In the final days of 2025, a piece of news sent shockwaves through the global space community. China submitted an application to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for spectrum and orbital resources covering approximately 203,000 satellites, spanning 14 distinct satellite constellations. This figure is nearly five times the total planned scale of SpaceX's Starlink project, which currently has an upper application limit of around 42,000 satellites. The uniqueness of this application lies in the fact that nearly 190,000 of these satellites were filed by a newly established entity: the Radio Spectrum Development, Utilization, and Technological Innovation Research Institute. This institute was officially registered in the Xiong'an New Area of Hebei province on December 30, 2025. Remarkably, just one day prior to its registration, applications for two mega-constellations, CTC-1 and CTC-2, each requesting 96,714 satellites, were submitted to the ITU under its name. The consortium behind this institute includes seven founding members, such as the State Radio Monitoring Center, China Satellite Network Group Co., Ltd., Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Beijing Jiaotong University, indicating clear state-level coordination.
Beyond these two super-sized constellations, this massive application also includes two constellations from China Mobile (comprising 2,520 and 144 satellites respectively), an expansion plan for Shanghai-based Yuanxun's Qianfan constellation (1,296 satellites), a supplementary application for Guodian Gaoke's Tianqi Internet of Things constellation (1,132 satellites), and multiple projects from commercial aerospace companies like Galaxy Space. When combined with the already-under-construction Guowang and Qianfan constellations, China's strategic layout in low Earth orbit (LEO) is unfolding on an unprecedented scale. Such a substantial application directly addresses an increasingly pressing reality: orbital and spectrum resources are becoming scarce, and this scarcity is pushing space competition into a more acute and concrete battleground.
Two incidents in 2021 serve as a critical starting point for understanding this competition. On July 1 of that year, SpaceX's Starlink-1095 satellite continuously lowered its orbit from 555 kilometers to approximately 382 kilometers, dangerously approaching the Chinese space station operating at an altitude of 390 kilometers. This forced the Chinese space station to initiate an emergency collision avoidance maneuver that evening. Just over three months later, on October 21, the Starlink-2305 satellite again approached closely, this time in a state of continuous orbital maneuvering with an unknown strategy and unassessable trajectory error, prompting the Chinese space station to perform another avoidance operation. The sensitivity of such close approaches lies in their extremely high risk; in LEO, the relative velocity of spacecraft often exceeds 7 kilometers per second. At such speeds, a collision between even a several-hundred-kilogram satellite and a multi-ton space station would be catastrophic. For context, in 1983, a window on the US Space Shuttle Challenger was cracked by a paint fragment only about 0.2 mm in diameter and weighing just tens of milligrams. Given that Starlink satellites weigh around 260 kilograms, a collision with the space station would generate a debris cloud capable of destroying the entire orbital platform.
China formally reported these two incidents to the United Nations via a diplomatic note, a relatively uncommon practice in its diplomatic history. The note stated that the United States, as the registering state for the Starlink satellites, holds jurisdictional and regulatory obligations under international law and should have engaged in prior consultations as per Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty when satellite maneuvers could cause harmful interference to other nations' space activities. However, China received no prior notification or coordination request from the US side in either instance. In September 2019, the European Space Agency's (ESA) Aeolus weather satellite also proactively performed an avoidance maneuver to prevent a potential collision with a Starlink satellite. Unlike China, ESA chose to "quietly endure" the situation without public protest. Research data indicates that the vast Starlink system generates approximately 1,600 close approach events weekly, over 500 of which involve spacecraft from other nations. As Starlink's deployment grows (exceeding 9,400 satellites in orbit by early 2026), the frequency of such events continues to rise.
Against this backdrop, the strategic intent behind China's massive application becomes clearer: to lock in orbital and spectrum resources as early as possible within the rules, preventing them from being occupied by latecomers. The legality of this strategy stems from the ITU's fundamental "first-come, first-served" principle. As the UN's specialized agency for information and communication technologies, the ITU allocates and manages global radio spectrum and satellite orbital resources. Since these are finite natural resources belonging to all humanity, the ITU has established a complex procedure for filing, coordination, and registration. For non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) satellites, the primary method is coordination, meaning whoever files first and completes the coordination process gains priority rights. However, "first-come, first-served" does not permit indefinite, unlimited hoarding. To prevent malicious stockpiling, the ITU adopted "Milestone Rules" at the 2019 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-19). These rules require that a satellite constellation must launch its first satellite and operate it for 90 days within 7 years of securing frequency resources. Subsequently, it must deploy 10%, 50%, and 100% of its total declared number by the end of the 9th, 12th, and 14th years, respectively. Failure to meet these milestones results in a proportional reduction of spectrum rights based on actual deployment.
This means that for the CTC-1 and CTC-2 constellations, each with 96,714 satellites, China would need to deploy approximately 19,400 satellites by the end of 2034 (the 9-year mark) to retain these frequency and orbital resources. This translates to launching an average of about 2,150 satellites per year, or roughly 6 satellites per day. Considering that China conducted 92 space launches in the entirety of 2025 (23 of which were by commercial aerospace companies), achieving this deployment rate would require an order-of-magnitude increase in rocket launch capacity. This highlights another inescapable reality: the competition for LEO satellite constellations ultimately boils down to "who can send payloads into space more cheaply and frequently." SpaceX's ability to deploy nearly ten thousand Starlink satellites in just a few years hinges critically on the reusable technology of its Falcon 9 rocket. By recovering and reusing the first stage, SpaceX has slashed launch costs from tens of thousands of dollars per kilogram to around $3,000, while increasing launch frequency to weekly or even higher. In 2025, SpaceX set a new annual record with 167 orbital launches, accounting for approximately 85% of US launches, averaging one rocket launch every two days.
China's commercial aerospace companies are racing to catch up. Private rocket firms like LandSpace, Galactic Energy, and CAS Space are all advancing the development of reusable rockets. The year 2026 is viewed within the industry as a "critical year for reusable rocket breakthroughs," with multiple rocket models scheduled for maiden flights or recovery tests. Simultaneously, satellite manufacturing capacity is expanding. Reports indicate that the designed annual production capacity of some domestic satellite factories has reached 1,000 units, with development cycles shortened from years to months. In January 2026, construction began on China's first offshore base for reusable rocket recovery and reuse in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, aiming for an annual production of 25 rockets and targeting launch costs comparable to SpaceX's.
From this perspective, the massive application itself could function as a "forcing mechanism": first setting an extreme target and securing resource positions, thereby compelling accelerated advancements in rocket launches, satellite manufacturing, ground control, and user terminals to rapidly build scaled supply capabilities. However, catching up in rocket and production capacity is only one piece of the puzzle. A deeper question remains: just how many satellites can low Earth orbit realistically accommodate? Yang Yuxiao, an associate professor at the College of Astronautics at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, previously stated to media that the theoretical limit in LEO altitudes between 400 and 2,000 kilometers is approximately 60,000 satellites—a figure representing a relatively crowded state. Currently, the global number of operational LEO satellites is around 8,000 to 10,000, already occupying a significant portion of available orbital resources. If calculated based on all applications submitted to the ITU by various countries, the total number of planned LEO satellites globally has surpassed 1 million. This clearly exceeds practical carrying capacity, meaning a large portion of these applications are destined never to be fully realized. Yet, this underscores the intensity of the competition, where parties are securing as much "paper space" as possible to gain greater flexibility in future actual deployments.
In 2021, Rwanda, in its own national capacity, applied to the ITU for a constellation named Cinnamon-937, planning to launch 337,000 satellites. As an African nation with a weak aerospace foundation, Rwanda clearly lacks the capability to deploy such a massive constellation. The industry widely believes this was an operation by certain companies leveraging Rwanda's national status to preemptively lock in ultra-large-scale orbital capacity under ITU rules. Similarly, France submitted an application on behalf of the startup E-Space for the Semaphore-C constellation comprising about 116,000 satellites. While China's application is massive, it differs fundamentally from these cases. Firstly, the applicant's background is clear: the Radio Innovation Institute is jointly established by national-level research institutions and leading enterprises, possessing actual technical reserves and industrial foundation. Secondly, the timing aligns with the development stage of China's commercial aerospace industry—the Guowang and Qianfan constellations are already in the batch launch phase, rocket production capacity is ramping up, and the entire supply chain is transitioning from experimental verification to scaled deployment.
More importantly, this application reflects a strategic shift in China's approach to spectrum resource planning. Based on public information, the two mega-constellations, CTC-1 and CTC-2, likely cover a wide range of frequencies, from traditional Ku-band (12-18 GHz) and Ka-band (26.5-40 GHz), to the Q/V band (33-75 GHz) and even E-band potentially used for future 6G communications. This strategy of full-spectrum coverage serves both as a hedge against the current dominance of Starlink in the Ku-band and a preemptive move to secure positions for the evolution of future communication technologies. Starlink currently primarily uses Ku-band and Ka-band. Ku-band is technologically mature and offers low terminal device costs, making it a traditional frequency for satellite communication. However, precisely because of its widespread use, this band is already very congested. If Chinese constellations also primarily used Ku-band, under ITU coordination rules, later-filed satellites would need to adjust frequencies or power down when encountering earlier-filed satellites to avoid interference, significantly reducing spectrum utilization efficiency. Therefore, occupying higher frequency bands becomes an inevitable choice. Ka-band offers larger bandwidth than Ku-band, supporting higher data transmission rates. Q/V band and E-band are key spectrum resources for future 6G satellite communication, akin to an unbuilt superhighway with dozens of lanes, forming the foundation for Tbps-level transmission rates and integrated space-ground networks. By securing these bands at the application stage, China reserves space for future technological generational shifts.
Of course, filing an application does not equate to actual deployment. According to the Milestone Rules, if China deploys only 10,000 satellites instead of the required 19,400 by the 9-year mark, the protected frequency and orbital resources would be reduced proportionally, with the excess applications released back into the international resource pool. From this perspective, the 200,000-satellite application quantity resembles an "upper-limit reserve," with actual deployment dynamically adjusted based on technological progress, market demand, and cost-effectiveness. Nevertheless, even deploying just 10% within the stipulated timeframe remains a monumental challenge for China's aerospace industry. This requires not only a leap in rocket launch capability but also scaled, batch satellite manufacturing capacity, and the coordinated development of the entire industrial chain, including ground control systems and user terminal equipment. Crucially, the design lifespan of LEO satellites is typically only 3 to 5 years, meaning constellations require continuous replenishment and updates, not just a one-time deployment.
Viewed from another angle, this application race also highlights the limitations of the current international regulatory framework. The ITU's "first-come, first-served" principle was born in an era when the total number of satellites in orbit was merely in the hundreds and orbital resources were relatively abundant. In the age of mega-constellations, this framework struggles to adapt to the new reality. Finding a balance between protecting the legitimate rights of early movers and preventing resource hoarding, establishing more effective international coordination mechanisms, and handling the increasing number of close approach events are all issues the global space community must collectively address. In December 2025, China's representative explicitly stated at a UN Security Council meeting concerning LEO satellite issues that the unchecked expansion of commercial satellite constellations by individual countries, coupled with a lack of effective regulation, poses significant safety challenges. This was not merely a criticism aimed at Starlink but also an appeal for the entire international rule system. After all, space is not the private domain of any single nation or company but a shared realm for all humanity. As more satellites are launched, the urgency of issues like space traffic management, debris mitigation, and spectrum coordination will only intensify.
Shortly after China submitted its application for 200,000 satellites, SpaceX announced plans to lower the orbital altitude of approximately 4,400 Starlink satellites from 550 km to 480 km in 2026, claiming this move aimed to "enhance the safety of space operations." A lower orbit allows defunct satellites to re-enter the atmosphere and burn up more quickly, reducing space debris accumulation. However, some analysts believe that a lower orbit also means shorter signal transmission delays and a better user experience, which aligns with SpaceX's commercial interests as well. Regardless of the motive, the competition for low Earth orbit has entered a white-hot phase. China's application for 200,000 satellites is less a direct confrontation with SpaceX and more a necessary move to secure strategic space for itself under a new technological paradigm and regulatory framework. In an increasingly crowded orbital environment, failing to secure a position means facing marginalization; and to secure a position, one must demonstrate tangible technical prowess and industrial foundation. In this sense, this space race has only just begun. It tests not only rocket launch frequency and satellite manufacturing capacity but also a nation's entire scientific and technological innovation system, industrial chain synergy, and the wisdom to conduct strategic maneuvers within the framework of international rules.
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