EAST BUY continues to face the recurring question: what remains when the key people leave? The company, which initially rose to prominence through its talent, is now grappling with this core issue.
Recently, four of the original core anchors who had been with EAST BUY since its transformation in 2022—Mingming, Tianquan, Zhongcan, and Linlin—collectively announced their departures. This marks the largest exodus in EAST BUY's history and signifies the definitive end of the era of the popular "EAST F4"—Dong Yuhui, Dundun, Mingming, and Tianquan.
However, unlike the previous passive crisis, EAST BUY's stock price stabilized quickly after a brief decline this time. Amid the turmoil, management introduced an equity incentive plan.
On the evening of April 28, EAST BUY announced that, under its 2023 share incentive scheme, it would grant 19.3014 million share rewards to 302 individuals, including company directors, senior executives, and core employees. Compared to the previous incentive plan, the number of beneficiaries has nearly doubled, extending benefits to more regular staff.
Yu Minhong publicly acknowledged management shortcomings but affirmed that the company would not alter its direction of reducing reliance on major anchors. His apology was sincere and his tone moderate, yet the strategic path remains unwavering.
The resolute strategy and its associated costs define EAST BUY's current reality. The company, which revived itself through intellectual livestreaming, must now decide whether to operate based on its people or its products.
From a "Hall of Fame Teachers" model to an assembly-line approach, EAST BUY has spent the past year and a half managing the consequences of de-emphasizing individual IPs, a process accelerated by the arrival of Sun Jin.
Sun Jin, a veteran who joined New Oriental in 2006 and rose through the ranks to become Executive President of EAST BUY in December 2025, differs from his predecessor. His background is in cost control and supply chain management, with no involvement in public speaking or livestreaming.
Yu Minhong justified the appointment, citing Sun Jin's potential to drive revenue growth and their aligned operational thinking and values. He praised Sun Jin as a "problem-solver," noting that feedback and implementation times have drastically improved under his leadership.
However, Sun Jin's efficiency-focused approach has clashed with the anchor team. Departing anchors expressed feelings of being marginalized, citing increased anxiety, a changed work atmosphere, and a sense that their idealistic and creative contributions were becoming obsolete.
Experts note a conflict between the creative, intellectual attributes that made EAST BUY anchors famous and the new management system being implemented. Under Sun Jin, the livestreams have shifted from a knowledge-sharing narrative toward a more conventional e-commerce model.
EAST BUY has launched a standardized recruitment show to batch-select new anchors, predominantly from media and performance backgrounds, contrasting with the previous "knowledgeable anchor" profile. The company plans to expand its presence on Douyin with over 20 matrix accounts, effectively diluting the influence of any single major anchor by increasing the total anchor team size.
Furthermore, EAST BUY opened its self-operated products to external influencers in March, meaning its goods can now be sold by any creator, not just its own anchors. These moves have rapidly altered the company's cultural landscape, sharpening its strategic focus on becoming an "online Sam's Club."
The departure of the four anchors initially triggered an over 8% drop in EAST BUY's stock price, which later narrowed to a 2% decline by market close. This investor reaction reflects a conflicted view: acknowledging short-term pain while recognizing the potential long-term logic of the strategy.
The livestream e-commerce industry presents two paths: the MCN model, betting on superstar anchors for quick but risky returns, or the retail model, betting on supply chain and brand for slower, steadier growth. EAST BUY is accelerating its shift toward the latter.
Financial reports show EAST BUY's self-operated product SKUs have reached 801, covering high-frequency categories like fresh food, oils, snacks, and daily necessities. The self-operated GMV share has jumped to 52.8%, with an average gross margin of 36.4%, nearly 5 percentage points higher than distribution services.
In a fiercely competitive 2026 market, the rising margin indicates growing brand premium for self-operated products. The CFO has confirmed these products as the primary growth driver. EAST BUY is also expanding offline, with over 40 automated retail machines and its first flagship store planned in Beijing.
The long-term rationale for the self-operated product strategy is sound, forming a "products-over-people" narrative that underpins Sun Jin's reforms. The idea is that even if anchors leave, self-operated products and the membership system can sustain the business foundation.
However, a sound strategy does not guarantee a smooth execution. While self-operated products represent a "good product" narrative, EAST BU Y's historical differentiation was "good story plus good product." Phasing out the storytelling reduces reliance on individual talent but risks cooling the brand's emotional connection.
Challenges remain. Data on brand loyalty is not stellar. Most GMV still comes from Douyin, and the growth of EAST BUY's private app channel has not been explosive. App GMV accounts for only 18.5%, and paid members have declined slightly. If users primarily discover EAST BUY through Douyin, its private domain vision remains incomplete.
Expanding self-operated products also presents hurdles. Current categories are mainly low-tech, standardized goods. Venturing into non-standard or high-trust categories like health supplements or pet food will exponentially increase pressure on quality control and supply chain management.
Consequently, Yu Minhong is keen to prevent further departures. The recent equity incentive, though smaller in total shares than the previous one, covers twice as many employees, aiming to stabilize the core team and reinforce long-term growth momentum.
Nevertheless, the tension between corporate culture and operational efficiency cannot be resolved by a single incentive. As Sun Jin's reforms proceed, the management team's next challenge is clear: to demonstrate that GMV can stabilize and self-operated products can grow while maintaining organizational cohesion and brand vitality.
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