5.4 billion yuan compared to the same period in 2024. Its core product "Niwodai" advertises "annual interest rates starting from 7%"; however, in practice, the platform inflates the comprehensive annualized rate for many users to 36% by adding various hidden fees like guarantee fees and service fees. A case from the [Hei Mao Complaints] platform shows: a borrower took a 49,100 yuan loan from "Niwodai" repayable in 12 installments; by the 9th installment, cumulative repayments reached 52,829 yuan, covering the principal and 3,729.1 yuan in interest, yet 3 installments totaling 13,927.2 yuan remained. Calculating based on full repayment, the total amount would be 66,756.3 yuan, with interest and related fees amounting to a high 17,656.3 yuan. Using the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) method, the actual annualized rate for this loan is approximately 42.8%, far exceeding the Supreme Court's judicial protection上限 of 24% and violating the 2025 loan facilitation新规's mandatory requirement that "annualized loan interest rates shall not exceed 24%".
The interest rate violations are even more severe with another Jiayin Tech product, the "Jirong App". The [Hei Mao Complaints] platform shows a borrower took a 42,000 yuan loan via Jirong App, agreed to repay in 12 installments, with the first two installments each being nearly 8,700 yuan (including 4,700 yuan in "service fees"). By the 4th installment, cumulative repayments reached 25,334 yuan, with a remaining balance of 31,768 yuan. Completing all 12 installments would total 57,102 yuan, 15,102 yuan more than the principal. Calculated via IRR, the monthly rate is about 5.5%, translating to an actual annualized rate of 66%. Compared to the current 3.45% one-year Loan Prime Rate (LPR), the legal annualized rate上限 is only 13.8%. Jirong App's 66% actual annualized rate exceeds the legal protection上限 by over four times, constituting typical变相高利贷.
Jirong App primarily inflates rates by cleverly creating "service fee" categories, while products under Jiayin Tech, including "Niwodai", commonly use a "high initial, lower later" repayment structure, artificially放大 borrowers' actual costs by splitting fees and adjusting repayment schedules.
In the loan facilitation industry, rights business and post-lending management have always been profit reservoirs. However, within Jiayin Tech's business structure, the core entities for these two profitable segments are placed outside the listed system. This directly leads to the listed entity's cash and cash equivalents being only 13% of peer Xiaoying Technology's, highlighting a tight funding situation. To operate with high pricing, Jiayin Tech employs a split model of "loan interest/fees + debt management fees". Notably, the entity collecting debt management fees is not mainstream licensed asset management companies like Guangxi Union, Tianjin Binhai, or Liaoning Shunyi, but a Jiayin-affiliated enterprise - Guangxi Guangmu Asset Management Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Guangxi Guangmu"). This company is essentially a related party of Jiayin Tech, with the core function of undertaking debt collection for Jiayin Tech and charging high management fees. Business registration information shows Guangxi Guangmu's general manager, Wang Jun, has an extensive business empire with links to 181 enterprises; he previously served as the legal representative for hundreds of branches of Jiayin (Shanghai) Enterprise Credit Co., Ltd., indicating deep ties to the Jiayin system.
Tracing the ownership structure, Guangxi Guangmu is controlled by Guangzhou Guangmu Information Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Guangmu Information"). Guangmu Information also controls two other key entities: Shenzhen Rongxinbao Non-Financing Guarantee Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Rongxinbao") and Shenzhen Cuike Information Consulting Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Shenzhen Cuike"). Information from the [Hei Mao Complaints] platform indicates that collection efforts for loans from both "Jirong" and "Niwodai" largely point to "Rongxinbao" and "Shenzhen Cuike", with aggressive collection tactics following any default or delinquency. Clearly, upon borrower default, the debt rights are transferred to these two collection companies. Thus, Guangmu Information acts as the core operator for Jiayin Tech's off-balance-sheet business, on one hand earning core revenue through Guangxi Guangmu by collecting high-rate debt management fees, and on the other hand,依托 Rongxinbao to assume loan default risks while utilizing Shenzhen Cuike for collection services to extract collection fees.
Under this structure, high debt management fees are successfully剥离 to outside the listed company's balance sheet, evading regulatory scrutiny. As a Nasdaq-listed entity, can Jiayin Tech's disclosed financial data truly reflect its full-scale business condition? Is there room for entities outside the system to manipulate profit/loss transfers to "beautify" the listed entity's risk exposure data? With substantial core profits and losses existing outside the listed entity, the trend of the listed company becoming a hollow shell intensifies; how then can it fulfill the guarantee capabilities promised to its funding partners?
For the first three quarters of 2025, Jiayin Tech achieved a net profit of 1.435 billion yuan, a sharp 84% increase year-over-year, already surpassing the full-year 2024 net profit of 1.056 billion yuan. In stark contrast, the company's ending cash and cash equivalents balance was merely 124.2 million yuan, plummeting 83.24% compared to the same period in 2024, with a sequential quarterly decrease of 60.72%. In 2025, Jiayin Tech's stock price fell from a June high of around $18.44 to $5.80 by year-end, a drop of approximately 68.5%; this trend reflects market concerns over the divergence between its performance and cash flow, compliance risks, and tightening regulatory policies, leading to a significant valuation correction.
Against the backdrop of a tight funding chain, Jiayin Tech's executives voted with their feet through减持出逃, further signaling a bearish outlook on the listed entity's development prospects to the market.
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